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1. Introduction 
  Non-combatants have become an important aspect of U.S. military 
operations in urban areas.  Recent experience shows how non-combatants can 
affect the United States’ ability to meet tactical and strategic objectives in 
engagements across the spectrum of warfare.  However, there is currently little 
systematic research on civilian behavior within the defense community, 
including the military modeling community.  As the policy questions about 
dealing with civilians continue to gain in importance, further research on non-
combatants would be beneficial.  This dissertation reviews recent urban 
operation campaigns and attempts to provide background research that will 
assist in incorporating non-combatants into models, simulations, training 
scenarios, and other analytic tools in a more formal way.  It identifies non-
combatant behavior from recent urban operations that have affected U.S. 
military activities.  It recommends a layered approach to civilian behavior, 
beginning with basic population density and other demographic characteristics.  
To this, it adds simple and then complex behaviors. 
This dissertation also assesses methods for modeling large numbers of 
non-combatants and proposes using agent-based modeling (ABM).  Introducing 
agent-based non-combatants into existing models and simulations also has the 
potential to extend current force-on-force models and allow them to be used in 
examining urban operations.  This is an important practical consideration and an 
alternative to waiting, possibly for years, until new urban combat models are 
built, tested, and formally accredited.  
Non-combatants in Recent Operations 
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has conducted several 
military operations in the midst of civilian populations.  It has been involved in 
peacekeeping, humanitarian relief operations, and other small-scale 
contingencies that have brought the U.S. military in close proximity to non-
combatants.  The war on terrorism has also meant an increased tempo of 
operations in populated areas, particularly in southwest and south central Asia.  
Overall, the past decade of U.S. experience in Somalia, former Yugoslavia, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq points to the impact that civilians and military operations 
can have on one another.  Interactions with civilians affect the conduct of a wide 2
range of missions, from humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping to high-
intensity urban combat, post-conflict situations, and counterinsurgency 
operations.  There are strategic, operational, and tactical implications for the 
behavior and presence of non-combatants in large numbers: civilians affect 
everything from rules of engagement to whether or not certain missions are 
successful.
It is clear that consideration for civilian casualties affects decisions about 
the use of force on many levels.  At the tactical level, it is factored into everything 
from air strikes to patrols to force protection.  For example, the USAF only used 
precision guided munitions (PGMs) when conducting air strikes in downtown 
Baghdad to minimize collateral damage during Operations Desert Storm in 
1991.1  U.S. forces avoided bombing up to three dozen “high priority” targets 
during the first few days of bombing in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) due to 
concern for nearby non-combatants.  Such targets included the Iraqi Ministry of 
Defense and some communications facilities.2  The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) 
operated under strict rules of engagement (ROE) during violence in Fallujah in 
2004 in an effort to minimize non-combatant casualties.3  Since September 11, 
2001, the war on terrorism also has an important non-combatant component at a 
more strategic level: U.S. policy makers attempted to show that they were 
fighting terrorists and not Muslim populations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  This not 
only meant minimizing non-combatant casualties, a highly sensitive issue with 
the advent of Arab news networks such as Al Jazeera, but also planning for 
humanitarian relief simultaneously with combat operations.  The humanitarian 
situation in Afghanistan in 2002 prompted the U.S. military to organize food 
drops.  Expectations of widespread refugees and internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) within Iraq at the start of OIF prompted the U.S. government to plan for a 
humanitarian disaster. 
The presence of non-combatants also adds specific difficulties to troops 
attempting to conduct operations in an urban environment.  They affect urban 
operations in particular, as (almost by definition) non-combatants are present in 
the largest densities in cities.  Within the urban setting, rules of engagement and 
concern for non-combatant injuries complicate activities in an environment that 
is already stressful and challenging.  The density of people, both combatant and 
________________  
1 United States Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 99. 
2 Eric Schmitt, “A Nation at War: Civilians; Rumsfeld Says Dozens of Important Targets Have 
Been Avoided,” New York Times, March 24, 2003, p. B12. 
3 CNN, “How Do Iraqis Obtain RPGs, Missiles?” CNN Live Sunday 16:00, April 12, 2004, 
Transcript #041103CN.V36. 3
non-combatant, often provides less time to make decisions than in other terrain.4
Daily non-combatant travel and other activities can also block movement of U.S. 
forces and permit opportunities for opponents to blend in and approach U.S. 
troops and vehicles.  The sheer numbers of non-combatants also complicates 
situational awareness and threat identification.5  Unexpected civilian responses 
to combat can also pose dilemmas for troops.  During United Nations Operations 
in Somalia in 1993 (UNOSOM II), non-combatants ran towards the sound of 
gunfire and protected Adid’s men by shielding them with their own bodies.6
Increased urbanization and the growth of urban populations during the past 
half-century also have important implications for urban operations.  For 
example, the increase in urban landscape and number of non-combatants means 
that significantly more personnel may be needed for missions than what would 
have required few forces decades earlier.7
Additionally, non-combatants have considerable power through their 
own actions to affect the outcome of U.S. military engagements.  Somalia is one 
vivid illustration of how non-combatants can have a dramatic impact on the 
course of events.  Although U.S. forces were successful in accomplishing their 
mission to arrest two of Mohamed Adid’s top supporters, hostile non-
combatants in Mogadishu greatly complicated U.S. attempts to exit the city and 
added to the U.S. death toll.  Graphic video of Somalis dragging U.S. bodies 
through the streets prompted strong public reaction, recriminations from 
Congress, and halted plans to attempt to capture Adid.8
Despite the increased importance of non-combatants in current military 
operations, the research into non-combatant casualties and non-combatant 
behavior still lags.  In actual battlefield planning, considerable effort goes into 
vetting air strike targets or to implementing stricter rules of engagement on the 
ground to minimize non-combatant casualties.  However, little attention has 
been paid to formally understanding the interaction between combatants and 
non-combatants, with the exception of the literature on peacekeeping operations.
There has also been recent work proposing the incorporation of intelligence on 
_________________ 
4 Russell W. Glenn, Randall Steeb, and John Matsumura, Corralling the Trojan Horse: a Proposal for 
Improving U.S. Urban Operations Preparedness in the Period 2000-2025 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2001), pp. 4-5. 
5 Jamison Jo Medby and Russell W. Glenn, Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for 
Urban Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002), pp. xiii, 34. 
6 Mark Bowden, Blackhawk Down: a Story of Modern Warfare (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 
1999),p. 20; Medby and Glenn, pp. 32-3. 
7 Glenn, Steeb, Matsumura, p. 6. 
8 Bowden, pp. 4, 408-9. 4
non-combatants as an explicit part of intelligence preparation of the battlefield 
(IPB) in urban areas.9  Yet for the most part, military histories, assessments, and 
lessons learned still generally do not assess strategies for interacting with non-
combatants or for minimizing non-combatant casualties.   
Even international relief agencies and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) often display gaps in their understanding of non-combatants.  For 
example, before OIF began, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs estimated that there would be 2 million internally 
displaced within Iraq and up to 1.45 million Iraqis who would become 
international refugees.10  The United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees 
(UNHCR) and various NGOs began preparing for a refugee crisis.  The reality 
when the war started was far different from expectations.  Some 300,000 Iraqis 
became internally displaced.  However, they were mostly Iraqi Arabs who had 
been relocated into Kurdish villages under Saddam Hussein and who were now 
leaving these areas.  Instead of a million Iraqis becoming international refugees, 
roughly 200 crossed into Syria and 1,200 fled into Jordan.  Additionally, the 
group that left for Syria was composed predominantly of third-party nationals: 
Iranians, Palestinians, and other non-Iraqi Arabs.11  In short, few Iraqis fled the 
country and the Iraqis that became internally displaced did so for reasons that 
NGOs did not anticipate. 
Non-combatants in Military Models and Simulations 
Parallel to this problem of often overlooking non-combatants in research 
and analysis in general is the problem of overlooking non-combatants in military 
models and simulations.  Models and simulations are often used in a variety of 
areas where real-life experimentation is prohibitively costly or unrealistic.  
Hence there is a particular applicability for defense planners.  Models have been 
used within the defense community for several decades for a wide variety of 
purposes.  These include combat modeling, weapons procurement, technology 
evaluation, force sizing, military manpower, logistics, information warfare 
analysis, national strategy, and cost estimation.12  Models and simulations have 
________________  
9 Medby and Glenn, pp. 7-8. 
10 Clare Graham, “Iraq: Dilemmas in Contingency Planning,” Forced Migration Review, Issue 17 
(March 2003), p.38. 
11 Dawn Chatty, “`Operation Iraqi Freedom’ and its Phantom Million Iraqi Refugees,” Forced
Migration Review, Issue 18 (September 2003), p. 51. 
12 Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., ed., Military Modeling (Alexandra, VA: Military Operations Research 
Society, 1984), pp. 4-5; John Matsumura, Randall Steeb, and John Gordon IV, Assessment of Crusader: 5
been used for analysis on issues ranging from strategic nuclear warfare to 
optimal weapons mix and life cycle costs for weapons platforms.13  Simulation 
has also been increasingly used in training and even in recruitment.14
Although used extensively by the defense community, models and 
simulations typically feature few non-combatants.  Recent U.S. military 
operations have often been conducted in close proximity to non-combatants, but 
the modeling and simulation community has not caught up to this reality.  The 
vast majority of military models still focus on “force-on-force” confrontations 
despite recent real-life experience. Most modeling scenarios predominantly 
involve “blue force” and “red force” participants and incorporate only a few 
neutrals or non-combatants.  Combatants heavily outweigh non-combatants in a 
typical simulation, if non-combatants are used at all.  There is also considerable 
interest at present in improving urban combat models because of ongoing urban 
operations in Iraq.  In the discussion of improving urban combat models, there is 
often more concern expressed for recreating the exact physical attributes of the 
urban terrain than there is for realistic non-combatants.  Yet basic non-combatant 
reactions in a situation will shape the environment considerably, and capturing 
basic non-combatant information in models and simulations may do far more to 
make models results useful than some of these more elaborate technical features. 
Figure 1-1 shows a sample urban combat scenario depicted using the 
Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) that depicts few civilians – in 
green – as opposed to “red” and “blue” actors.  However, this does not reflect 
operational reality.  For example, there were 170,000 U.S. and British troops in 
Kuwait in 2003 who were scheduled to enter Iraq at the start of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.15  Using a 2002 estimate of 5.8 million people living in Baghdad,16 the 
ratio of non-combatants to blue force combatants would be approximately 34:1 if 
________________________________________________________________________ 
the Army’s Next Self-Propelled Howitzer and Resupply Vehicle (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
1998), MR-930-A. 
13 John A. Battilega and Judith K. Grange, The Military Applications of Modeling (Wright-Patterson 
Air Force Base: Air Force Institute of Technology, 1984), pp. 422-8; Arthur Brooks, Steve Bankes, and 
Bart Bennett, Weapon Mix and Exploratory Analysis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997), DB-
216/2-AF; Francis P. Hoeber, Military Applications of Modeling: Selected Case Studies (New York, NY: 
Gordon and Breach, 1981), pp. 33-60. 
14 Richard W. Pew and Anne S. Mavor, ed., Modeling Human and Organizational Behavior: 
Application to Military Simulations (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1998), p. 49; and 
“America’s Army,” a downloadable computer game geared towards potential recruits, accessed at 
www.goarmy.com/aagame/index.htm on March 12, 2004.  For tournament play and more 
information, go to www.americasarmy.com.
15 Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, American Soldier (New York, NY: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2004), p. 434. 
16 “Iraq: Key Facts, November 19, 2003,” World of Information Country Report, Quest Economics 
Database; accessed through Lexis-Nexis on March 12, 2004. 6
all these troops had entered Baghdad.  If one tenth these troops were in Baghdad 
at any given moment, they would have encountered a ratio of 340 civilians per 
soldier or Marine.  This is in stark contrast to many analytic models that portray 
a few non-combatants running around in a sea of combatants.  Yet actual 
experience strongly indicates that overwhelming number of non-combatants can 
have significant operational effects: it would be ideal to capture this element in 
combat and stability and support models as well. 
Figure 1-1.  Sample Urban Combat Scenario in JCATS (Few Civilians) 
Aside whether or not non-combatants may need to inhabit military 
simulations on a vaster scale, additional work needs be done to produce more 
realistic behavior.  Non-combatants in existing models are sometimes stationary, 
not programmed to react to events around them (such as combat), and are 
usually identical to one another.  Ideally, simulated civilians would move, 
interact with combatants and their environment, and exhibit different behaviors 
to better reflect real-world complexities.  It would also be best to populate 
military models with non-combatants whose behavior is similar to what has 
been observed in actual urban conflicts.  Aggregate information on non-
combatant movement, activities, and casualties would be useful for lower-
resolution models.  Such aggregate data would also be useful for calibrating both 
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high-resolution and low-resolution models.  Detailed information on individual-
level behavior should be helpful for replicating more realistic non-combatant 
behavior in higher-resolution models. 
There are some current efforts that promise to better incorporate non-
combatants into models and simulations in the future.  For example, Urban 
Resolve is a program being run by the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) 
J9 Directorate and the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP) and the 
Institute for Defense Analysis on finding new approaches to urban combat.  
Urban Resolve involves advancing urban combat simulation and increasing the 
density of civilians in simulations.17  However, even Urban Resolve calls for 
fewer civilians than may be realistically expected in the type of urban terrain that 
is envisioned in the program.  Anticipated civilian behavior is also currently 
limited to traveling and does not touch upon more complex or interactive 
behavior.  
Combat modeling is difficult.  Because they are abstractions from reality, 
most models cannot fully reflect the complexities of the phenomena they are 
designed to represent.18  This is especially true of models that incorporate 
human behavior and decision making.  Warfare models fall into this category.  
They incorporate human as well as physical effects, and the complex nature of 
warfare makes realistic combat modeling a difficult challenge.  At the same time, 
they are valuable tools and there appears to be room for continuing 
improvements.  There has been an effort to introduce more realistic human 
behavior representation in military models where individual responses and 
organizational behavior affect outcomes.  For example, greater use of 
psychological research on decision making, memory, and group behavior 
enhance representation of individual combatants and units.19  Although most of 
this qualitative research has been done to improve the modeling of combatants, 
similar research could also be conducted to enhance the representation of non-
combatants.  Increasing the number of non-combatants and introducing more 
realistic non-combatant behavior would add realism to military models and 
allow models to incorporate an important policy consideration. 
_________________ 
17 Andy Ceranowicz and Mark Torpey, “Adapting to Urban Warfare,” Interservice/Industry 
Training, Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC) 2004, Paper No. 1554, pp. 1-5. 
18 Notable exceptions include models and simulations of physical phenomena, such as light, 
gravity, etc. 
19 Pew and Mavor, pp. 10-11, 20. 8
Research Approach 
This dissertation uses case study methodology to review the U.S. 
military experience in three recent urban operations.  The case studies are: 
Operation Just Cause (Panama), UNOSOM II (Somalia), and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (Iraq).  Based on information gathered in the case studies, it 
recommends behavioral rules for non-combatants in military models.  Agent-
based modeling appears to be a good approach for simulating non-combatants 
and is the framework that is used.  ABM allows individual agents, acting upon 
internal rules, to interact with their environment and with other agents.  It also 
allows for emergent and adaptive behavior on the part of agents.  ABM will be 
further discussed in the methodology section.  The literature on ABM specifically 
within military modeling is also highly relevant and will also be discussed in 
greater depth. 
Non-combatant behavior is discussed using a layered approach.  The 
first “layer” of non-combatant behavior consists of how to populate models with 
non-combatants.  The second layer of non-combatant behavior consists of simple 
behaviors such as basic background movement and basic reactions to combat.  
The third layer of behavior consists of more complex behaviors, including 
interactions between combatants and non-combatants.  These layers of behavior 
are intended to build on one another and to identify policy-relevant behaviors 
that may be fairly easily modeled.  This dissertation is in no way intended to be a 
comprehensive compendium of non-combatant behaviors and how they should 
be modeled.  Rather, it is an introductory effort aimed at approaching non-
combatants in military models in a more systematic way than it has been done so 
far.  This layered approach is illustrated in Figure 1-2. 
This dissertation contributes to knowledge in two ways.  First, there is 
no work to date that examines non-combatant behavior across cases.  This 
dissertation discusses behavior and important facts about civilians that have had 
implications for recent urban operations.  This information should be of general 
interest to decision makers dealing with urban operations and of specific interest 
to anyone engaged in urban operations modeling or analysis.  The second set of 
insights is how the ABM framework might be used to model non-combatants.  
The chapters of simple and complex behaviors are particularly geared towards 
those using ABM in combat and MOOTW simulations. 9
Figure 1-2.  Layered Approach to Non-combatant Agents in Military Models and 
Simulation
Dissertation Organization 
Chapter Two covers methodology.  It begins with a discussion of case 
study methodology and the reasons for why this is appropriate for this analysis.  
It also gives an overview of ABM and reviews some of the general literature on 
ABM and social phenomena.  The third section of Chapter Two discusses the 
literature on current uses of ABM in military modeling.  The final section of the 
chapter reviews modeling successes using ABM in areas that are relevant to non-
combatant behavior.  It also discusses how ABM might be used to salvage 
existing constructive, force-on-force models and makes the case for proposing 
ABM over other approaches for representing non-combatants. 
Chapter Three discusses case study criteria and presents finding about 
civilian behavior in the three case study operations.  It also identifies the 
behaviors that will be discussed in the rest of the dissertation. 
  Chapters Four, Five, and Six discuss non-combatant behavior and are 
structured around a layered approach to introducing them into military models.  
The dissertation begins with the simplest consideration in Chapter Four: 
populating models with non-combatants.  The chapter emphasizes the 
operational and analytic importance of accounting for the correct scale of the 
civilian population.  It deals with population size, density, and demographic 
factors, using information from the case study cities and other urban areas to 
illustrate policy implications. 
Chapter Five discusses simple civilian behaviors from the case studies, 
including background movement and simple reactions to combat.  It discusses 
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Simple
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the significance of these behaviors and some ways that better understanding of 
these behaviors could improve U.S. interactions with local populations.  The 
chapter also examines these behaviors specifically in the context of ABM, and the 
added analytic capabilities that would result from including these behaviors into 
models.
Chapter Six reviews complex civilian behaviors and civilian interactions 
with combatants from the case studies.  It discusses the operational and policy 
significance of these behaviors.  This chapter also contains a section that deals 
with modeling complex behaviors using ABM. 
Chapter Seven reviews the layered framework discussed in the 
preceding chapters and discusses broader policy implications of having analytic 
tools that better incorporate civilians in urban operations.  The chapter ends with 
directions for future research.11
2.  Methodology and Literature Review 
  Chapter Two covers methodology and the pertinent literature.  The first 
section covers case study methodology and discusses why it is appropriate for 
examining non-combatant behavior in urban operations.  The second section 
introduces agent-based modeling and covers the general literature on using 
ABM to model social phenomena.  The third section discusses the literature that 
is available specifically on using ABM in military models and simulations.  The 
final section of this chapter discusses why ABM is an appropriate approach to 
depicting non-combatants in military models and simulations. 
Case Study Methodology 
This dissertation uses case study methodology to review three recent U.S. 
urban operations for non-combatant behaviors.  It reviews a variety of sources 
for each case to gather information about non-combatant behavior, casualties, 
and the interaction between non-combatants and combatants.  Materials include 
official histories, newspaper reports, and NGO information. 
Case study methodology is ideal for understanding non-combatant 
behavior in urban operations.  It is best when a “holistic, in-depth investigation” 
is desired into a phenomenon.  Urban operations are complex events with 
multiples viewpoints; case studies are appropriate because they are multi-
perspective.  Case studies are also a good choice for this subject because they 
constitute a “triangulation research strategy” for dealing with multiple types and 
sources of data.20  In total, the methodology offers four kinds of triangulation: 
data source triangulation, investigator triangulation, theory triangulation, and 
methodological triangulation.21  This “triangulation” feature makes it a good 
candidate for dealing with non-combatant behavior during urban operations.
When dealing with non-combatant behavior, there are multiple data sources, 
multiple points of view, and even different theories on what caused such 
behavior.  There are six types of data sources for case studies: documentation, 
_________________ 
20 Winston Tellis, “Applications of a Case Study Methodology,” The Qualitative Report, Vol. 3, 
No. 3, September 1997.  Online journal.  Internet: accessed at www.nova.edu/sss/QR/QR3-
3/tellis2.html on February 19, 2004. 
21 Tellis. 12
archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and 
physical artifacts.22  This dissertation deals primarily with documentation such 
as written accounts. 
Case studies are often used to establish causality.  Social science research in 
fields such as political science is often concerned with explanatory analysis that 
build or test causal models.  However, this dissertation is more interested in 
describing the non-combatant behaviors that occur in the case studies than in 
making the case for causal mechanisms.  One reason is that causal studies do not 
always have the most direct implications for policy research.  They may in health 
care and other areas where interventions are easier to monitor and control.  Yet 
in areas such as urban operations, the shear complexity of compounding factors 
easily outweighs the information learned about the effects of isolated factors.  A 
second reason is that modeling and simulation is less concerned with causality 
than identifying the existence of relationships and how those relationships may 
interact.  For instance, in modeling it may be acceptable to combine many inputs 
into one whereas in causal theory building and explanation this type of 
simplification would be inappropriate.  Hence, this dissertation focuses more on 
exploring non-combatant behaviors, the relationship between behaviors, and the 
relationship between non-combatants and combatants than it does on explaining 
why certain behaviors arise under what circumstances.  Although there is some 
discussion of the latter, it is not the chief purpose of this research effort. 
Besides case studies, other qualitative techniques exist that could possibly 
be employed to understand and to suggest rules for non-combatant behavior.  
However, many of these alternatives are less than ideal for understanding social 
behavior during times of war because circumstances are so tumultuous.  For 
example, ethnographic decision modeling (EDM) is a technique used in 
anthropology to build causal models on decision making under specific 
circumstances.  It creates decision trees on why fishermen decide to fish in a 
given location or how people choose treatments for illnesses.23  It might 
theoretically be employed to describe how non-combatants make decisions to 
leave or enter cities during conflict, for example.  However, gathering data to 
construct such a tree requires interviews with people who both made and did 
not make a given decision.  It also requires open-ended interviews to construct 
decision pathways and additional interviews to test theories built from such 
________________  
22 Tellis; Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, second edition (Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publishing, 1994), pp. 79-90. 
23 Gery Ryan, “Ethnographic Decision Modeling (EDM).”  Internet: accessed at 
web.Missouri.edu/~anthgr/papers/Bibs/EDM.htm on January 15, 2004. 13
initial interviews.24  To apply this technique, it would require traveling to Iraq, 
Somalia, and Panama; employing translators; and finding and interviewing non-
combatants who had both engaged in a behavior of interest and who had not.  
These requirements often make EDM impractical for understanding non-
combatant decisions made during times of conflict. 
Agent-based Modeling 
Agent-based modeling appears to be a suitable modeling approach for 
non-combatants in military models and simulations.  This section provides an 
introduction to ABM and reviews portions of the ABM literature.  The purpose 
of the literature review is to lay the groundwork for assessing the applicability of 
ABM to modeling non-combatants.  It also discusses how behavioral rules for 
agents are typically constructed in ABM research.  Because non-combatant 
behavior is a social phenomenon, the primary focus of the literature review in 
this section is on the use of ABM in the social sciences.  It excludes the more 
technical uses of ABM within computer science and the use of ABM to model 
purely biological activities such as the behavior of ant colonies and the 
propagation of coral reefs.  However, it touches upon some of the work in 
evolutionary biology because of its connection to the literature on cooperation 
and norms.  The literature on ABM in military modeling is reviewed separately 
in the following section. 
The work by Thomas Schelling on self-segregating neighborhoods is 
considered by many to be the first execution of an agent-based model.25  Using 
dimes and pennies represent homeowners of two different races and a grid to 
represent neighborhoods, Schelling gave his agents a simple set of rules to 
follow.  Each “race” was willing to tolerate up to a certain percentage of its 
neighbors being of the other race: dimes wanted at least half of all their 
neighbors to be dimes, and pennies wanted at least one third of their neighbors 
to be pennies.  An agent would examine its immediate neighbors.  If the 
percentage of other-race agents was below this threshold, it would stay; 
otherwise, it would move.  Schelling found emergent patterns when his agents 
acted upon these rules about neighbor preferences.  This emergent behavior 
_________________ 
24 Phone interview with Gery Ryan at the RAND Corporation on qualitative research methods, 
January 15, 2004, Santa Monica, CA. 
25 Joshua M. Epstein and Robert Axtell, Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom 
Up (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1996), p. 3; and Alessandro Lomi and Erki R. 
Larsen, Dynamics of Organizations: Computational Modeling and Organization Theories (Menlo Park, CA: 
AAAI Press, 2001), p. 8. 14
showed patterns of self-segregation and mimicked real-world neighborhoods 
that “tipped” even though agents are fairly tolerant.26
Thomas Schelling simulated this first ABM using coins.  Since then, 
ABM has become closely associated with computer simulation and is being 
applied to a growing number of topics and research questions.  The declining 
cost of computing power makes computation exploration such as ABM possible 
on a scale that was not possible in previous decades.  (Sometimes the phrase 
“multi-agent model” is used instead of “agent-based model”.)27  ABM has been 
employed in an ever-widening number of areas because of its flexibility and 
relative ease of use.  It is able to link individual behavior to emergent trends.
ABM also scales readily and is able to handle heterogeneous and adaptive agents 
– a feat not easily accomplished by many other modeling approaches.28  ABMs 
are often employed when dealing with complexity, non-linear phenomena, and 
non-equilibrium outcomes.29  It is a natural fit for complex adaptive systems 
(CAS) where non-linearities mean that the behavior of a system as a whole is 
more than the sum of the behavior of its parts.30  ABM has also been called a 
“natural description” of a system that includes behavioral components.31  This 
has made it a fitting tool for research on complex social phenomena. 
A basic ABM consists of autonomous agents and emergent behavior.
Instead of being scripted or being reliant on a central program to determine their 
actions, autonomous agents interact with one another and make individual 
decisions based on internal criteria and information about their immediate 
environment.32  For example, Schelling’s agents decided to move or to remain 
depending on their desired mix of neighbors and the mix that they perceived.
The emergent behavior was a pattern of self-segregating neighborhoods.33  In 
addition to autonomy, agents typically exhibit social ability through interactions 
________________  
26 Thomas C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 
1978), pp. 147-66. 
27 Nigel Gilbert and Klaus G. Troitzsch, Simulation for the Social Scientist (Buckingham and 
Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press, 1999), pp. 158-9. 
28 Robert Axtell, “Why Agents?  On the Varied Motivations for Agent Computing in the Social 
Sciences,” Brookings Institute, Center on Social and Economic Dynamics, Working Paper No. 17, 
November 2000 (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2000), pp. 2-3, 5. 
29 Axtell, p. 2-3. 
30 John H. Holland, Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity (Cambridge, MA: Perseus 
Books, 1995), pp. 4-5.  CAS is also marked by “coherence under change” and often by an amplifier 
effect, where small changes act as an amplifier on larger parts of the system. 
31 Eric Bonabeau, “Agent-based Modeling: Methods and Techniques for Simulating Human 
Systems,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 99 (May 14, 2002), p. 7281. 
32 Bonabeau, p. 7280; and Gilbert and Troitzsch, p. 159. 
33 Schelling, p. 153-5. 15
with other agents, reactivity to their environment, and initiative in pursuing 
their goals.34  Agents in a model are typically given goals, such as finding an 
acceptable mix of neighbors, traveling to a destination, finding food, making 
money in the stock market, or deciding to adopt technology, to name but a few 
of the objectives they have been given. 
Agents in ABMs may also be heterogeneous, adaptive, or both.35  In 
addition to different classes of agents, agents within classes may also be 
heterogeneous in parameters, behavioral rules, endowments, information, 
rationality, and other attributes.  Heterogeneity across a large enough variable 
space even allows for a population of unique individuals.  When agents are 
adaptive, they are able to change strategies and behavior based on changes in 
their environment.  Heterogeneity and adaptive behavior are often used in 
tandem with one another to identify agents or strategies that are best suited to 
survive over time, and to identify potential long-term trends.36  On the other 
hand, it is quite possible to have a useful ABM without adaptive agents or
heterogeneous agents.  For example, Schelling’s agents do not have adaptive 
behavior (they cannot change their preferences or their strategies) but are able to 
offer an explanation for how neighborhoods became self-segregating.  Another 
example is the work on crowd panic situations.  Although agents in this 
literature tend to be homogeneous and non-adaptive, models still yield valuable 
insight into preventing deaths in panic scenarios.37
Despite its strengths, ABM also carries disadvantages when used in 
research.  Perhaps the biggest disadvantage is the question of generalizability.  
Precisely because ABM outcomes tend to be non-linear, this poses a difficulty: 
Nonlinearities mean that our most useful tools for generalizing observations into 
theory – trend analysis, determination of equilibria, sample means, and so on – 
are badly blunted.  The best way to compensate for this loss is to make cross-
disciplinary comparisons…in hopes of extracting common characteristics.38
While also acknowledging the problem of generalizability, one proposed way to 
address this concern is merely to conduct multiple runs of a simulation: 
_________________ 
34 Gilbert and Troitzsch, p. 159. 
35 Holland, pp. 10-15, 19-20. 
36 Robert Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and 
Collaboration (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 15. 
37 Dirk Helbing, Illes Farkas, and Tamas Vicsek, “Simulating Dynamical Features of Escape 
Panic,” Nature, Vol. 407, September 28, 2000, pp. 487-90. 
38 Holland, p. 5-6. 16
Despite the fact that each run of such a model yields is a sufficiency theorem, a 
single run does not provide any information on the robustness of such theorems.  
That is, given that agent model A yields result R, how much change in A is 
necessary in order for R to no longer obtain?  In mathematical economics such 
questions are often formally resolvable via inspection, simple differentiation, the 
implicit function theorem, comparative statistics, and so on.  The only way to 
treat this problem in agent computing is through multiple runs, systematically 
varying initial conditions or parameters in order to assess the robustness of 
results.39
However, there is a serious problem with the idea that multiple runs are 
all that is needed to solve the problem of generalizability for ABM model results, 
particularly when applied to social phenomena.  As with any model, an ABM is 
an abstraction and is not reality itself.  Again excluding models of well-
understood physical phenomena, simulation results are not the same as data.  To 
treat them as such, as some in the literature are prone to do, gives too much 
weight to model results without offering other sources of proof.  Instead, it 
seems best to use simulation results to generate possible theories, or to use a 
simulation is tandem with other data and arguments to support policy 
decisions.40  On the other hand, when simulations are used to illustrate what is 
known and to demonstrate past events in a specific operation, there are fewer 
issues with generalizability.  (Such applications are useful in training.)  If ABM 
were used in this way, it would avoid this key weakness of the approach.  For 
example, this dissertation will make qualitative generalizations about non-
combatant behavior from three case studies and then suggests ways to 
incorporate these findings into ABMs and other military analysis. 
Every year there is more published works that use ABM.  One way it is 
used is for theoretical inquiry and experimentation in topics where simulation is 
useful because real-life experimentation is not practical.  These types of research 
areas include anthropology, archeology, economics, behavioral finance, 
evolutionary biology, sociology, and political science.  There is work that 
simulates ancient household migration patterns, game theory, norms and 
altruistic behavior, asset pricing and stock markets, organizational behavior, 
technology diffusion, political sorting, the emergence of states, and banding 
behavior in rhesus monkeys.  A second way to employ ABM is in analysis used 
to inform decision makers in both public and private sector settings.  Examples 
of these topics include research into crowd panic behavior, smallpox 
________________  
39 Axtell, p. 3. 
40 Questions about generalizability are hardly new for members of the defense modeling 
community and it is unlikely to prose dramatic new problems for model users.  That is, the main 
disadvantage to ABMs is actually a disadvantage inherent to the use of models and simulation in 
general.17
transmission, operational risk analysis, greenhouse gas emissions trading, traffic 
jams, lines in theme parks, and civil violence.  A third use of ABM is for 
entertainment purposes.  Examples of this include computer games such as 
SimCity and simulations used in movies such as the Lord of the Rings trilogy.41
The research discussed in this literature review is not without shortcomings.  In 
some cases, there is a tendency to be overly enamored of the technique and less 
concerned with the craft of building models.  However, they do illustrate the 
range of phenomena that can be plausibly explored with ABM. 
There are several works that serve as introductions or overviews of 
ABM.  Among these are Holland (1995), Parunak, Savit, and Riolo (1998), Gilbert 
and Troitzsch (1999), Rauch (2002), Axtell (2000), Bonabeau (2002), Elliott and 
Kiel (2002), and Conte (2002).  Holland, the originator of genetic algorithms, 
provides a clear and excellent manual for those interested in building their own 
ABMs.  Holland discusses objectives, agents, and adaptation.  His seven basics of 
a complex adaptive system (CAS) are: aggregation, tagging, nonlinearity, flows, 
diversity, internal models, and building blocks.  He further discusses adaptation 
and emergent behaviors.  Parunak, Savit, and Riolo introduces ABM as an 
alternative to equation-based modeling (EBM).  Gilbert and Troitzsch briefly 
discuss ABM in their volume on simulation for social scientists.  These two 
authors cover the basics and uses an ABM of ant colonies as an example. 
Written for a general interest magazine, Rauch covers a few well-known 
models by Schelling, Epstein, and Axtell.  In contrast to Holland, Rauch’s 
purpose is to offer an intuitive feel of how ABM may be used rather than to 
provide technical clarity on its construction.  Axtell discusses the strengths and 
weaknesses of ABM compared with other simulation techniques that may be 
applicable to fields such as economics.  Bonabeau, Elliott and Kiel, and Conte 
were papers published in the same issue of the Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences.  Bonabeau offers an overview of ABM and its benefits.  He 
also discusses its application in describing flows, markets, organization, and 
diffusion.  Elliott and Kiel give a brief overview of ABM in simulating 
competitive and cooperative behavior in social science research.  Conte discusses 
ABM’s applicability to individual and social intelligence. 
In addition to these general ABM discussions are articles and books that 
use ABM in a specific application.  First, there are examples of ABMs for 
theoretical inquiry.  As previously discussed, Schelling (1978) uses ABM to 
_________________ 
41 New Line Cinema, Lord of the Rings: the Two Towers Extended DVD, 2003.  See the feature on 
computer generated effects. 18
explore assumptions about neighbor preferences and the self-segregation 
patterns that emerge.  Another well-known ABM of social behavior is the 
Sugarscape model created by Epstein and Axtell (1996).  Epstein and Axtell 
create a world where agents harvest and consume sugar in order to survive and 
reproduce.  Moving across a landscape, agent survival is affected by such things 
as vision and metabolism.  From this simple start, the authors discuss such social 
phenomena as the distribution of income (sugar), migration patterns, 
genealogical networks, fertility, cultural transmission, evolution, cultural tags, 
and even combat.  This happens as they make modifications to agent rules and 
characteristics to induce more complex behavior.  Introducing a second 
commodity, spice, brings about markets, trade, and demand and supply curves.  
Epstein and Axtell then go on explore disease transmission and immunity in 
their world.  The authors raised the question of policy implications from the 
economic markets that resulted from sugar and spice.  However, most of the 
discussion in this work appeared relevant for theoretical inquiry.  The 
Sugarscape world took ABM and showed its potential applicability to a number 
of social science fields.
  Epstein, Axtell, and fellow researchers affiliated with the Brookings 
institute have produced additional work that attempts to apply ABM to cross-
disciplinary inquiry as well as to policy problems.  Axtell (1999) uses ABM to 
explore the emergence of different sizes of firms.  According to Axtell, agents 
sort themselves into different sized firms based on heterogeneous preferences for 
income and leisure.  The output of firms increases as agents join, but then an 
agent’s individual payoff for more effort diminishes.  Those with strong 
preferences for income then leave the firm as it grows, and output diminishes.
Arguing that the simulated distribution of firm sizes is consistent with that 
found among actual U.S. firms, Axtell concludes that theories of the firm 
centered on microeconomic equilibriums are unable to account for many real-life 
phenomena.  Axtell’s work on the firm uses microeconomic theory and adds 
heterogeneous agents and assumptions about self-sorting.  The author makes the 
controversial argument that current methods of evaluating equations in 
economics are insufficient to capture real economic processes.  Another example 
is the work by Axtell, Epstein, and Young (2000) on the emergences of classes.  
The authors discuss the emergence of classes in an artificial society that have 
norms and social expectations.  This is another piece that is primarily used for 
theoretical exploration. 
The use of ABM in the literature on conflict and cooperation is another 
example of using ABM primarily for theoretical inquiry.  Simulation is 
particularly useful in understanding the implications of game theory.  Authors 19
such as Axelrod (1997) borrow from the evolutionary biology literature when 
exploring game theory.  Building on his previous work on reiterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma games,42 the author creates a world where agents are instructed to 
cooperate or defect in different time periods depending on their “genetic” code.
The use of genetic algorithms and random mutations allows for adaptation and 
the emergence of new strategies.  At the same time, preferential replication of 
more successful strategies allows the population to “evolve” towards more 
successful cooperation strategies.  Based on computational runs of such a 
program, Axelrod concluded that Tit-for-Tat like strategies, those that cooperate 
or defect based on the opponent’s previous move, offer the largest gains and 
emerge as the “best” cooperation strategy.43  Axelrod’s work is widely cited in 
discussion on topics including international trade, the evolution of norms, and 
the nuclear standoff between the superpowers during the Cold War.  It is 
debatable how “realistic” Axelrod’s assumptions are.  However, the outcome of 
these ABMs was of theoretical value for a number of different subjects that deal 
with the question of why cooperation emerges. 
  Another example of using ABM for academic theoretical inquiry is work 
by Cederman (1997) on the emergence of states and nations.  Cederman uses 
models of actors in international politics to test for the emergence of different 
types of international systems (unipolar, bipolar, multipolar) under varying 
assumptions such as offense dominance, defense dominance, and the existence 
of defense alliances.  He then complicates his basic model by introducing 
different assumptions about alliances, adaptation, and other factors.  Cederman 
bases many model and behavioral assumptions on political science theory and 
uses his findings for further discussion on theory.  ABM’s allowance of self-
sorting behavior makes its application to international relations theory an 
interesting one because small units are allowed to merge or break off.  
Additionally, his decision to have many of this behaviors and rules grounded it 
theory from the field makes the outcomes relevant for theoretical discussion. 
  Kollman, Miller, and Page (1997) apply ABM to the question of political 
sorting.  They simulate Tiebout models, where citizens sort themselves among 
different jurisdictions depending on their preferences and the bundle of public 
goods that each jurisdiction offers.  Kollman, Miller, and Page evaluate the 
performance of different simulated political institutions in allowing citizens to 
maximize their preferences.  They also allow jurisdictions to be adaptive, 
_________________ 
42 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1984). 
43 Tit-for-Tat is a strategy that plays the opponent’s previous move in a reiterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game.  In computer tournaments held by Axelrod and discussed in The Evolution of 
Cooperation, Tit-for-Tax emerged as the winning strategy. 20
changing their public goods in response to citizen preferences.  The authors 
compare different political institutions: democratic referenda, direct competition 
with varying numbers of parties, and proportional representation with varying 
numbers of parties.  Kollman, Miller, and Page are then able to discuss the 
political institutions that maximize citizen utility assuming different numbers of 
jurisdictions and different numbers of political parties.  This paper was done 
primarily from a theoretical point of view and adds to the literature on Tiebout 
models.  At the same time, it is not difficult to see how such work might have 
policy relevance when creating political institutions for a new democracy. 
  The Sante Fe Institute is perhaps the best-known institution connected 
with the study of complexity.  Although much of their work is beyond the scope 
of this literature review, the institute has also been associated with the 
application of ABM to social phenomena.  The volume edited by Kohler and 
Gumerman (2000) compile several works by anthropologists and archeologists 
who have used ABM in their research.  Works include simulation of primate 
aggression and social groups; the evolution of warning calls; the evolution of 
signals; the role of beliefs and emotions in artificial societies; patterns of 
Mesolithic foraging; settlement development among pueblo populations; the 
emergence of common property; and the political impact of marriage on 
Polynesian society.  These works show how ABM is a powerful simulation tool 
that may be used for theoretical exploration in these two fields.  When behavior 
is based on existing theory, model results may aid in enriching the theoretical 
debate within an academic discipline.  Kohler and Gumerman show how flexible 
ABM can be as a tool in investigating a wide variety of human and animal 
behavior when real experimentation is impossible.  Simulation of plausible 
migration and settlement patterns of long-gone human populations allows 
researchers to theorize about the sudden disappearances of a culture.  It also 
allows for archeologists and anthropologists to make assumptions about social 
behavior and “test” the social patterns that might have emerged. 
  Again, two other fields that are increasingly experimenting with 
simulation in general and ABM in particular are economics and finance.  As 
noted above, Axtell addressed microeconomic theories of the firm in his work on 
firm sizing.  ABM also appears to be well suited to simulating markets and has 
been used both to explore financial theory and to predict the consequences of 
changes in financial institution rules.  Again, there are several works in this area 
and the few that are included in this literature review merely constitute a 
sampling.  Arthur, Holland, LeBaron, Palmer, and Tayler (1996) explore asset 21
pricing in artificial stock markets.44    Arthur, et. al. argue that because 
expectations in a market depend on anticipating others’ expectations, assets 
markets are recursive and cannot be deduced from a set of assumptions.
Instead, the authors use ABM to model expectations and test two theories of 
asset markets: standard efficient-market theory versus “market psychology” 
beliefs.  In an interesting result, Arthur, et. al. found that in their simulations, 
allowing agents to explore a high number of alternative models of other agents’ 
expectations resulted in the simulation of a complex market with many of the 
features of a real market.  There were bubbles, crashes, technical trading, and 
market measurements that reflected the statistical behavior of actual markets.  
On the other hand, permitting only a low rate of belief exploration led to the 
standard “efficient” market. 
  In addition to these types of works are those whose primary purpose is 
to inform specific decisions or to support policy analysis.  In some cases there is 
an overlap between theoretical inquiry and results that have policy applications.  
Here, theoretical inquiry produces results that may be acted upon.  In other 
cases, the research was constructed around a policy problem and is not 
concerned with testing academic theories against each other.  Although “policy” 
is usually associated with decisions in the public sector, studies focused on 
decision making in the private sector are included in the paragraphs below as 
well.  Regardless of the type of decision maker that this type of ABM research is 
intended to benefit, the key distinguishing feature is the use of ABM to inform 
specific decisions rather than as an instrument of academic theoretical inquiry.  
Although behavioral rules might be informed by theory, the purpose is usually 
to build a realistic simulation that might be used to gauge potential decisions.  
(Policy makers facing decisions about non-combatants in urban operations fall 
into this category.)  This is in contrast to the purpose of many of the works 
mentioned above, which seek to evaluate theories of behavior or to help create 
new ones.  Generally for policy purposes, there is less concern that behavioral 
rules be consistent with any kind of formal theory.  Instead, the criterion appears 
to be that rules are reasonable or plausibly reflect a behavior of interest.  This is 
particularly true when research is exploratory or mainly concerned with strategy 
robustness over a space of parameters. 
  One notable area of policy applicable ABM research is the study of 
pedestrian and vehicle traffic flows.  Helbing, Farkas, and Vicsek (2000) discuss 
simulating crowd panic behavior and stampedes.  Basing panic behavior on 
psychology theory and modeling the physical forces involved in crowds 
_________________ 
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pressing against each other, the authors produce a model of people stampeding 
and converging on an exit.  Helbing, Farkas, and Vicsek are able to simulate 
bottlenecks and to measure the flow of people successfully emerging from an 
exit as well as the number of injuries that result.  Agents were homogeneous.
This work departs from traditional work on pedestrian behavior, which typically 
(and incorrectly) applied fluid dynamics to pedestrian flows.45  Helbing (2003) 
goes on to discuss other phenomena such as self-directed pedestrian lanes, 
“phantom” traffic jams, route selection when traveling, and standing human 
waves at sporting events.  One interesting recommendation from Helbing (2003) 
is the idea that columns near an emergency exit can actually improve flow and 
result in fewer injuries during panic situations. 
Still (2000) is another in-depth look at crowd panic behavior.  Still 
formulates rules to simulate a number of behaviors in places such as stadiums.
The author notes behavior such as the spontaneous formation of directional 
pedestrian lanes within a crowd and takes note of turnstile data to better 
understand flow.  In general, Still derives rules for agent behavior from visual 
observations of crowd movement.  Unlike the agents used by Helbing, Farkas, 
and Vicsek, the ones used in Still’s simulation do not have a round ground 
imprint but an oblong one to simulate shoulders.  Still also notes the 
heterogeneity of area taken up by individuals, offering statistical data based on 
race, ethnicity, and gender.  Based on his rules of crowd behavior and 
incorporating queue theory, Still is able to evaluate emergency exits, corridor 
geometry, and other factors that affect flow in a given stadium or building. 
Works by various authors affiliated with the Brookings Institute also 
point to the possibility of using ABM across a number of different policy areas.  
Epstein, Steinbruner, and Parker (2001) use ABM to model civil violence.  In their 
first model, the authors attempt to simulate “generalized rebellion against a 
central authority.”  This first model has an agent rebel when its grievance level, a 
function of hardship and perceived legitimacy of the central authority, is 
sufficiently high enough to overcome the agent’s risk aversion.  The model also 
employs “cops” who can arrest agents and remove them from the population.  
The second model used in the paper is one that represents ethnic violence.  In it, 
ethnic cleansing happens when groups do not perceive each other as having a 
right to exist.  Genocide typically emerges unless peacekeepers are present.
Epstein, Steinbruner, and Parker discuss the phenomena of genocide and the 
potential policy implications of preventing it.  Rules for the two models do not 
appear to be based on theory, but appear to be set to reflect reasonable 
________________  
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assumptions about what behavior might be.  Gulden (2002) is a related work, 
also from Brookings.  The paper is concerned with ethnic mix and ethnic 
violence.  Gulden finds a non-linear relationship between ethnic mix and the 
number of deaths due to ethnic violence during civil conflict in Guatemala from 
1977 to 1986. 
Epstein, et. al. (2002) use ABM to produce policy recommendations for 
containing smallpox during a bioterrorism attack.  Agents within this world 
commute back and forth between home, work, or school.  Infection rates for 
different locations are based on historic data for smallpox outbreaks in Europe 
during the 20th century.  Using this simulation, the authors evaluate different 
strategies to halt the spread of the disease: trace vaccination of those who had 
close proximity to victims, mass vaccination, and combined vaccination 
strategies.  Epstein, et. al.’s approach to understanding the dynamics of smallpox 
transmission differ from more traditional equation-based models that assume 
perfect mixing.  Calibrated with historic data, the simulation illustrates smallpox 
transmission using all available knowledge.  In this work, behavioral rules 
reasonably approximated commuting and other daily activities.  Transmission, 
death rates, and recovery rates were based on historic data. 
  Environmental policy is another area where ABM is being used to 
evaluate strategies.  Lempert (2002) uses an ABM of technology diffusion to 
compare different strategies for controlling global climate change.  Agents with 
heterogeneous beliefs adopt different technologies based on expectations of 
performance and cost.  Actual costs depend on the number of agents who do in 
fact adopt the technology.  Energy prices and greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
are affected by the technology that agents adopt.  The model also includes policy 
levers such as carbon taxes and technology incentives.  Lempert uses the model 
to test the robustness of different policies over a range of different parameter 
values for variables such as environmental damage.  Agent behavior in 
Lempert’s model also reflects potentially reasonable behavior, rather than 
behavior based on academic theory.  Mizuta and Yamagata (2001) also apply 
ABM to model policies designed to curb GHG.  Based on previous work by the 
authors on commodity markets, Mizuta and Yamagata set up virtual online 
auctions to simulate GHG trading under the Kyoto Protocol.  The paper argues 
for the suitability of ABM to model similar systems and calls for further research 
on GHG emissions trading using this technique. 
  ABM also has the potential to be very useful for private business 
applications.  For example, it can be used for organizational simulation.  Because 24
organizational behavior may be represented as emergent behavior, ABM can be 
used for such purposes as evaluating operational risk.46  Another way that ABM 
may be employed is to assess technology diffusion within an organization.
Parunak, Savit, and Riolo, apply ABM to model supply chains.  When combined 
with the literature on behavioral finance, ABM may also produce 
recommendations for organizations that deal with financial markets.  One very 
interesting project conducted by the Bios Group simulated potential changes to 
the National Association of Security Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ) 
trading rules.  The NASDAQ proposed to reduce the smallest increment in stock 
price from 1/8th of a dollar to one cent, in hopes of increasing the ability of 
traders to perform price discovery and hence decrease the bid-ask spread on 
prices.  However, the Bios simulation accurately forecasted that reducing the 
smallest increment in pennies would result in reduced price discovery and higher
spreads.  This prediction was borne out in real life when the NASDAQ did in 
fact move to decimalize their prices and spreads increased.47
ABM and Military Modeling 
For many of the same reasons outlined above, ABM is currently being 
applied to combat models.  Complexity – the emergence of macrophenomena 
from many moving parts – and non-linearity are concepts that may also be 
applied to warfare and the military modeling community has been well aware of 
the possibilities.48  ABM also allows to models to take aspects of combat into 
account that are difficult to model with other approaches.  For example, the 
random nature of agent interactions in an ABM is closer to the stochastic nature 
of real life combat.  Attrition and detection are also random to an extent.49  It is 
also argued that actual battles themselves are non-linear and often contingent on 
“probabilistic ‘swing events’” of the sort that ABM is known to handle well.50
Precisely because of this ability to deal with non-linearity, ABM advocates 
maintain that the technique is better at replicating non-linear realities that 
________________  
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49 Thomas W. Lucas.  “The Stochastic Versus Deterministic Argument for Combat Simulations: 
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doctrine acknowledges but that model results often do not show.  Additionally, 
ABM can be used to better reflect intangibles in warfare such as morale or 
personality.  A number of military models have already begun using ABM to 
better simulate command and control processes, human adaptability, strategic 
effects, and other factors that were previously difficult to incorporate.51
There is already a considerable research effort dedicated to ABM and 
military modeling.  Project Albert is an unclassified, international effort 
sponsored by the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) 
to apply ABM to combat modeling.52  The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) 
hosts two of the ABMs that have come out of this effort: EINSTein, a land combat 
ABM; and ISAAC, its cellular automata (CA) forerunner.  ABM combat models 
are also being sponsored by non-U.S. governmental agencies, such as the New 
Zealand Defence Technology Agency (DTA) and the Defence Science and 
Technology Organization (DSTO) within Australia’s Department of Defence.
This work by New Zealand and Australian researchers is usually included in 
discussions about Project Albert.  The Naval Postgraduate School in Monterrey, 
California is another source of research on ABM in military modeling.  There are 
several master’s theses published through the school that use military ABM 
models and discuss results.  The U.S. Air Force (USAF) has also developed 
ABMs and has a literature on its usage. 
This section of the chapter reviews the literature on ABM in military 
modeling.  It begins with those pieces that are overviews or summaries of ABM 
in military applications and with those that are overviews of Project Albert.  It 
then discusses work primarily aimed at describing specific land combat ABMs.  
After that is research that applies an ABM to a specific land combat problem and 
presents results.  The last part of this section reviews work with ABMs on 
airpower questions.  Overall, the literature on ABM in military modeling is very 
supportive of ABM’s usefulness to combat simulations.  Researchers argue that 
warfare is a complex adaptive system and that ABM research helps model non-
linearities, co-evolving landscapes, and intangibles in a way not possible with 
previously available tools.  It has been used to model a number of different 
combat-related aspects and appears to have the ability to advance understanding 
and inquiry in these areas.  At the same time, non-combatants are absent from 
many (though not all) of the combat ABMs currently being developed.  U.S. 
_________________ 
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combat models in particular typically do not include unarmed or neutral agents 
that could be used to depict non-combatants.53
To begin with, there are pieces that serve as general discussions of ABM 
in military modeling.  Ilachinski (1996) at the CNA was involved in ISAAC’s 
development and discusses an “eight-tiered” approach to complexity and land 
warfare.  Ilachniski begins with an introduction to complexity theory, non-linear 
dynamics, and complex adaptive systems.  The author then discusses generic 
properties of a complex system and how they are relevant in land combat: 
nonlinear interaction, nonreductionism, hierarchical structure, decentralized 
control, self-organization, nonequilibrium order, adaptation, and collectivist 
dynamics.  Ilachniski then reveals his “eight tiers of applicability” that 
complexity has for modeling land warfare: 1) general metaphors for complexity 
in war, 2) policy and general guidelines for strategy, 3) extending existing 
modeling approaches, 4) describing the complexity of combat, 5) combat 
technology enhancement, 6) combat aids for the battlefield, 7) developing 
synthetic combat environments for training, and 8) inspiring basic research and 
original conceptualizations of combat. 
Horne (1999) discusses the main concepts behind Project Albert and the 
question of whether to confront an enemy directly or to maneuver.  Horne uses 
the term “distillation” rather than model or simulation to refer to low-resolution 
ABMs and cellular automata models.  This is terminology that is often echoed by 
other defense researchers.54  Horne discusses the challenges facing someone 
attempting to answer the maneuver question through simulation: deterministic 
chaos, non-linearities, and intangibles such as cohesion, morale, and leadership.
Arguing that current modeling approaches cannot cope with “complex, dynamic 
processes,” the author describes Project Albert as a different approach to such 
analytical problems. 
Holland, et. al. (1999) at Los Alamos National Laboratory discuss the 
concept of generative analysis.  Rather than relying on analyst-dependent 
scenarios, the idea behind generative analysis is to explore a wider variety of 
conditions and scenarios.  This is achieved by automatically generating different 
combinations of simulation factors.  Using the example of a simulated urban 
________________  
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engagement, Holland, et. al. discuss how they would potentially generate 
millions of runs using less detailed models of different components.  This would 
stand in contrast to a more standard modeling approach, which would have a 
few runs of more detailed models.  If the objective is unconstrained exploration 
of the parameter space, some type of experimental design can be used to sample 
from the space.  If the objective is to optimize a particular output, there are non-
linear optimization approaches such as genetic algorithms or simulated 
annealing that may be used. 
Upton (2001) is also an overview of Project Albert concepts and 
terminology.  Upton calls generative analysis an “integrated technology” that 
depends on distributed computing, agent-based simulations, knowledge 
discover methods, and heuristic search techniques.  Upton defines data farming 
– another Project Albert concept – as an interactive process between a human, a 
computer, an ABM, and techniques such as generative analysis.  The paper 
illustrates how generative analysis might be applied by using the introduction of 
a new system, micro Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), as an example. 
Sanchez and Lucas (2002) describe ABM as a “cornerstone” of Project 
Albert because of the project’s interest in intangibles in warfare but spend most 
of their discussion on the uses and strengths of the technique in general.
Sanchez and Lucas review a few key characteristics of ABM and discuss analysis 
of ABMs.  ABMs can be difficult to analyze because they differ from other classes 
of simulations.  For example, there may never be a possibility of calibrating, 
predicting, or optimizing using ABMs.  Sanchez and Lucas discuss 
considerations for implementing rules and collecting data.  The authors also go 
over some methods for sampling from a space of all possible factor (full factorial) 
combinations: gridded, low resolution, group screening, frequency-based, and 
Latin Hypercube designs.  Sanchez and Lucas also suggest visualizations that 
may be useful in understanding ABM results, such as regression trees, three-
dimensional surface plots, Trellis plots, and contour plots. 
Two 2002 Information & Security issues devoted to ABM use in defense 
and security provides a look at ABM research across a much broader number of 
issue areas than discussed within the Project Albert literature.  The two issues 
cover agent-based defense modeling and simulation, the security of agent-based 
systems, coalition operations planning and negotiation, and agents in resource 
planning.  The volumes also discuss using ABM to model situational assessment 
for submarines, air mobility planning, logistics planning, coordinating discovery 
of time-sensitive targets, planning for joint operations, threat assessment in small 
unit operations, military training, and robots in demining operations.  An 
editorial in one of the issues also notes methodological and technical challenges 28
for ABM in the field, including a lack of standard terminology, problems 
integrating ABM technology with existing large military simulations, the need 
for robust agent behavior controls, and the need to prove the usefulness and 
reliability of agents to the military.  Information & Security argues that intelligent 
agents have been very effective in modeling military aspects that had not been 
modeled easily before, such as individual reasoning, communications, and 
coordination.  Echoing many of the Project Albert authors, it also maintains that 
using agents to model combat as a CAS has shown insight into non-linearity, co-
evolving landscapes, and intangible aspects of warfare. 
Although the listing above shows the extent to which ABM may be 
applied to various defense and security issues, this literature review now turns 
to research involving ABMs that depict combat or military operations other than 
war (MOOTW). 55  Ilachinski (undated) discusses the cellular automata model, 
ISAAC (Irreducible Semi-Autonomous Adaptive Combat), and its ABM 
successor, EINSTein (Enhanced ISAAC Neural Simulation Toolkit).  The author 
briefly reviews Lanchester Equations and contrasts the approach with ABM.
Ilachinski again argues that land warfare contains the central features of a CAS, 
and that ABM allows understanding of emergent patterns when a system is not 
at equilibrium.  ISAAC was created as a “proof of concept” to test to what extent 
warfare might be a self-organizing CAS.  Ilachinski describes ISAAC agents, 
move selection, meta-rules, and sample behavior.  He discusses the then-ongoing 
enhancement of ISAAC, EINSTein, and the ways in which EINSTein would 
expand on the former’s capabilities.  Two issues to be further explored with 
EINSTein are command and control and battlefield information.  Ilachinski 
concludes by arguing that ABM not only offers a new general approach to 
modeling, but that it also causes researchers to invariably ask new and 
interesting questions.  According to the author, ABM has the potential to aid 
discovery of fundamental new relationships between local and emergent 
phenomena in combat.  ISAAC and EINSTein are “blue on red” “dot” models 
where the central focus is on interactions between combatants.  However, non-
combatants do not enter into either model. 
  Bailey (2001) discuses a model developed by the Defence Science and 
Technology Laboratories (DSTL) within the UK Ministry of Defence.
DIAMOND (Diplomatic and Military Operations in a Non-warfighting Domain) 
________________  
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was created to simulate peace support operations and models non-combatants 
and NGOs as well as military forces.  DIAMOND is intended to answer force 
structure questions for peace support operations.  Because the model was 
specifically created with these types of missions in mind, validation is based on 
past peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and other similar operations.  Bailey 
describes DIAMOND as a “high level, stochastic, object-oriented simulation” 
rather than as an ABM.  However, entities within the model have information on 
their environment and make decisions about their activities.  Interviews with 
researchers who have used DIAMOND also confirm that it is an ABM.56  The 
model is constructed around nodes that represent physical locations such as 
cities, seaports, or other areas.  There are facilities and information on 
functionality, damage, capacity, etc.  There are four types of entities within the 
model: intervention forces, other factions, non-military organizations, and 
civilians.  DIAMOND appears to have the most advanced simulation of non-
combatants in any military simulation to date.  The model can include up to 
several million civilians and attempts to include a range of behaviors.  
DIAMOND also allows for differing rules of engagement on the part of 
intervention forces. 
 Reynolds and Dixon (2001) briefly introduce Archimedes, another ABM 
to come out of Project Albert.  According to the authors, Archimedes was 
designed to accept various missions including non-combatant evacuation 
operations (NEOs), other small scale contingencies (SSCs), and military 
operations on urban terrain (MOUT).  Agents within the program can represent 
individual or units.  Archimedes is also able to accommodate data farming and 
scalable fidelity.  Agents have a physical state that represents their interaction 
with the physical world within the model as well as a behavioral state that 
represents intent.  Agent rules may also be fuzzy, a feature that distinguishes it 
from other Project Albert ABMs.  Reynolds and Dixon demonstrate Archimedes 
using a reconnaissance scenario. 
Luscomb, Mitchard, and Gill (2002) at Australia’s Defence Science and 
Techology Organization provide a brief introduction to MANA (Map Aware 
Non-uniform Automata), a cellular automata model developed by the New 
Zealand Defence Technology Agency (DTA).  MANA was inspired by ongoing 
work in Project Albert and focuses on intangibles in combat behavior: cohesion, 
morale, fatigue, and suppression.  MANA uses four states of behavior for its 
agents: unsuppressed, suppressed, pinned, and cowering.  The intangibles affect 
_________________ 
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the efficiency and effectiveness of agents in combat.  Luscomb, Mitchard, and 
Gill emphasize MANA’s contribution to furthering research on intangibles. 
  Grieger (2002) at Australia’s Defence Science and Technology 
Organization (DSTO) gives an overview of several different ABMs and cellular 
automata models, referring to them collectively as agent-based distillations 
(ABDs).  Grieger discusses ISAAC, EINSTein, MANA, Socrates, 
Archimedes/Pythagoras, and Bactowars.  For each, Grieger discusses model 
parameters, data collection, terrain, and other features.  Grieger also discusses 
differences between the models, including those in communication between 
agents, editing properties, parameters, data collection, run time, movement 
algorithms, interface, documentation, and numerous other aspects.  Although 
not mentioned by Luscomb, Mitchard, and Gill, Grieger notes that MANA has 
neutral agents in the model whereas ISAAC and EINSTein do not.  Grieger also 
discusses Socrates, another product of Project Albert.  With three levels of 
command (grunts, commanders, and leaders), Socrates has a more detailed 
command structure than other land combat ABDs.  Socrates also has no neutral 
agents and the model in general is noted as more difficult to use than other 
ABDs reviewed in the paper.  Grieger also notes that Archimedes will be 
renamed Pythagoras in subsequent releases.  The author also discusses how 
variables within Archimedes/Pythagoras can be fuzzy, allowing greater 
freedom when assigning behaviors but making it more difficult to implement.  
The paper also discusses Bactowars, an ABD in the early stages of development 
at the time of Grieger’s writing.  It is being developed by DSTO and is similar to 
ISAAC.  In addition to reviewing ABDs, Grieger discusses agent movement 
algorithms in these types of models and conducts case studies using EINSTein 
and MANA. 
  Barlow and Easton (2002) discuss CROCADILE (Conceptual Research 
Oriented Combat Agent Distillation), and ABD developed at the Australian 
Defence Academy.  The key features of CROCADILE include: a 3D or 2D 
environment; movement by air, land, or sea; command, mission, and 
communications structures for agents; higher fidelity combat resolution; multi-
team structures; and neutral agents.  Barlow and Easton review the simulation 
engine, agents, agent capabilities, and usage issues.  The authors also run a 
traditional armored combat scenario 100 times and analyze results.  Barlow and 
Easton argue that CROCADILE’s contribution to the existing suite of Project 
Albert combat ABDs (ISAAC, EINSTein, MANA, etc.) is in: 1) adding greater 
model resolution, including a 3D environment; and 2) offering an extendible 
engine that can expand efficiently.31
  Schwarz (2004) discusses command and control for civilian actors in 
PAX, a German ABM that focuses on peace support operations.  Funded by the 
German Bundeswehr’s Training and Doctrine Command, PAX in another model 
associated with Project Albert.  PAX stands out from most other Project Albert 
ABMs because its primary focus is modeling civilians rather than combatants.  
PAX models communication between military and civilian agents as well as 
communication among civilians. 
Aside from these papers, there are research publications using Project 
Albert or other ABMs that captures military operations to test theories, explore 
relationships, and make recommendations.  Lauren (1999) uses ISAAC to explore 
the basic behavior of CAS combat models.  Lauren compares battle engagements 
between two forces of similar size first when forces attack forming Napoleonic 
squares, and then when forces use fluid formations.  The author describes model 
statistics from the latter scenario as non-Gaussian and intermittent, with attrition 
rates that are the cube root of the kill probability rather than linear multiples as 
in conventional models.  There is also a greater chance for extreme events under 
fluid formations.  Lauren found that attrition was fairly constant over time when 
agents were deployed in squares.  In contrast, when formation was fluid, battle 
was characterized by decisive clashes that could change the situation 
dramatically.  Lauren also experimented with different types of agents, such as 
artillery, and found that adding agent types increased complexity. 
Lauren and Stephens (2000) use ISAAC to model patrol survivability in a 
peacekeeping operation.  The authors find that the main drivers of risk for 
peacekeeping troops are: enemy disposition, civilian disposition, the ability of 
enemy to support each other, and the ability of enemy forces to coordinate and 
concentrate.  Lauren and Stephens maintain that in order to correctly gauge the 
risk that patrols face, friendly forces should understand enemy densities, 
training, and communication capabilities.  They also find that opponents do not 
need to be very well armed in order to hamper peacekeeping missions.  Also 
according to the authors, it is best if peacekeeping troops are considered too 
dangerous to challenge.  Lauren and Stephen also very briefly mention Maui, 
another ABD being developed by the New Zealand Defence Operational 
Technology Support Establishment (DOTSE). 
Brown (2000) uses ISAAC to investigate the human elements of 
command and control in an urban operation.  Brown bases the modeling 
scenario on the United States Marine Corps’s (USMC’s) experience with 
withdrawing NATO troops from Somalia in 1995.  The author also used a desert 
scenario.  Brown models a smaller blue force against a larger, less 
technologically capable, and loosely organized red force.  The author then covers 32
ISAAC parameters and the statistical methods used to evaluate model outputs.  
Brown measures time to mission completion and the number of blue forces 
killed during the course of a mission as measures of effectiveness (MOE).  
Increasing a local commander’s information results in more maneuver and a 
longer time until mission completion.  High sensor range also increased mission 
completion time dramatically and in a non-linear fashion.  However, it did 
reduce the number of blue casualties.  Brown also tests commanders’ and 
subordinates’ propensities to move towards other blue or red agents on the 
number of blue agents killed. 
Woodaman (2000) applies ABM to military operations other than war, 
specifically to a confrontation between peacekeepers and a rioting crowd.  The 
riot scenario is inspired by a 1994 incident between Cuban migrants and U.S. 
forces at Guantanomo Bay, Cuba.  The author uses his own model AgentKit, an 
extension of Simkit.  Peacekeepers in the scenario guard a site with nonlethal 
weapons as an initially peaceful crowd turns hostile and begins to throw stones.
Woodaman uses two measures of effectiveness, expected hits taken per 
peacekeeper and expected hits taken per rioter.  There are two tactical scenarios.
In the first, peacekeepers are reactive and only return fire.  In the second, 
peacekeepers are more proactive, firing on the most violent members of the mob, 
and attempting to break up the crowd.  There are also two types of mobs: one 
with a clear leader and one without.  According to Woodaman’s simulation 
results, the proactive strategy results in fewer peacekeeper and rioter casualties.
The presence of an explicit leader in the crowd did not make a significant 
difference.
Yiu, Gill, and Shi (2002) use MANA to model strategies for managing 
civil violence.  The authors base their simulation of civil violence on the work by 
Epstein, Steinbruner, and Parker (2001) reviewed in the previous section of this 
chapter.  Epstein, et. al. modeled “quiets” within the population transitioning to 
“active” and back.  Some portion of agents active in civil violence become 
“jailed” and agents return from the jailed population as active.  On the other 
hand, agents in Yiu, et. al. transition from quiets to actives to jailed and back to 
quiets.  As in Epstein, et. al.’s model, “cops” within the population remove 
“actives” that they perceive.  The authors investigate different strategies that 
cops and actives can implement.  The optimal strategy for actives involves 
avoiding cops and mixing with the quiet population.  The optimal strategy for 
“cops” is merely to concentrate on the actives instead of the general population.  
Yiu, et. al. also play optimal versus no strategy for both groups and discuss the 
results of each strategy combination. 33
Erlenbruch (2002) uses ABM to model peacekeeping exercises for 
German forces.  The modeled exercise is from one used by at the German UN 
Training Center to train company and platoon leaders headed for Kosovo.  
Erlenbruch argues that peacekeeping operations are appropriately modeled as 
CAS.  He uses two programs, Peacekeeping and TryShoot, to model tactics and 
training.  Erlenbruch has red and blue agents, leaders and followers, and agent 
“personalities” that reflect risk aversion, closeness to leader, and other attributes.
The measure of effectiveness is a combination of several utility functions that 
peacekeepers try to maximize.  Peacekeeper utility is maximized when they 
minimize the following: access to the red objective, peacekeeper deaths, 
peacekeeper injuries, protester deaths, and protester injuries.  From the results, 
Erlenbruch argues that using a defensive tactical approach resulted in the best 
MOE for peacekeepers.  The author also argues that the value of using ABM to 
model peacekeeping is not in the answers but in the exercise of asking questions 
and learning the scenario.  
  Ling (2001) uses MANA to explore how uncertainty can hinder 
command and control operational effectiveness.  Ling discusses the limitations of 
EBMs for understanding the dynamics of action and reaction in combat and in 
capturing intangible aspects such as emotions and team cohesion.  He too argues 
for the applicability of CAS in modeling warfare.  Within the scenario, red and 
blue agents attempt to capture one another’s posts and to intercept opponent 
agents that come to capture theirs.  Measures of effectiveness are time to reach 
the red post, number of blue casualties, and whether or not red agents capture 
the blue post.  Ling focuses on two blue variables: the value of situational 
awareness and the number of squads.  The number of blue squads is an attempt 
to introduce uncertainty for blue force command and control.  Increased 
situational awareness was found to improve blue performance.  Increasing the 
number of blue squads was found to add more complexity to agent behavior.  As 
the number of squads increase, situational awareness appears to have a less clear 
impact on outcomes.  Ling argues that MANA shows non-linearity and 
surprising behavior even with a simple command and control model. 
Ghazal, Morley, Terry, and Klingaman (2003) use MANA to test three 
Soldier Tactical Mission System (STMS) alternatives for the U.S. Army (USA).  
These are current soldier, Land Warrior Version 1.0, and Objective Force 
Warrior.  The authors briefly note the advantages of ABM and its “widespread 
use” by the USMC and USAF, as well as its widening use within the USA.  The 
authors derived parameter values for current soldier and Land Warrior agents 
from field manuals and other DoD literature.  Objective Force Warrior parameter 
came from Future Combat Systems (FCS) specifications as maintained by the 34
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).  Ghazal, et. al. varied 
parameters for firepower, fire range, communications delay, armor, and sensor 
range.  Objective Force Warrior was superior to Land Warrior on all these 
parameter values and Land Warrior was superior to current soldier.  The 
scenario was a squad-level encounter in a village. Ghazal, et. al. note that Land 
Warrior suffered fewer blue casualties and inflicted more red casualties than 
current soldier.57
In addition to land combat ABMs, there is also ongoing research 
sponsored by the USAF on modeling airpower through ABM.  Tighe (1999) in 
his master’s thesis at the Air Force Institute of Technology discusses applying 
ABM to analyzing the strategic effects of destroying key targets and centers of 
gravity.  Tighe quantifies strategic effects through a method based on the 
Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) decision cycle.  Although USAF theory and 
doctrine embrace the notion of strategic effects, Tighe argues that they are “not 
directly accounted for” in present military models and simulations.  The author 
goes on to define strategic effects, noting that strategic attack should “produce 
effects well beyond the direct physical damage of the attack.”  Tighe then 
assesses THUNDER, a USAF theater-level combat model.  He argues that 
THUNDER is not sufficiently able to model strategic effects and develops a 
proof-of-concept model that does incorporate strategic effects. 
Bullock, McIntyre, and Hill (2000) at the Air Force Studies and Analyses 
Agency use an ABM, the Hierarchical Interactive Theater Model (HITM), to 
model the strategic effects of airpower.  Each agent within the model has its own 
OODA loop, which can be examined for friction, or the dissipation of energy due 
to interactions with the opponent.  The shorter the OODA loop, the less friction 
an agent is experiencing.  Agents cause friction for their opponents by 
conducting air strikes against their opponents’ centers of gravity.  Red and blue 
teams within the simulation have equal amounts of territory and equal amounts 
of resources (centers of gravity).  HITM provides for three different target sets: 
leadership (command and control), organic essentials, and infrastructure.  There 
are also five classes of agents: commander, operations, ground units, defensive 
aircraft pilots, and attack aircraft pilots.  Bullock, et. al. discuss three “regions” of 
non-linear systems: equilibrium, complexity, and chaos.  The authors argue that 
their model results show these three regions.  In model runs there is a 
“equilibrium” period where damage is local and results are stable.  There is then 
________________  
57 Curiously, they do not note the simulation results for Objective Force Warrior agents.  
However, given the superior parameter values for Objective Force Warrior agents, it would be 
surprising if these agents did not have better simulation results than Land Warrior agents. 35
a “complexity” period where agents begin to adapt.  This is then followed by a 
“chaos” period where damage propagates and destruction results.  The model 
shows cascading effects from damage to centers of gravity that are consistent 
with the effects predicted by doctrine. 
Hill, McIntyre, Tighe, and Bullock (2003) use HITM and a second 
prototype ABM, the Strategic Effects Model (SEM), to further investigate 
strategic effects from airpower.  Hill, et. al. argue the case for applying CAS to 
combat and discuss the nature of agents in an ABM.  The authors use SEM, a 
land warfare model partly inspired by ISAAC, to replicate the non-linear effects 
of information superiority as a force multiplier.  The OODA loop is programmed 
into SEM agents as well and used to examine force multiplier effects.  SEM is a 
“capture the flag” model that is primarily concerned with ground forces.  Hill, 
et. al. compare Lanchester’s square law results to model results to estimate the 
effects of force multipliers in SEM.  The authors move to theater-level strategic 
effects by next running simulations in HITM, which extends land-based SEM to 
the theater level and adds an air component.  The experiment is the one 
discussed in Bullock, McIntyre, and Hill (2000).  The authors argue that HITM 
succeeds in capture the non-linear, cascading effects of destroying 
interdependent resources in a way not demonstrated by preceding models. 
There are currently several agent-based military models in use.  Table 2-
1 below summarizes the ones mentioned above and notes whether or not they 
allow for neutral (non-combatant) agents.  These models represent a body of 
knowledge about the uses and limitations of ABM in combat and MOOTW 
modeling.  It represents a creative class of simulations that may be further 
enriched by the addition of non-combatant agents.  Note that the U.S. Army does 
not currently sponsor an ABM, although perhaps it should.  Additionally, most 
of the U.S. military ABMs that do exist do not incorporate non-combatants, even 
as the sheer scale of U.S. military activities mean that real-world interactions 
with civilians occurs on a frequent basis. 36
Table 2-1.  Current Combat and MOOTW Cellular Automata and Agent-based Models 
Model Sponsor  Non-combatant 
Agents Possible 
CROCADILE  Australian Defence Force Academy  Yes 
Bractowars  Australian Defence Science and Techology 
Organization
N/A
DIAMOND  UK Defence Science and Technology 
Laboratories
Yes
EINSTein  Center for Naval Analysis; 
Office of Naval Research 
No
HITM  Defense Modeling and Simulation Office; 
Air Force Studies and Analysis Agency 
No
ISAAC  Center for Naval Analysis; 
Office of Naval Research 
No
MANA  New Zealand Defense Technology Agency  Yes 
Maui  New Zealand Defence Operational Technology 
Support Establishment 
N/A
PAX  German Bundeswehr Training and Doctrine 
Command 
Yes
Pythagoras/
Archimedes
USMC Combat Development Command  N/A 
SEAS  USAF Space and Missile Systems Center 
Directorate of Transformation and Development 
Yes
SEM  Defense Modeling and Simulation Office; 
Air Force Studies and Analysis Agency 
No
Socrates  USMC Combat Development Command  No 
  Source: Bailey (2001), Barlow and Easton (2002), Grieger (2002), Hill, et. al. (2003), Lauren and 
Stephen (2000), Reynolds and Dixon (2001), www.teamseas.com, Schwarz (2004). 
  ISSAC and MANA are cellular automata models.  Other may be: CA models and ABM are not 
always distinguished from each other in the ABD literature. 
Applicability of ABM for Non-combatant Behavior 
There are two main reasons for recommending ABM for non-combatant 
behavior in military models and simulations.  First, ABM has already improved 
modeling in several areas that are closely related to non-combatant behavior 
during urban operations.  The successful application of ABM in these areas 
makes it a logical extension to use ABM for many of the behaviors reviewed in 
this dissertation.  Second, ABM offers the most practical solution for introducing 
large numbers of non-combatants into current military simulations.  It appears to 
be the best alternative among several discussed below.  And not 
inconsequentially, using ABM would permit researchers to salvage existing 
force-on-force models and expand their range of analysis into urban operations. 
The first main reason for arguing in favor of using ABM is that it has 
already led to better models in areas relevant to non-combatant behavior during 37
urban operations, such as crowd panic behavior, vehicular traffic, civil violence, 
and combat.  ABM has produced good results when used to simulate certain 
types of human behavior; and at times, it has led to significant improvements 
over what was previously the standard method.58  Simple and intuitive rules 
have been successful in capturing individual-level behavior not previously 
modeled well.  In light of some of these developments, it is hardly novel to begin 
applying this technique to civilian movement and actions.   
It should be clear that using ABM does not automatically produce a 
better model; it is susceptible to the drawbacks inherent in any modeling 
approach.  As with any model, the output from an ABM is only as good as the 
assumptions that go into its construction.  ABMs are as likely as other types of 
models to suffer from model artifacts, poor data, opaque assumptions, 
incorrectly specified relationships, researcher bias, insufficient sensitivity 
analysis, and incorrect application of model results.  Additionally, a model that 
does not ask useful questions is of little use to decision makers regardless of the 
technique it uses.  There are clear instances where ABM has not resulted in a 
model that is useful, and instances where the ABM model is not necessarily an 
improvement over existing forms of analysis.59  However, in many instances it 
has led to better models and this point should not be overlooked.  With the oft-
repeated caveat that all models are wrong but some are useful, and the other 
major caveat that most models are to be used in conjunction with other forms of 
research and analysis, improved models should help lead to improved decision 
making. 
Before further discussion on whether it is progress to use ABM for non-
combatant behavior military models and simulations, it is necessary to first ask 
what constitutes a good model and what qualifies as an improvement.  Clearly, 
whether or not a model is good depends on its purpose and the questions it is 
designed to help resolve: a simulation used to explain queues to students in an 
undergraduate operations research class is a good model if it illustrates the 
_________________ 
58 Dirk Helbing, “Agent-based Simulation of Traffic Jams, Crowds, and Supply Networks,” 
Proceedings of the IMA ‘Hot Topics’ Workshop (Minneapolis, MN: IMA, 2003), pp. 1-5. 
59 For example, it is not clear that Epstein, et. al.’s work with smallpox vaccination is a case 
where building an ABM gave results that were analytically sounder than or different from what could 
have been achieved with existing approaches.  The primary conclusions that come directly out of that 
model are to focus on vaccinating health care workers and the family members of those that contract 
the disease.  However, the ABM was not needed to arrive at this conclusion.  Rather, the authors’ 
results are largely driven by historic data which show that the highest smallpox transmission rates 
were in hospitals and in households.  Casual observation of this information would also lead most 
informed analysts to identify hospitals and households as two areas to concentrate vaccinations.  
(One further criticism of the model is that if the high rate of smallpox transmission in hospitals was 
mostly the result of the disease spreading from patient to patient, vaccinating health care workers 
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concepts effectively and a poor model if it does not get across the points that the 
instructor is trying to make.  A high degree of technical sophistication does not 
automatically make a model good.  For example, a military combat simulation 
designed to judge the potentially effectiveness of a certain weapon system may 
have a high degree of visual realism but still make for a poor model if there are 
significant oversights in combatant tactics. 
ABM and Predictive Modeling 
Although the definition of a “good” model may be quite case-specific, 
there are some general observations that may be made to gauge the quality of 
models.  In general, models created to predict events or outcomes are judged on 
their predictive power; a change to a model is considered an improvement if it 
increases predictive power.  Scientific and engineering models and simulations 
are good if they can accurately predict airflow over a wing design of certain 
proportions; predict the correct rate of gas exchange across a barrier; anticipate 
the directional stress load on composite materials; or forecast the correct blast 
effects from miniaturized nuclear weapons.  The defense community uses many 
such technical models that are predictive in nature, particularly in research and 
development, where the mechanisms of a phenomenon are understood to a 
degree that researchers are able (to some extent) to substitute simulation for live 
experimentation.
ABMs have contributed to the art of predictive modeling in a few areas 
particularly relevant to non-combatant behavior in urban operations, such as 
crowd behavior.  Prior to work by Helbing, Farkas, and Vicsek (2000), Still 
(2000), and Helbing (2003), most models of crowd flow in panic situations were 
based on the principles of fluid dynamics and particle systems: such models 
were consistent with previously help ideas in sociology that crowd participants 
were controlled by a collective crowd identity and lacked individually separate 
behavior.60  However, fluid and particle behavior do not capture important 
aspect of crowd behavior, such as herding behavior, multi-directional flow, and 
uneven crowd density.61  Such models are also no longer consistent with 
________________  
60 Kincho Law, Kenneth Dauber, and Xiaoshan Pan, Computational Modeling of Nonadaptive 
Crowd Behaviors for Egress Analysis: 2004-2005 CIFE Seed Project Report, CIFE Technical Report #165, 
October 2005 (Center for Integrated Faculty Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 2005), p. 
2.  The authors consider work by Helbing, Farkas, and Vicsek to be consistent with fluid dynamics.  
However, this assessment is debatable given Helbing, et. al’s agent-based approach and other 
features of their work which are clearly not consistent with fluid and particle behavior, such as dead 
individuals who block exits. 
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updated beliefs about the presence of individual behavior even within crowds.
Additionally, fluid dynamics and particle systems are not ideal for modeling one 
important aspect of actual crowd panic situations, namely: individuals crushed 
to death who then become physical obstacles for others.  The agent-based work 
in this area does constitute an improvement, and a significant one, because they 
result in models that more accurately predicted crowd movement, injuries, and 
deaths from panicked crowds.
ABM thus has a history in allowing researchers to improve modeling 
and simulation of this particular aspect of crowd behavior.  There is also room 
for additional improvement in modeling crowds because the agent-based 
approach now allows for the construction of simulated crowds that demonstrate 
individually directed behavior.  As more and more research points to this as the 
correct approach in describing crowd behavior (in contrast to the idea of 
individuals being uniformly directed by a collective), ABM offers a tool for 
simulations that better illustrate correct theories in this field. As dealing with 
crowds is a potentially dangerous part of urban operations, research and 
analysis on crowd dynamics should be of considerable interest to the defense 
community.
Traffic modeling is an area where ABM and cellular automata improved 
predictive power of traffic models because it is a technique that reflects 
individual behavioral rules that are consistent with the way drivers make 
decisions; and it produces system-level dynamics that reflect traffic real-world 
patterns.  Until fairly recently, the dynamics of traffic jams were not easily 
recreated.  In contrast to ABM and CA, top-down equation models of traffic 
primarily dealt with aggregate traffic statistics.62  Such macro models were also 
often based on fluid dynamics or other models of movement from the physical 
sciences.63  However, shortcomings of this approach included models that were 
extremely sensitive to initial settings, and models that depicted traffic only under 
ideal conditions.64  The introduction of CA and then ABM in the 1990s in 
transportation simulation began a major shift towards models that took micro 
behavior into account.65  Modeling self-directed agents with fairly simple rules 
for interactions have allowed researchers to recreate the dynamics behind stop-
_________________ 
62 Peter Weiss, “Stop-and-Go Science,” Science News, Vol. 156, No. 1, July 3, 1999, p. 8. 
63 Kutluhan Erol, Renato Levy, and James Wentworth, Application of Agent Technology to Traffic 
Simulation, unpublished Department of Transportation technical report, 1999. 
64 Erol, Levy, Wentworth. 
65 Weiss, p. 8. 40
and-go traffic, “phantom” traffic jams, and other forms of vehicle congestion.66
As a result, researchers are now able to use simulations to reasonably forecast 
the effects of speed limits, stop lights at on ramps, and other traffic control 
strategies.67
ABM has gradually become a standard approach to modeling traffic, one 
embraced by academics and graduate students with toy models as well as by 
government research centers funding major model development.  TRANSIMS, 
an agent-based transportation network simulation of large metropolitan areas, 
illustrates how widely accepted ABM has become in this area.  TRANSIMS was 
developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory with funding from the 
Department of Transportation (DoT), the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), and the Department of Energy (DoE) as part of the Travel Model 
Improvement Program.  Available from Los Alamos and from DoT, TRANSIMS 
is intended to assist regional transportation analysis of traffic congestion, energy 
consumption, land use, emergency evacuation, and other transportation issues.68
In light of these developments in transportation simulation and research, 
it hardly an untested or novel idea to use ABM to model civilian traffic in urban 
combat and MOOTW simulations.  ABM has proven to be the best method to 
simulate traffic patterns from individual cars, and it would be illogical not to use 
it in the kind of high-resolution military models that depict individual 
combatants.  It is clearly not possible to overlay an aggregate transportation 
model based on fluid dynamics onto an urban combat model and expect any 
realistic non-combatant reactions to combat.  Modifications are doubtlessly 
necessary to the rules that govern vehicles in most ABM transportation models.  
For instance, TRANSIMS is unlikely to have agent rules specifying how drivers 
should react in the event they encounter gunfire, see other destroyed vehicles, 
find tanks in their path, experience an explosion in their vicinity, or receive 
communication that encourages them to abandon their trip.  However, once 
reactions to these types of events are specified, agent-based vehicles should be 
able to give rise to traffic patterns, congestion, and other vehicle traffic 
considerations that could affect military operations.  
________________  
66 Helbing, pp. 1-5. 
67 Helbing, p. 1. 
68 “Taking the ‘Guessing’ Out,” TRANSIMS information page at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory’s website; internet: accessed at www.ccs.lanl.gov/transims/index.shtml on January 21, 
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ABM and Exploratory Modeling 
In addition to the contribution ABM has made to the types of predictive 
models discussed above, it has had a large impact on exploratory models that are 
relevant to non-combatants in urban operations.  Combat and MOOTW models 
are rarely used in a predictive manner because of the highly complex nature of 
war.  Instead, the purpose of large-scale warfare models such as JANUS and 
JCATS is largely exploration: exploration of tactics, configuration of forces, 
hypothetical weapons systems, and more.  Exploratory use of models and 
simulations generates new avenues for further research by raising issues and 
relationships that may not have occurred to researchers without their use.69
Exploratory models are also meant to be used in conjunction with other types of 
studies and analysis to further research and decision making on a topic.  This is a 
“weak” use of models, but one that is as valid and as potentially useful as the 
“strong” use of predictive models. 
How does one judge whether or not an exploratory model is good?  It 
goes without saying that any model should produce results that are credible or 
at least plausible upon investigation.  Results should also show internal 
consistency.  Beyond this, the test of whether or not an exploratory model is 
good is not necessarily how complete it is, or even how “correct” the results are, 
but how many new ideas or insights it helps to generate.  (A major improvement 
to exploratory modeling in generates additional insights of a significant nature.)  
When a phenomenon is being newly explored, almost any plausible exploratory 
model may be considered good because it helps to generate insights and points 
to avenues for further research that are also likely to be new. 
Because ABMs currently being developed by the defense community 
allow researchers to investigate so many new phenomena that were difficult to 
embody using existing models, the community is almost in this precise situation.  
It is in the middle of a creative period where a new tool makes it relatively easy 
to construct new models exploring aspects of warfare excluded from previous 
models.  There is no question that among the authors discussed in the previous 
section (ABM and Military Modeling), some analyses are better than others.  
However, ABMs have improved exploratory modeling in several topics 
pertinent to non-combatant behavior in urban operations: combat, peacekeeping, 
other MOOTW, civil disobedience, and crowd confrontation.
_________________ 
69 Phone conversation with Randall Steeb, January 6, 2006.  Interviewee also discussed using 
models for comparing the performance of hypothetical weapons systems, and for exploring the 
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A number of papers in the previous section demonstrated ABMs that are 
expanding the boundaries of exploratory military models.  Ilachinski (undated) 
was among the first to explore the idea of combat as a self-organizing system.  
Luscomb, Mitchard, and Gill (2002) examine intangibles in combat behavior: unit 
cohesion, morale, fatigue, and suppression.  Brown (2000) also used ABM to 
explore another intangible: human factors in command and control.  ABM also 
allows Tighe (1999) and Hill, McIntyre, Tighe, and Bullock (2003) to demonstrate 
non-linearities from strategic effects that are consistent with military doctrine, 
but that were not previously captured in other models.  Work in both the 
intangibles and strategic effects are in its early phases, but they represent new 
avenues of exploration and new elements that might eventually be introduced 
into mainstream, widely used combat simulations.  The significance of the work 
listed above is not necessarily the particular results from these models, but their 
success in creating new insights and raising new questions.  This successful use 
of ABM in exploratory combat models suggests that it could also yield new 
insights and new questions when used to incorporate non-combatants into 
combat models. 
Even more directly relevant to evaluating ABM as an appropriate 
technique for non-combatants is the ABM work in MOOTW models that contain 
civilians.  Lauren and Stephens (2000) use ABM to assess different risks for 
peacekeepers, including the effect of civilian disposition.  Woodaman (2000) uses 
ABM to model a confrontation between peacekeepers and a rioting crowd.
Bailey (2001) discusses modeling the interactions between military forces, non-
combatants, and NGOs during peace operations.  Yiu, Gill, and Shi (2002) model 
policing strategies for managing civil unrest and violence.  Schwarz (2004) 
explores communication between civilian agents during peace support 
operations.
These works deal with such topics as civilian grievance, communication 
between civilians (and with combatants), and strategies for interacting with 
civilians to maintain order and to obtain intelligence and other forms of support.  
These are all important “intangibles” in U.S. military interactions with civilians, 
and there is a parallel to Project Albert work on intangibles in force-on-force 
combat.  There are shortcomings to this body of work; mainly, they do not show 
deeper understanding of crowd behavior.  Their non-combatant behavior does 
not seem to be based on any theory of crowd dynamics and only Woodaman 
appears to have used non-combatant behaviors from an actual historical event.  
However, it this body of research demonstrates a way to incorporate more 
complete research on these intangible non-combatant behaviors into military 
models using ABM.  As ongoing events in Operation Iraqi Freedom show the 43
overwhelmingly influence that these types of intangible and political factors can 
have on military operations,70 there is a strong argument for attempting to 
include them in urban operations analysis. 
ABM also has the potential to allow defense analysts to simulate non-
physical aspects of non-combatant behavior.  Currently, combat and MOOTW 
models include communication between combatants, but not between 
combatants and non-combatants, nor among non-combatants.  Just as ABM has 
allowed modelers to begin exploring intangibles in combat, the technique better 
enables simulations to better handle aspects that current constructive and force-
on-force models ignore.  These include the impact of information operations on 
the local population; intelligence-gathering activities where combatants attempt 
to glean information from non-combatants; and changes in civilian attitudes over 
time.  Ongoing events in Operation Iraqi Freedom have shown the importance of 
such intangible interactions with the civilian population, particularly in the 
context of counterinsurgency operations.  Because ABM is an approach that is 
better than existing methods at allowing simulated individual to learn and 
communicate, it should be worthwhile to explore its application in this arena. 
Practical Issues and Alternatives to ABM 
The second major reason is that aside from the discussion above, there 
are significant practical reasons to use ABM to model non-combatants.  In 
addition to illustrating non-combatants within purely ABMs, overlaying an ABM 
of non-combatants in existing accredited models would be a practical solution to 
expanding the range of these models to better cover urban operations.  This 
would help salvage current, constructive, force-on-force models that have 
required vast amounts of time, money, and resources to build.  Models such as 
Janus and JCATS are the result of significant development efforts.  These models 
have also undergone a lengthy and detailed verification, validation, and 
accreditation process that is designed to improve the quality of widely used 
military simulations.  Despite the effort that has gone into creating these existing 
large high-resolution combat models, they are ill equipped to handle many 
aspects of urban warfare.  ABM is the best alternative if one wishes to salvage 
these models, and the following discussion examines its advantages and 
disadvantages relative to other modeling approaches that could also be used to 
add non-combatants to existing accredited models. 
_________________ 
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The discussion above has already discussed the advantages and 
disadvantages of ABM.  There are other ways to represent non-combatant 
behavior in models and simulations: aggregate modeling, constructive modeling, 
and human-in-the-loop simulation.  Looking at each of these in turn, each has 
limitations that make them more difficult to use than ABM for simulating non-
combatants.  For comparison’s sake, this section also examines the strengths and 
weaknesses of using live actors to portray non-combatants in live exercises. 
The first alternative approach, aggregate modeling, is by far the easiest 
to implement.  This dissertation defines aggregate models to be those that do not 
deal with individual non-combatant actors, but use model inputs that represent 
aggregate numbers of non-combatants.  An example of a simple aggregate model 
with non-combatants is an equation that uses the size of a city’s population to 
suggest the number of troops required for peacekeeping or post-conflict 
operations.  The advantage to aggregate modeling is that it is simple and not 
computationally intensive.  Assumptions are usually much easier to discern than 
for other, more complex models.  It is also trivial to “include” very large 
numbers of civilians.  At the same time, this approach as significant drawbacks.  
Aggregate models of non-combatants miss much of the behavioral variation 
between individuals and do not illustrate the range of behaviors that troops on 
the ground might face.  They are also good for a limited number of policy 
questions, such as force sizing and some civilian casualty estimates, but are 
insufficient for many other issues.  For example, they do not allow models to 
incorporate individual-level behavioral theories and would not be useful for 
examining civilian crowds.  They are unable to deal with localized phenomena 
or very complex non-combatant behavior. The also lack the resolution to serve 
as a test bed for such things as weapons or sensor technologies. 
The second alternative is to use constructive modeling to control 
civilians in military models.  Constructive modeling does allow for individual 
civilian actors and for different types of actors.  However, actions are scripted, 
which does not allow for individual actors to react to their environment or 
surrounding actors.  This tends to produce unrealistic behavior, such as civilians 
continuing to travel along their assigned paths even as combat erupts around 
them.  Constructive modeling also makes it difficult to incorporate a large 
number of civilians into a simulation because programming individual and 
cooperative actions for each non-combatant becomes a time-consuming 
behavior.  This makes constructive modeling difficult to scale to the population 45
density level that would be seen in an actual urban environment.71  It is possible 
to control large number of non-combatants in constructive models using 
statistical approaches.  A 2004 Urban Resolve experiment modeled civilian 
vehicle traffic in Jakarta as part of a MOUT simulation.  Individual civilians had 
a timetable of events, a randomly generated departure time within a particular 
window, and randomly generated routes.72  Moving vehicular traffic is an 
important feature for MOUT models that include civilians, and the use of 
timetables does address the issue of scalability.  However, non-combatants were 
still not able to react to combatants, one another, or their environment and 
behavior remained unrealistic.  Because simulated non-combatants follow 
scripts, they would also be unable to show any of the complex behaviors 
discussed in this dissertation. 
The third alternative is modeling with some HITL responses.  HITL has 
the potential to generate non-combatant actors with a high degree of behavioral 
sophistication.  No matter how adaptable ABM agents may be, humans 
“gaming” a simulation will always be able to display a wider variety of 
behaviors and advanced attributes such as learning, adaptation, communication, 
and deception.  Human-controlled agents are also more flexible than 
programmed agents, making it easier to change the non-combatant environment.
Showing complex non-combatant behavior is also easy with HITL.  However, 
HITL approaches are also impractical to use for very large numbers of civilian 
actors.  Behavioral rules for HITL actors may also be opaque, and non-combatant 
behavior is likely to vary considerably when the human in the loop changes. 
The fourth alternative to using ABM (or any other purely virtual 
technique) is to depict non-combatants in live exercises.  Using real human 
beings to act as non-combatants during an urban exercise has many of the same 
advantages that HITL simulations offer: very intelligent and adaptable civilians 
who can exhibit a range of behaviors.  Theoretically, live exercises should be able 
to include a very large number of non-combatant actors.  In practice, resource 
constraints, safety, and potential legal issues put limitations on the number of 
participants.  They also limit the range of scenarios that one may consider 
because safety issues and resource constraints often limit the scope and variety 
of situations address in live exercises. One should also note that live exercises 
with civilian actors may be as susceptible to researcher bias as computer models.  
Controlling groups of exercise participants invariably involves giving them 
_________________ 
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instructions or guidelines for how to react and behave.  Such instructions do 
establish the boundaries for behavior, suggest behaviors, define the level of 
hostility, and set many other characteristics for the live non-combatant 
population.  These instructions will reflect the biases and assumptions of the 
person designing them, and it is unlikely that even live actors can ever act 
exactly as civilians do during actual urban operations. 
Table 2-2 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages for ABM and 
the alternative approaches discussed above.  The insufficiency of aggregate 
modeling for many policy issues and the impracticality of the remaining 
approaches almost leave ABM as the default method.  ABM’s disadvantages are 
manageable while its advantage of autonomous and scaleable agents addresses 
the prime shortcomings in constructive modeling.  Scalability is also the key 
reason that ABM is a better choice than HITL modeling, and it is a factor in 
considering ABM over live exercises. 47
Table 2-2.  Advantages and Disadvantages of Different Approaches to Replicating Non-
combatant Behavior 
Approach Advantages  Disadvantages 
Agent-based modeling  x Able to show individual-
level behavior 
x Scalable
x Heterogeneous actors 
x Learning and adaptation 
x Fairly simple agent 
behaviors give rise to 
complex non-combatant 
populations
x Non-combatant agents 
less intelligent or 
adaptable than HITL or 
live exercises 
x Use of technique does 
not automatically 
produce realistic 
behavior
Aggregate modeling  x Easy to implement 
x Sufficient for certain 
policy questions 
x Assumptions very 
transparent
x Unable to show 
individual-level 
behavior
x Inappropriate for high-
resolution modeling 
x Useful for limited 
number of policy 
applications
x Unable to handle 
localized environments 
Constructive modeling  x Able to show individual-
level behavior 
x Heterogeneous actors 
x Not easily scalable 
x Non-combatants do not 
respond to environment 
or other actors 
x Behaviors scripted and 
unlikely to be realistic 
x Complex population-
level behaviors difficult 
to portray 
Human-in-the-loop
(HITL) during 
simulations 
x Able to show individual-
level behavior 
x Highly intelligent and 
adaptable civilian actors 
x Can easily exhibit broad 
range of behaviors 
x Complex population-
level behaviors possible 
x Not easily scalable 
x Behavioral rules not 
transparent
x Non-combatant
behaviors will vary with 
participants
Live exercises  x Able to show individual-
level behavior 
x Simulated civilians 
intelligent and adaptable 
x Can easily exhibit broad 
range of behaviors 
x Complex population-
level behaviors possible 
x Narrower range of 
situations and scenarios 
x Resource constraints 
limit scalability 
x Potential safety and 
legal issues 
x Instructions given to 
participants also reflect 
designer biases and 
assumptions 48
Using ABM for non-combatants is also consistent with the current shift 
in military modeling towards autonomous combatants.  One example of this 
trend is TacAir-Soar, an “entity-based” system that generates autonomous pilots 
in tactical air combat simulations.73  Automated pilots are aware of their 
surroundings, are able to receive orders, and make decisions consistent with 
doctrine and tactics.74  TacAir-Soar was an improvement over Semi-Automated 
Forces (SAFORs), a system that produced semi-autonomous tactical air agents 
but that still required human input for many aspects of their behavior.75
Another example of the shift towards automation is MOUTbots, prototype 
autonomous adversaries developed specifically for urban training models.  
MOUTbots use Infiltration, a commercially available game, to model perception 
and motor actions.  It also uses Soar cognitive architecture to model long-term 
memory, perception, situational awareness, mission information, and goals.76
MOUTbots are intelligent, independent entities that can communicate and 
coordinate with each other.  This method of using commercial game engines 
within the Soar architecture is already being applied in the OneSAF simulator, 
and other models such as Full Spectrum Warrior and Full Spectrum Command 
use similar algorithms.77
Autonomous, independent, and adaptive model entities such as those 
discussed above may be considered “agents”.  Although ABM quite often 
conjures images of dot models, the ABM literature also describes complex 
entities whose primary distinguishing trait is that they are autonomous and 
intelligent.  There is no real separating line between the “entities” described in 
some of the more recent military simulations literature and the “agents” in some 
of the self-identified ABM literature.  Thus in a sense, mainstream military 
modeling and simulation has already begun using agent-based approaches.  It is 
incorrect to regard the Project Albert experiment in ABM as somehow 
unconnected to ongoing advances in more standard military simulations.  Using 
ABM to introduce autonomous non-combatants into military models is new only 
in that the approach has not been widely used to date for non-combatant actors. 
________________  
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Because of all these properties listed above, ABM should be of obvious 
interest to anyone attempting to simulate non-combatants.  Non-combatant 
behaviors contain many components that may be represented by a CAS.  Non-
combatants in urban operations are numerous, heterogeneous, operate on 
individual agendas, interact with other non-combatants, and respond to events 
around them.  In contrast, current non-combatants in existing military models 
are usually unresponsive, homogeneous, and unable to interact with combatants.  
ABM’s potential to simulate very different local non-combatant environments is 
also particularly relevant to urban operations.  However, this is a feat that has 
not yet been achieved with non-combatants in existing models.  ABM is also 
easily scalable to a large number of agents, allowing the possibility of simulating 
non-combatants in something approaching real-life population densities.  Again, 
current military models and simulations lack realistic non-combatant population 
density.  The ease with which ABM handles large populations suggests that 
further work with ABM may produce promising results. 
The realistic densities of non-combatants, the individually driven and 
adaptive behavior, and the emergent population-level behavior that emerges 
also have the possibility of expanding an element in military simulations that is 
typically in short supply: the fog of war.  Many things are meant by the fog of 
war, including: bad information, lack of information, poor communication, 
unexpected events, and other factors that produce cascading uncertainties.  Some 
frequent criticisms of combat models are that actors are too rational and that 
there are too few uncertainties compared to real life warfare.78  For those critics, 
having a virtual civilian population whose actions are not know beforehand (and 
whose interactions with combatants may have unforeseen consequences) should 
constitute an improvement over the current state of the art. 
_________________ 
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3. Case  Studies 
This dissertation reviews three past urban campaigns: Operation Just 
Cause (Panama, 1989), UNOSOM II (Somalia, 1993), and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (Iraq, 2003-ongoing).  Case studies focused on non-combatant behavior, 
casualties, and interaction with combatants during urban operations.  These 
behaviors are examined in greater depth in the following chapters.  Cases were 
selected from recent and ongoing U.S. operations in urban terrain.  All three 
cases involved high intensity urban warfare in the midst of sizeable urban 
populations.  Panama and Iraq also included a post-conflict phase where non-
combatants were prominent.  The rest of the chapter discusses each of the case 
studies in turn and summarizes the non-combatant behaviors that came out of 
these case studies.
Operation Just Cause (Panama) 
  President George H.W. Bush ordered Operation Just Cause in 1989 with 
the primary aim of removing Panamanian leader General Manuel Noriega.  The 
U.S. intervention came after steadily eroding relations between the United States 
and Panama.  Tensions culminated in an incident on December 16, 1989 where 
Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) killed a USMC lieutenant.79  The operation 
began on December 20, 1989 and military action was largely over by December 
24 when Noriega sought asylum at the Papal Nunciature.80  U.S. Southern 
Command’s (USSOUTHCOM) objectives were to destroy the combat capability 
of the PDF, to seize facilities vital to operating the Panama Canal, and to 
apprehend Noriega.  Joint Task Force (JTF) South consisted of 13,000 U.S. troops 
already in Panama plus 9,500 additional personnel from the United States.81
U.S. ground troops included Army infantry, airborne, and Rangers; Marines; and 
________________  
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Navy SEALS.82  Panamanian forces consisted of 19,600 PDF personnel and 
12,300 police, paramilitary, and Dignity Battalion members.  Panamanian forces 
were equipped and organized to deal with internal security but not designed to 
face an invading army.83
  U.S. forces carried out operations in and around Panama City and 
Colon, the two cities bordering the Panama Canal.  Panama City had a 
population of 1.2 million while Colon had a population of 60,000.84  Rules of 
engagement (ROE) allowed U.S. forces to shoot anyone that was armed, but U.S. 
personnel were also instructed to keep casualties – both combatant and non-
combatant – to a minimum.85  Approval was needed before ordering indirect fire 
from artillery or mortars, as well as for aerial bombing or strafing.  (Gunship 
cannon and rocket fire were exempt.)  Helicopter gunners were not permitted to 
return small arms fire from crowds and urban homes.86  Additionally, U.S. 
personnel on the ground were not allowed to return fire from snipers operating 
from the midst of crowds.87  Heavier weaponry, such as 90mm recoilless rifles, 
was not permitted against snipers on tenement balconies because of the 
hundreds of civilians within the buildings.88  ROE were also designed to give 
members of the Panamanian armed forces an opportunity to surrender.89  Many 
U.S. troops interpreted the ROE to mean that they had to take fire before being 
allowed to shoot.90
Some of the combat occurred in densely populated areas of Colon and 
Panama City where non-combatants were often intermixed with combatants.  
For example, some Panamanian military families lived in PDF buildings, and 
PDF complexes included civilian business or restaurants.91  Inevitably, there 
were non-combatant casualties even with the ROE.  Civilians were inadvertently 
_________________ 
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injured and killed inside their homes or as they fled gunfire.  There were also 
incidents of people in civilian vehicles being killed at roadblocks.92
Additionally, there were an uncertain number of deaths from the fires that 
started during the fighting.  On the first night of Operation Just Cause, fires 
broke out among several wooden buildings surrounding PDF headquarters in 
the El Chorillo neighborhood of Colon.93  U.S. tracer rounds are thought to be 
responsible for some of these fires.94  And estimated 2,000 buildings were 
burned down,95 leaving about 2,700 families in El Chorillo (between 10,000 and 
15,000 people) homeless.96  However, civilians in Colon were generally friendly 
to U.S. forces and reacted with celebration at the news that Noriega had 
surrendered.97
After initial combat in Colon, U.S. forces were engaged in negotiations to 
convince remaining PDF forces to surrender.  Snipers, often members of the 
Dignity Battalion, operated from civilian buildings and crowds in Colon and 
Panama City after PDF forces had largely stopped fighting.  Snipers continued 
even after Noriega was in U.S. custody.98  In the meantime, Colon residents 
began looting the city.  Navy SEALs killed three armed civilians during looting 
in Colon in an incident that reduced the scale and magnitude of the looting 
afterwards.99  Tear gas was also somehow released within the city, causing some 
to panic.  U.S. forces urged civilians to remain in their homes, but some 200 out 
of the 60,000 living in Colon fled the city.  Looters ransacked hundreds of stores 
and looting continued even though U.S. forces were in control of Colon by the 
third day of the invasion.  There was also extensive looting in Panama City.100
In that city, U.S. military operations largely took place on the outskirts of the 
city.  However, looting began in the center of the capital early on December 20th.
Looting and chaos continued in downtown Panama City for three or four days 
and firefights often broke out between vigilantes, looters, and Dignity Battalion 
forces.101  It should be noted that looting in Panama City began on December 20, 
________________  
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the same day that Operation Just Cause began.  It appears that looting began as 
soon as it became clear that Noriega’s forces were no longer in control, even 
though Noriega did not officially surrender until four days later.  
  Estimates of the total number of non-combatant dead are better for 
Panama than they are for the other two cases in this dissertation.  The most 
credible estimates of Panamanian civilian deaths during Operation Just Cause 
put the number between 200 and 300.  USSOUTHCOM estimated 202 civilians 
and 314 Panamanian military dead, while the Panamanian Institute of Legal 
Medicine estimated 270-345 Panamanian civilian and military dead.102  The 
independent Panamanian Committee for Human Rights calculated 565 total 
Panamanian deaths, and the U.S. Physicians for Human Rights came up with a 
comparable figure.103  The Panamanian Institute of Legal Medicine and the 
Panamanian Committee for Human Rights identified 13% of the dead as women 
and children.104  Operation Just Cause also saw one U.S. civilian death. 
  Overall, despite the civilian casualties and the overthrow of a 
Panamanian government, Panamanians were basically friendly to U.S. forces.  
Panamanians had historically been concerned about the extent of U.S. influence 
in Panamanian affairs.  However, the Noriega government was unpopular and 
Panamanian public opinion generally favored the U.S. invasion.105  During 
combat between U.S. and Panamanian forces, civilians ran from gunfire and did 
not attempt to interfere.  (This is in contrast to civilians in Mogadishu, as will be 
described below.)  There was no attempt on their part to act as human shields for 
Panamanian forces or to attack U.S. forces.  Civilians even went as far as to 
identify PDF members and armed civilians for U.S. troops after Noriega 
surrendered.106  Panamanian forces were generally in uniform and did not 
attempt to use civilians as human shields.  Although some Dignity Battalion 
members did operate out of crowds and civilian buildings, this behavior did not 
seem to be as extensive as it would later be in Iraq.  Panamanian forces did use 
_________________ 
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civilian buses and other vehicles, but did not appear to do so out of any 
deliberate effort to camouflage themselves among the civilian population. 
Operation Continue Hope (Somalia) 
In 1992 and 1993, the UN undertook humanitarian relief efforts to 
address a famine in Somalia and peacekeeping operations to broker a ceasefire in 
that country’s civil war.  UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) lasted from 
April 1992 to March 1993.  (Operation Provide Relief and Operation Restore 
Hope were the U.S. contributions to UNOSOM I.107)  Under UNOSOM I, UN 
peacekeepers were to observe a ceasefire between warring factions in Somalia 
and to escort humanitarian aid deliveries in Mogadishu and other areas of the 
country.108  However, the security situation continued to worsen.  When it 
extended UN operations after the end of UNOSOM I, the UN Security Council 
authorized the 22,000 peacekeeping troops involved in UNOSOM II to use force 
if necessary to provide for a secure environment for ongoing humanitarian aid.
(Operation Continue Hope was the U.S. contribution to UNOSOM II.)  
UNOSOM II continued from March 1993 to March 1995.109  Unfortunately, the 
ceasefire did not hold during UNOSOM II either.   In June, fighting between 
armed Somalis and UNOSOM II personnel in Mogadishu left two dozen 
Pakistani peacekeepers dead.  Other clashes between UN peacekeepers and 
Somalis followed.  Then in October 1993, 18 U.S. peacekeepers died during a raid 
on members of Mohamed Farrah Aidid’s Habr Gidr clan in Mogadishu.  The 
United States withdrew from Somalia in early 1994.  UNOSOM II continued after 
the withdrawal of U.S. troops and formally ended in March 1995.110
  Most of this discussion about non-combatants in Operation Continue 
Hope centers around the two-day U.S. raid on October 3-4, 1993.  Task Force 
Ranger’s objective during a midday raid on the 3rd was to arrest several of 
Aidid’s top aids, including his foreign minister, political advisor, and 
propaganda chief.111  Members of Task Force Ranger included Army Rangers, 
________________  
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Delta Force, and Navy SEALs.  It was composed of 19 aircraft, 12 ground 
vehicles, and about 160 men.112  U.S. troops faced Aidid’s Somali National 
Alliance (SNA) militia plus other irregular fighters who joined in the fighting.  
Although the UN estimated the militia’s strength at about 1,000 full-time 
members, the SNA claimed 12,000 militia members.113  UN ROE in place at the 
time allowed UN peacekeepers to engage technicals, militia, and other armed 
crews without provocation.  U.S. forces had a more aggressive interpretation of 
the ROE than other peacekeepers.114
During the October raid in Mogadishu, there were several types of 
participants.  Aside from U.S. troops, there were members of Aidid’s militia, 
other armed Somalis who fired at the Americans, non-combatants who assisted 
those opposing U.S. forces, and other non-combatants not directly involved in 
the fighting.115  While civilians in Panama on the whole had been reasonably 
friendly to U.S. forces, Somali civilians proved to be quite hostile to U.S. troops.  
For example, by one estimate, there were three or four non-militia Somalis 
shooting at the Americans for every militia member also in the fight.116  By 
another estimate, there were some 50,000 people loyal to Aidid in the Wardigley 
district of Mogadishu where the raid took place.117  Citywide, estimates of 
Mogadishu’s total population ranged from half a million to nearly a million in 
1995.118
Unlike in Panama, civilians in Somalia often actively attempted to 
interfere with U.S. military operations during the October raid.  In the initial 
phase of that operation, thousands of Somalis (many armed) ran into the streets 
towards U.S. forces.  Overhead videotape of the engagement also showed 
“crowds of Somalis throughout the area erecting barricades and lighting tires to 
summon help,” presumably from Aidid’s militia or from irregular fighters.119
_________________ 
112 Bowden, pp. 5-6. 
113 Rich Atkinson, “The Raid that Went Wrong; How an Elite U.S. Force Failed in Somalia,” 
Washington Post, January 30, 1994, p. A1.   
114 Allard, p. 37. 
115 Rick Atkinson, “Night of a Thousand Casualties; Battle Triggered U.S. Decision to Withdraw 
from Somalia,” Washington Post, January 31, 1994, p. A1. 
116 Bowden, p. 200. 
117 Wheeler and Roberts, p. 5.  It is not clear how many of these 50,000 engaged in armed or 
unarmed opposition to U.S. forces. 
118 “Mogadishu,” Tiscali Reference, 2004, Internet: accessed at 
http://www.tiscali.co.uk/reference/encyclopaedia/hutchinson/m0002385.html on July 29, 2004; 
and “Somalia Page,” ElectionsInfo.com, 2003, Internet: accessed at 
http://www.electionsinfo.com/coun/s/somalia/index.php on July 29, 2004. 
119 Bowden, p. 19. 56
This behavior of civilians running towards the sound of fighting is a very 
unusual civilian response to combat.  Some have explained this as cultural.  
However, in addition to any cultural differences, there appear to have been other 
factors that could have encouraged less timid civilian behavior than in the other 
case studies.  One is that neither Noriega’s or Saddam Hussein’s government 
had popular backing.  Somalia did not have and still does not have a functioning 
government to speak of.  However, Aidid’s control over parts of Somalia was 
based on clan loyalties that gave him the support of many Somalis who were 
also members of the Habr Gidr clan.  Another potential factor was the scale of 
the conflict in Mogadishu compared with the other case study cities.  Fighting in 
Mogadishu involved a small number of U.S. troops in HMMWVs, trucks, and 
helicopters.  In contrast, fighting in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities involved 
much larger U.S. forces with Abrams tanks and a “shock and awe” aerial 
campaign.  Fighting in Panama also involved a greater use of force than in 
Somalia.
For several reasons, the distinction between non-combatants and 
combatants was especially difficult to make in Mogadishu.  First, Somali 
militiamen and other armed Somalis did not have uniforms.  Just as combatants 
in Somalia were distinguishable only by the arms they were carrying, militia 
vehicles were also armed civilian vehicles.  Aidid’s militia did not have vehicles 
that would normally be considered military vehicles.  However, Aidid’s men 
rode around in “technicals” – trucks armed with machine guns.  Second, there 
was an unusual amount of intermixing between combatants and non-
combatants.  In Mogadishu, gunfire brought Somalis both running towards it 
and away from it.  A crowd would often gather at the site of a firefight ten to 
twenty minutes after it began.  People flocking to the sound of gunfire included 
women, children, and the elderly in addition to armed Somali men.120
Third, people who would traditionally be considered non-combatants 
often joined in the fighting.  For example, in one incident a Somali boy about five 
years old fired an AK-47 at U.S. troops.  In another incident, a woman held a 
baby as she fired her pistol at U.S. forces.121  Fourth, unarmed non-combatants 
often voluntarily acted as human shields.  Somali women and children stood in 
front of armed combatants, both during the October 1993 raid where 18 U.S. 
servicemen died and during the June incident when the Pakistani peacekeepers 
________________  
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were killed.122  On the other hand, it also seems that concerns about civilian 
casualties may also have encouraged Somali combatants to exercise restraint.  In 
an interesting twist on the usual debate about human shields, many Somalis 
claim that U.S. troops avoided being killed as they spent the night of October 3rd
in the city because they took women and children hostages.123
Overall Somali civilian attitudes towards U.S. troops were quite hostile.  
Somali combatants mobilized the population with megaphones, calling them to 
come out and defend their homes.  The U.S. presence also seemed to unify and 
galvanize the various armed groups within the city.124  In contrast to operations 
in Panama, where civilians provided U.S. personnel with intelligence, civilians in 
Operation Continue Hope identified U.S. positions to Somali gunmen.125
Civilians in Operation Just Cause did not have a significant impact on 
either the outcome of U.S. military operations or the magnitude of U.S. military 
casualties.  In contrast, civilians in Mogadishu increased the mission’s difficulty 
for U.S. troops.  Somali leaders are quoted as saying that they had 312 killed and 
814 wounded.126  However, it is unknown how many of this number were 
militia, how many were irregular fighters who joined in the action, or how many 
were genuine non-combatants.  Other sources put the number of Somali civilian 
deaths at over 500.127
Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq) 
  The United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in March 
2003 primarily to prevent the use of Iraq’s suspected weapons of mass 
destruction against the United States.  British, Australian, and Canadian forces 
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also participated in OIF.  In total, the invasion of Iraq involved almost 470,000 
U.S. and coalition personnel, of which approximately 170,000 entered Iraq.128
OIF may be thought of in two major phases: major combat operations and post-
conflict operations.  Major combat operations lasted from March 19, 2003 to May 
1, 2003.  The second major phase of OIF lasted through the handover of 
sovereignty back to an Iraqi government in June 2004 and was ongoing at the 
time of this dissertation.  In November 2003, there were about 140,000 U.S. and 
coalition forces in Iraq.129  Although Iraqi civilians had ample warning of 
impending hostilities, OIF did not trigger the wave of refugees feared by many 
humanitarian aid agencies.  Instead, the vast majority of non-combatants 
remained in their homes and was present during major combat operations.
Although Iraqis left local areas that experienced fighting during the post-conflict 
operations, the second phase of OIF did not appear to generate large numbers of 
displaced persons either. 
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Figure 3-1.  Aerial Photograph of Baghdad (April 2, 2003) 
Source: NASA. 
Unlike the 1991 Gulf War, a significant percentage of the fighting during 
major combat operations in OIF took place in urban areas.  Fighting occurred in 
cities such as Baghdad, Basra, Nasiriyah, and Najaf.130  Baghdad was Iraq’s 
_________________ 
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largest city, with an estimated 5.6 million inhabitants.131  During this stage of 
OIF, U.S. forces faced the regular Iraqi Army, Iraqi Republican Guard, the 
paramilitary Saddam Fedayeen, and irregular volunteers from other Arab 
countries.  Rules of engagement for the U.S.Army’s Third Infantry Division (ID) 
allowed soldiers to shoot anyone in uniform or anyone with a weapon.  While 
many of the Iraqi soldiers and Republican Guard were in uniform, some were in 
civilian clothing and some wore mixed civilian and military clothing.  Fedayeen 
dressed in black or in civilian clothes.  Adding to the confusion were armed 
combatants deliberately dressed as civilians and soldiers shedding both their 
arms and their uniforms.132  There were also reports of gunmen in civilian 
clothing pretending to surrender or pretending to be dead.133
In Baghdad the Fedayeen did much of the fighting while Iraq’s 
conventional forces were not as active in engaging U.S. forces.  During major 
combat operations in OIF, the Fedayeen disguised themselves as civilians and 
operated from civilian buildings and vehicles.134  Iraqi conventional forces also 
appeared to have a strategy of putting military equipment and munitions in 
populated areas.  One U.S. Army battalion commander remarked that the Iraqi 
military and Fedayeen had put “90%” of their munitions caches in hospitals, 
schools, and mosques.135  Fedayeen also used Iraqi civilians as human shields in 
a much more direct way.  In villages in southern Iraq, Fedayeen forced groups of 
civilian outdoors to act as shields.  They also held women and children inside 
buildings from which they fired at U.S. troops.136  Human rights agencies 
reported frequent instances of Fedayeen deliberately using individuals and Iraqi 
families to attempt to shield themselves when confronted by U.S. forces.137
Eyewitness accounts give specific examples where Fedayeen deliberately sought 
out women and children as shields.138  Foreign Arab volunteers also often 
operated with a similar attitude towards civilians as the Fedayeen.139  Iraqi 
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civilians generally did not attempt to interfere in the fighting or to actively aid 
Iraqi combatants as Somali civilians had done.  Although Iraqi combatants 
deliberately attempted to disguise themselves within the surrounding civilian 
population, in general Iraqi civilians were not active participants in this tactic.  
Instead, civilians appeared to be reluctant involuntary human shields. 
Iraqi civilians did seek shelter during the fighting and generally 
appeared to be taking defensive actions.  However, there were occasions during 
major combat operations when they seemed to misunderstand their immediate 
danger.  For example, in one case civilians remained standing as U.S. Marines 
shot at snipers in their midst.  In that particular incident, civilians evidently had 
a high degree of faith in the accuracy of U.S. weapons and the ability of U.S. 
troops to shoot whomever they wanted without harming bystanders.140  This 
misunderstanding of U.S. technology may also have been a factor in why so few 
Iraqis left Baghdad before OIF began.141
During OIF, there was also frequent intermingling of non-combatant and 
combatant vehicles.  One reason for this intermixing was that Iraqi combatants 
deliberately attempted to use civilian vehicles for cover.  The Fedayeen often 
used civilian vehicles during major combat operations in Baghdad.  In addition 
to employing civilian trucks mounted with machine guns or anti-tank weapons, 
Iraqi combatants fired weapons out of cars that were otherwise indistinguishable 
from civilian vehicles.  Iraqi combatants also attempted to drive close to U.S. 
vehicles with hidden anti-tank and other weapons, posing as civilians.  
Additionally, Fedayeen deliberately forced civilians into Fedayeen vehicles in an 
attempt to use them as human shields.142
One feature present during the battle for Baghdad (but not in Colon, 
Panama City, or Mogadishu) was the presence of suicide bombers in civilian 
vehicles attempting to approach U.S. forces.143  This considerably heightened 
tensions for U.S. troops over seemingly civilian vehicles that could have hostile 
intentions.144  It had an effect on how U.S. forces tended to perceive approaching 
civilian vehicles, even though the actual number of suicide bombers turned out 
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to be fairly low.  (One former USMC officer that accompanied the 1st Marine 
Division into Baghdad estimated that one out of perhaps ten thousand cars 
approaching U.S. forces was a suicide bomber.145)  For approaching vehicles, 
ROE for units of the U.S. Army’s 3rd ID instructed them to fire a warning shot 
and then to fire into the engine before firing at occupants.146  By some accounts, 
however, there were no clear instructions for when to fire on approaching 
vehicles for the 1st Marine Division that was also sent into Baghdad.147
A second factor that added to this intermingling of vehicles was the fact 
that Iraqi civilians also seemed to underestimate the dangers of driving during 
combat.  On the approach to Baghdad, U.S. forces often encountered civilians 
driving on highways at night.  This was despite the fact that civilians were 
evidently aware that U.S. tanks and Fedayeen in civilian vehicles were also on 
the road.148  Iraqi civilians for their part did not seem to grasp the danger they 
were in because of the Fedayeen’s tactics and continued to drive in plain sight of 
American forces.  Civilians seemed to fail to understand the level of danger they 
faced when they were near U.S. forces and inadvertently provided cover for 
Iraqi combatants.  (There is no evidence to suggest that civilians purposely drove 
on the streets to camouflage the Fedayeen.)  They also seemed to disregard the 
additional difficulty that U.S. forces would have in distinguishing between 
vehicles at night, regardless of night-vision technology. 
A third factor that increased the number of non-combatant vehicles on 
the battlefield was a lack of information.  When U.S. troops began the battle for 
Baghdad, the vast majority of Iraqis were not aware that the Americans had 
entered the city.  Instead, they were driving around the city carrying on their 
normal activities.  With Saddam Hussein’s government announcing to its public 
that U.S. forces had been stopped outside the capital, even members of his armed 
forces were caught off-guard when they came face-to-face with U.S. combat 
vehicles in the city.149  Many Iraqi families continued routine travel on 
Baghdad’s roads and highways during the initial U.S. advance into the capital, 
often blundering into crossfire or straight at U.S. military vehicles.  Even when 
U.S. forces followed ROE designed to warn off approaching vehicles, many 
civilians killed in approaching vehicles appeared to have ignored or 
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misunderstood these warnings.150  In some cases, civilians who were killed by 
U.S. troops for driving towards them did not seem to have heard warning shots 
or to even notice U.S. tanks before they were shot.151
Although non-combatants did not play an active role in events at the 
beginning of OIF, large numbers of Iraqis did participate in the looting that 
followed the fall of Saddam Hussein’s government.  Iraqi civilians began looting 
government buildings and state-owned companies on the same day as soon as it 
became clear that the government was no longer in control.152  Just as 
Panamanian looters did not wait for Noriega to surrender before they began 
taking advantage of the lack of law and order, Iraqi looters were also 
opportunistic and began looting the same day it was clear that Saddam Hussein 
was no longer in control.  (U.S. forces later captured Saddam Hussein on 
December 14, 2003.153)  The looting increased in scope as it continued for days 
and in many cases turned violent.154  Looting was also reported in other cities 
such as Basra and Mosul, even though Mosul had not seen any previous fighting 
during OIF.155  Baghdad descended into lawlessness and chaos with few Iraqis 
deterred by the relatively small number of U.S. troops present in the city at the 
time.  Scenes of civilians looting for days in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities 
created political pressure for the U.S. government to bring the situation under 
control quickly.  At the operational level, there was pressure for U.S. troops to 
transition into law enforcement activities, even as they continued to conduct 
combat operations against remaining combatants. 
  Total Iraqi civilian casualties during major combat operations are 
difficult to estimate.  While there are better figures available than for Operation 
Restore Hope, estimates of the number of non-combatants killed are not nearly 
as precise as they were for Operation Just Cause.  The Project on Defense 
Alternatives estimated that 8,789 to 10,638 civilians died between March 19, 2003 
when the war started and March 31, 2003.  The group’s estimate was based on 
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media reports and eyewitness accounts.156  However, it is impossible to say what 
percentage of these civilians were killed by U.S. or British forces, as opposed to 
being victims of Iraqi regular or irregular forces, or to the crime and looting in 
the aftermath of the government’s fall.  Another group, Civic, estimated that 
there were more than 5,000 civilians killed between March 20 and May 1, 
2003.157  The Associated Press’ survey of half Baghdad’s hospitals found 3,240 
civilian deaths between March 20 and April 20.158  The majority of the civilian 
deaths appear to have been caused by the ground war.  While most of the air 
war did not seem to harm large numbers of civilians, the “decapitation” strikes 
aimed at senior Iraqi leaders did appear to result in a disproportionate number 
of casualties: these fifty or so leadership strikes were often conducted near 
civilian homes in populated areas and are thought to have caused dozens of 
casualties in each incident.159
During the second phase of operations in Iraq, U.S. and British forces 
faced Sunni and Shitte insurgents, former Baath party members, and foreign 
Arab terror groups.  These factors often formed various militia groups such as 
Moqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army.160  By late October of 2004, U.S. officials 
estimated that there were between 8,000 and 12,000 dedicated insurgents in Iraq.  
Including active sympathizers and accomplices brought this number up to over 
20,000.161  U.S. forces were engaged in a mix of reconstruction and combat 
activities at once, often engaging in high-intensity urban conflict in areas 
including Karbala, Najaf, Fallujah, Nasiriya, Basra, Ramadi, Sammara, and Sadr 
City in Baghdad.162
Insurgent attacks on both coalition forces and Iraqi civilians increased in 
2004, with bombings and hostage-taking becoming almost daily activities by the 
latter half of the year.163  Fallujah was the center of intensified Sunni resistance 
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during April of 2004.  Al Sadr was one of the strongest forces behind Shiite 
resistance, which manifested itself throughout the year in Karbala, Najaf, 
Nasiriya, and Sadr City.164  Despite numerous counter-insurgency operations 
and negotiated cease-fire agreements with al Sadr’s forces, the United States 
continued to face an ongoing low-level Shiite insurgency for much of 2004.  
During this period, Iraq also became a magnet for al Qaeda and other terrorist 
groups.  Al Qaeda operative Abu Musad al-Zarqawi’s group, Monotheism and 
Jihad, was thought by U.S. forces to be operating out of Fallujah by the fall of 
2004.165  U.S. forces specifically targeted Zarqawi and his followers during 
operations in Fallujah in October 2004.166  During this stage of OIF, insurgents 
did not appear to actively force civilians to act as involuntary human shields, as 
the Fedayeen had done during major combat operations.  However, insurgents 
did operate out of heavily populated areas to blend in with the surrounding non-
combatants. 
Iraq’s insurgency continued after democratic elections in January 2005 
despite hopes that elections would reduce violence.167  The year was marked by: 
an ongoing Sunni resistance, fears of sectarian conflict, violent criminal activity, 
and additional activity from al Qaeda members in Iraq.  Cases of apparent 
violence between Sunni and Shiite Iraqis became more evident after April 2005, 
when a Shiite-led government took power as a result of the elections.168  These 
included car bombings in Shiite areas of Baghdad; attacks on Shiite pilgrims on 
their way to Karbala and Najaf; and attacks on Sunni clerics and other prominent 
individuals.169  In addition to their usual bombings and kidnappings, in 2005 al 
Qaeda began targeting diplomats from other Arab countries.  In July 2005, the 
group captured and killed the Egyptian representative to Iraq and kidnapped 
two Algerian diplomats.170
The frequent clashes between U.S. and coalition troops with various 
insurgents and terrorists in urban areas invariably resulted in civilian casualties 
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even after major combat operations were declared over on May 1, 2003.  Human 
Rights Watch reported 20 confirmed and 74 suspected civilians deaths at the 
hands of U.S. forces in Baghdad between May 1 and September 30, 2003.  The 
organization reported three categories of deaths: those that happened during 
raids, those who died when military personnel “responded disproportionately 
and indiscriminately,” and those who did not stop at checkpoints.171  Confusion 
over instructions, misunderstanding over how to react to U.S. warning shots, 
nervous sentries, the presence of actual suicide bombers, and the changing 
location or unexpected presence of checkpoints in Iraq resulted in quite a few 
civilian casualties.  In some of the document cases in Baghdad involving 
casualties at checkpoints, civilians did not stop because they were unaware of 
the checkpoint; unaware that they were required to stop at checkpoints; afraid to 
stop because of hijackers; driving too fast to hear warnings; or driving with 
music playing too loudly to hear warnings.172
Again, many civilians were killed during clashes between U.S. troops 
and insurgents after major combat operations ended.  Many others were killed 
and injured by insurgent bombs aimed at civilians, or were caught in insurgent 
attacks directed at U.S. troops, U.S. contractors, and the Iraqi army.  During 
reconstruction, Iraqi civilians also became targets in their own right.  Car and 
suicide bombings became common occurrences in Baghdad and other areas of 
the country, killing people at mosques, funerals, weddings, checkpoints, 
employment lines, and other congregation points.173  (There were 135 car 
bombings in Iraq in May 2005.174)  Individual Iraqis perceived to be working 
with U.S. forces, U.S. contractors, U.S. or international news agencies, or 
international aid groups were often killed or kidnapped.175  Members of the 
Iraqi police and their potential recruits were also frequent targets of bombings 
and shootings.176  In addition to deliberately attacking civilians, insurgents also 
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used the civilian population as human shields.  Although insurgents did not 
actively force individual civilians between them and U.S. forces, they operated 
out of civilian areas to blend in with the surrounding population and thus used 
civilians as involuntary human shields.177
Iraqi civilian deaths continued to mount during OIF.  Most estimates put 
total civilian deaths at between 10,000 and 15,000 from the start of OIF in March 
2003 through October 2004.178  In July 2005, the group Iraq Body Count 
announced that 25,000 Iraqi civilians had died since the beginning of OIF, 
including Iraqi police, police recruits, and Iraqi army recruits.179  According to 
its statement, Baghdad had the highest number of deaths (nearly half) and 
Fallujah had the second highest.  Iraq Body Count noted that civilian deaths had 
increased over time, with roughly 6,000 deaths the first year after major combat 
operations ended but about 11,000 deaths the second year.180  The group also 
maintained that U.S.-led forces caused 37% of these deaths, criminals 36%, and 
insurgents 10%.181  This would suggest that 2,500 Iraqi civilians were killed by 
insurgents.  In contrast, the Iraqi Interior Ministry claimed that 12,000 Iraqis had 
been killed by insurgents as of June 2005182 – a figure that would be roughly half 
of Iraq Body Count’s total number of deaths.183
Also according to Iraq Body Count, 18% of Iraqi civilians who died 
within the first two years after the start of OIF were women and children under 
age 18.184  The data covered both major combat operations and reconstruction, 
making it difficult to see how exposure to danger changed for women and 
children over time.  Adult women made up 9% of the dead,185 consistent with 
the idea that women restricted their travel during OIF.  Fear of sexual assault 
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and abduction in the security vacuum the followed major combat operations 
lead many families to keep women and girls at home.186
There were still instances during major combat operations in OIF when 
women and children made up a disproportionate number of the casualties.  In 
instances when the violence is brought directly into Iraqi homes, restricting 
travel does not arguably reduce exposure to danger.  In these cases, it is 
reasonable to expect that women and children among the dead would approach 
their overall demographic numbers.  For example, air strikes aimed at Iraqi 
leadership targets frequently killed families in their homes.  The unsuccessful 
April 5, 2003 strike against Lieutenant General Ali Hassan al-Majid (“Chemical 
Ali”) in a residential area of Basra killed 17 civilians, including 11 children under 
age 18 and three adult women.187  The use of cluster munitions in some areas 
also increased casualties among children as they had a higher propensity to pick 
up unexploded submunitions.  For example, the use of cluster munitions in the 
town of al-Hillia on March 31, 2003 left 11 children and four adults dead.188
Women and children were also a higher proportion of deaths during the ground 
war in Iraq was the battle for Nasiriyah in March and April 2003.  Fighting 
between Marines and Iraqi forces from March 20 to April 25 resulted in 405 
documented civilian deaths directly attributable to the fighting, including 169 
children (42% of deaths) and 72 adult women (18% of deaths).  The death toll in 
Nasiriyah during major combat operations was thus 60% women and 
children.189
Overall, Iraqi civilians attitudes towards U.S. troops has been mixed, 
with some groups hostile, some neutral, and some friendly.  This is reflected in 
the fact that civilians have provided intelligence to both U.S. personnel and to 
insurgents.190
Types of Non-combatant Behaviors 
  Table 3-1 below summarizes some general case study characteristics.  All 
operations involved high-intensity urban combat but differed in a number of 
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other attributes, such as different operation durations and civilian to U.S. 
combatant ratios.  Reviewing the three case studies shows different civilian 
characteristics from each operation as well.  Civilians in Panama were generally 
friendly to U.S. forces (with some exceptions) while civilians in Somalia were 
generally hostile.  Iraqi non-combatants were generally neutral during the major 
combat phase of OIF but more mixed in their responses during the post-conflict 
period.  The case studies also showed the different degrees to which enemy 
combatants attempted to blend into the civilian population or to otherwise use 
their presence to their advantage.  Panamanian and Iraqi forces both traveled in 
vehicles that appeared to be civilian.  Although Panamanian forces did not 
appear to do so out of an attempt to disguise themselves among the civilian 
population, Iraqi combatants during OIF used civilian vehicles precisely for this 
effect. 
Table 3-1.  General Case Study Characteristics 
Panama Somalia  Iraq 
Major combat 
Iraq
Post-conflict
Operation Timeframe  Days Hours  – 
Days
Weeks Months 
General Civilian 
Attitude to U.S. Troops 
Friendly Hostile  Neutral  - 
Friendly 
Mixed
Combatants Disguised 
as Civilians 
No Not 
Deliberate
Yes Yes 
Human Shields  No Voluntary  Involuntary  Involuntary 
Population in Capital 
During Operation 
1.2 million  500,000 to 
1 million 
5.6 million  5.6 million 
U.S. Forces in 
Country** 
22,500 4,500  170,000  110,000  to 
150,000
Enemy Combatants  31,900  N/A  N/A  8,000 to 12,000 
Citywide Ratio 
Civilian: U.S. Troops
60:1* 3,000  to 
6,000:1
N/A N/A 
Civilian Deaths  202  500+  5,000+  12,000 - 20,000 
(July 2005) 
U.S. Deaths 26  18  138  1,797 
(July 31, 2005) 
Approximate Ratio 
Civilian: U.S. Deaths
8:1  30:1  40:1  7 to 11:1 
*Average ratio across Panama City and Colon. 
**May be different than forces present in a city. 
Source on civilian and U.S. military deaths: Glenn, et. al. for Panama; Allard and Glenn, et. al and 
Somalia; Civic, Onishi, Tavernise, O’Hanlon and de Albuquerque, and GlobalSecurity.org for Iraq. 
This dissertation proposes a layered approach to introducing civilian 
behavior in models, simulations, and other types of analysis.70
Figure 3-2.  Modeling Non-combatant Behavior 
It is best to begin with general civilian population demographics when 
thinking about non-combatants in urban operations.  Often, a first approach to 
thinking about non-combatant behavior in models and simulations is to begin 
with the advanced, complex behaviors that require specific goals and interaction 
between non-combatants and combatants.  However, general population 
characteristics provide the context for non-combatant behavior and may be 
thought of as the base layer in a framework for incorporating non-combatants 
into military models and simulations.  The next layer is simple behavior that 
civilians most commonly exhibit in urban settings, such as daily travel, and 
reflexive reactions to combat.  Many of the simpler behaviors may be more 
universal than complex behaviors and are important in their own right for 
understanding civilian casualties and the operational challenges that U.S. forces 
face in densely populated areas.  The final layer is complex behavior that 
requires purposeful action on the part of civilians and a more sophisticated level 
of interaction with enemy and U.S. combatants.  The layers build on one another 
with the lower ones, providing context and support for the upper ones.
The simple and complex behaviors identified in this dissertation were 
the ones that stood out in the case studies as having the greatest impact on U.S. 
military operations and on civilian casualties.  Simple behaviors provide the 
backdrop and context for more complex ones.  They also appear more frequently 
than complex behaviors.  Simple physical movement includes background 
activity, such as commuting, travel, and congregation: 
Populating Models
Simple
Behavior
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Behavior
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Table 3-2.  Travel and Congregation During Operations 
Panama Somalia  Iraq 
Major combat 
Iraq
Post-conflict
Commuting/Travel Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Congregation  Limited Yes  Yes  Yes 
Travel, commuting, and congregation were universal behaviors across 
all three cases studies.  Although the extent to which civilians showed these 
behaviors varied, they appeared in all three case study countries even during 
very different types of urban operations.  A look at non-combatants in the case 
studies showed that background behavior was fairly universal.  Simple 
behaviors also include simple reactions to combat: running from fighting, taking 
shelter, ignoring combat, and running towards fighting.191
Table 3-3.  Simple Civilian Reactions to Combat 
Panama Somalia  Iraq 
Major combat 
Iraq
Post-conflict
Run Away  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Take Shelter  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Ignore
Combat
Vehicles Uncertain  Vehicles, 
Some pedestrians 
Vehicles
Run Towards  No Yes  No  No 
  Most of the simple reactions to combat (running away, taking shelter, 
ignoring the fighting, and running towards it) also appeared to be near-universal 
responses.  Non-combatants in the case studies exhibited the first three behaviors 
to varying degrees.  Running away from combat and taking shelter were evident 
among civilians in all case studies.  For example in Panama, civilians ran from 
firefights, often using lulls in the fighting to run away from the proximity of 
combatants.  The fires in Colon also caused people to flee certain areas.  Many 
Somali civilians also ran away from the fighting and sought shelter, even as 
others were running towards combat at the same time.  Iraqi civilians also 
frequently showed these two behaviors.  Seemingly ignoring combat was also a 
trait found among civilians in both Panama and Iraq, particularly those in 
_________________ 
191 Civilians may have various motives when they display these behaviors.  For instance, 
civilians that appear to be ignoring combat may be unaware of their situation, or may underestimate 
the danger they face. 72
vehicles.  On the other hand, only Somali civilians ran towards the sound of 
fighting and congregated at the scene.192
Civilians in the case studies also displayed behavior that could be 
considered complex.  The following table is not meant to be an exhaustive list of 
all the complex behavior that non-combatants in these three cases exhibited.  
Instead, it identifies some of the more notable complex behaviors found during 
these operations.  The ones examined in this dissertation are looting, acting as 
human shields, attacking U.S. forces, and swarming.  Although the simple 
behaviors discussed above had interaction between civilians and combatants, 
this interaction is best characterized as unplanned or reflexive.  On the other 
hand, these complex behaviors begin to incorporate purposeful and directed 
interactions between civilians and enemy combatants or U.S. forces.  With some 
of the behaviors, non-combatants begin to cross the line into becoming 
combatants themselves.
Table 3-4.  Complex Civilian Reactions to Combat 
Panama Somalia  Iraq 
Major combat 
Iraq
Post-conflict
Looting  Yes No Yes  No 
Involuntary 
Human Shields 
No No Yes  Yes 
Voluntary 
Human Shields 
No Yes No  No 
Attacking U.S. 
Forces 
Yes (Rare)  Yes (Common)  Yes (Rare)  N/A 
Swarming  No Yes No  No 
Compared with the simple behaviors listed in Tables 3-2 and 3-3, the 
complex behaviors above are much more likely to be situation-specific.  In other 
words, all non-combatants in each of the case studies displayed some of the 
simple background behaviors such as traveling and running from combat; but 
whether or not they looted or attacked U.S. forces varied on a case-by-case basis.
Identifying which of the listed complex behaviors appeared in each case study 
gives a feel for the civilian environment that U.S. troops encountered in each 
operation.  For instance, civilian attacks on U.S. forces in Panama and Iraq 
during major combat operations were generally isolated cases.  In contrast, in 
________________  
192 There appear to be very few instances of this behavior anywhere outside the Somalia case.  
From a modeling prospective it is still a simple reaction to combat and will be discussed in the 
chapter on simple non-combatant behavior. 73
Somalia, it was common for civilians to attack U.S. troops, to act as voluntary 
human shields, and even to swarm – a complex behavior on the battlefield 
generally associated only with combatants.   
Following the layered approach suggested above, the following chapters 
begin with the simplest facts about non-combatants and build up from that 
point.  Thus, Chapter 4 discusses populating military models and simulations 
with non-combatant actors.  Chapter 5 discusses simple behaviors such as 
background activity and simple reactions to combat.  Chapter 6 continues on to 
complex behaviors.  Each layer of non-combatant attributes or behaviors builds 
on the next, with simple and widely applicable attributes at the bottom of the 
pyramid and complex and situation-specific ones at the top.  The remainder of 
Chapter 3 presents a brief summary of the non-combatant behaviors that will be 
discussed.74
4.  Populating Models with Non-
combatants
How should the United States think about conducting operations in 
highly populated areas?  Chapter Four discusses beginning with the simple step 
of populating models with non-combatants.  Analytically, this is the first 
building block in modeling civilians. Introducing the proper non-combatant 
population density and ratio to combatants is a starting point for understanding 
the scope of how non-combatants may impact events.  There are insights to be 
gained from merely populating models with non-combatants in numbers that 
reflect real-life cities.  Even before discussing non-combatant behaviors, doing so 
allows for consideration of civilian casualties, operational challenges, and force 
structure requirements.  It is also a good beginning for modeling something as 
complex as non-combatant behavior in urban operations.  This is because 
starting with a stationary population of non-combatant agents is analogous to 
creating a model with simple assumptions and exploring the implications before 
going on to more sophisticated inputs and functions.  Rather than starting with a 
few highly complex non-combatant actors in a model, it is simpler and more 
analytically robust to begin with simple questions about the scale of a non-
combatant population in a model.  Starting with the numbers of non-combatants 
in a given urban area is to begin with the most general characteristic of a non-
combatant population, rather than to begin with highly specialized and 
situation-specific non-combatant agents. 
This philosophy of beginning with the simplest assumptions and 
building up to more complex ones is reflected even within this chapter.  The first 
section elaborates on the importance of incorporating the correct scale of non-
combatants in a model.  The section that follows on population density 
introduces the simple assumption of a civilian population that is stationary, 
homogeneous, and uniformly distributed.  The next section discusses expanding 
on this assumption by adding heterogeneity in a population – heterogeneity in 
density, demographic characteristics, casualties, and other attributes.  The 
following section deals with changes in density and heterogeneity over time.  
The final section of Chapter 4 provides an example of how using population 
density can result in relevant analysis on a policy problem. 75
Importance of Scale 
As previously argued, many current military models and simulations do 
not include non-combatants.  Where they do, combatants usually vastly 
outnumber non-combatants.  Although this is the current norm in the military 
simulations, it would be useful to populate models with non-combatant 
population densities that better reflect real-world levels.  There are several 
reasons why military models would be enhanced by the addition of non-
combatant actors on the correct scale. 
First, it begins to give a picture of the correct magnitude of civilian 
casualties one could expect from an operation.  Second, it gives a more realistic 
picture of the operational challenges that U.S. forces may face even among a 
large number of neutral civilians.  Even when civilians are relatively passive or 
seeking to stay out of the way of the fighting, their mere presence may 
complicate matters.  Analysis that explicitly deals with population numbers can 
highlight implications for planning and other issues.  Scale begins to matter 
particularly as some effects are exponential rather than linear.  Third, scale 
affects force structure requirements.  Introducing the correct order of magnitude 
of an urban population allows for basic force structure modeling and 
understanding of force requirements.  Fourth, combatant and non-combatant 
interactions in real life can have dramatic effects on casualties and mission 
objectives.  Having non-combatants in a model at the correct scale is arguably a 
necessary precondition to fully see these effects in the analytic tools that the 
defense community uses to make policy decisions. 
To expand on the first point, civilian casualties are a major concern when 
using military force in urban areas.  By definition, these areas have large 
numbers of non-combatants who can be harmed or killed by U.S. operations.  In 
addition to basic concern for human life, non-combatant deaths can also lead to 
political backlash and to operational constraints.  Instantaneous media coverage 
of conflicts, the advent of precision weaponry, and increased sensitivity over 
civilian deaths since World War II have changed the norms about what level of 
civilian casualties are acceptable.  During World War II, the tens and even 
hundreds of thousands of civilians killed by the U.S. firebombing of German and 
Japanese cities did not result in pressure to scale back these attacks.  In contrast, 
the United States significantly decreased bombing operations in Baghdad after 
planners unwittingly killed hundreds of Iraqi civilians in a shelter at the Al 76
Firdos command, control, and communications facility during the 1991 Gulf 
War.193
Adding more realistic non-combatant population densities to models 
would begin to allow decision makers to see the type of casualties that they may 
expect in real cities.  At these higher levels of simulated casualties, slight shifts in 
weapons parameters or tactics may produce noticeable changes in casualties that 
may not have been statistically significant in a simulated environment that 
consisted of relatively few civilians.  Another aspect of population demographics 
not yet incorporated into existing models is differentiation by age and gender.  
There is greater sensitivity to deaths among women and children during actual 
operations, yet non-combatants in most models are homogeneous.  The United 
States is also more likely to conduct operations in developing countries where 
there are a high percentage of young children.  Models with greater population 
densities will naturally show larger numbers of such sensitive casualties. 
On the second point, increased civilian population densities in models 
should also better highlight some of the operational difficulties that U.S. troops 
on the ground face in urban areas. However, the potential extent of such 
difficulties is not visible in models that are sparsely populated with non-
combatants.  For example, the problem of clutter, situational awareness, and 
successfully enemy identification in a densely populated city may not seem to be 
a major issue in a simulation or real-life exercise where combatants significantly 
outnumber non-combatants.  However, this problem could easily start to look 
overwhelming when non-combatants outnumber combatants by a thousand or 
more to one.  This would be especially true if there are disadvantageous 
nonlinear or threshold effects for sensors, communications networks, and other 
attributes that would otherwise enable better situational awareness.  This 
magnitude of sensory clutter would also become an important consideration 
when simulating the value or the effect of information in urban terrain. 
Clutter from high concentrations of non-combatants is especially 
important when simulating the performance of innovative programs such as 
Future Combat Systems (FCS), which rely heavily on superior situational 
awareness for survival.  In the wake of OIF, some have raised doubts about the 
potential survivability of FCS in an urban setting.  FCS depends heavily on 
information superiority for survival, but critics have noted that such superiority 
is far easier against conventional armored vehicles in a conventional war than 
________________  
193 Eric Schmitt, “A Nation at War: Civilians; Rumsfeld Says Dozens of Important Targets Have 
Been Avoided,” New York Times, March 24, 2003, p. B12; and William M. Arkin, “ Baghdad: the Urban 
Sanctuary in Desert Storm?” Airpower Journal, Vol. 11 (Spring 1997), pp. 13-4. 77
during stability and peace operations in an urban environment where 
combatants blend in with non-combatants.194  Given the requirement that the 
FCS be able to operate across the spectrum of conflict, it would be important to 
understand its potential in urban settings.  Dramatically increasing the number 
of non-combatant actors in simulations of FCS deployment is a simple way to 
begin exploring this question. 
On the third point, the scale of a civilian population will have force 
structure and force sizing implications in urban operations.  Dramatically 
increasing population densities even in very low-resolution analytic models 
begins to yield insights about force structure and manpower requirements that 
would not have been obvious with the way models are currently populated.  As 
has been frequently discussed in the urban operations literature, cities in most 
areas of the world are becoming more and more populated.  For example, urban 
combat in modern day metropolitan Seoul would be vastly different from what 
it was over fifty years ago during the Korean War when the city was 
unindustrialized and far smaller.  The dramatic increase in population and urban 
structures in that city since the 1950s would increase both the intensity of urban 
warfare and the size of a force required to secure and hold the city.195  The 
manpower requirement for some types of peacekeeping and stability operations 
is also proportional to the size of the surrounding civilian population.  Larger 
civilian populations require greater numbers of military police to provide 
security, civil affairs personnel for manage relations, and engineers to run or 
repair urban infrastructure.  (One criticism of OIF is that the U.S. failed to have 
enough troops on the ground in Baghdad to manage the security situation in the 
city immediately after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s government.196)
Lastly, on the fourth point, few models currently employ the kinds of 
civilian-combatant interactions that often mark actual urban operations.  The 
presence and behavior of non-combatants is background to the drama between 
red and blue in most current models.  Non-combatant behavior and casualties 
are often side outcomes in a model run and do not in and of themselves affect 
the primary results: red casualties, blue casualties, and other measures of 
effectiveness for the simulated mission.  A few models that concentrate on 
stability and support operations (SOSO), such as DIAMOND, do incorporate 
non-combatant behavior into the outputs and measures of effectiveness used to 
_________________ 
194 Joshua Kucera, “Iraq Conflict Raises Doubts on FCS Survivability,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,
May19, 2004. 
195 Glenn, Steeb, Matsumura, p. 3. 
196 Robin Wright and Thomas E. Ricks, “Bremer Criticizes Troops Levels,” Washington Post,
October 5, 2004, p A1. 78
evaluate model results.  However, it is usually the case that non-combatants are 
afterthoughts who have little impact on combatant activities in a simulated 
battle.  Again, this is in contrast to the reality of urban operations, where non-
combatants often effect or even direct events.  Increasing the number of 
interactive non-combatants by a few orders of magnitude in a simulation should 
better allow for the recreation of a challenging urban environment and would set 
the groundwork for analyzing the effects of more complex civilian actions.  
Further developing these analytic tools should help policy makers in urban 
operations decisions ranging from equipping platforms to providing guidance to 
troops on how to interact with non-combatants. 
Non-combatants can have a substantial impact on the course of events in 
an urban operation.  This not to say that they always do: they did not appear to 
hinder U.S. forces in Colon (Panama) in 1989 or the initial armored force in 
Baghdad in 2003 from achieving their combat objectives.  Instead, the point is 
that they may and that populating models correctly is the start of taking this into 
consideration.  There were isolated incidents in all three case studies where 
civilians attacked U.S. troops.  However, it was only in the case of Somalia that 
civilians drastically hindered U.S. operations because the high prevalence of this 
behavior plus an urban population density produced a situation that 
overwhelmed U.S. personnel.  In any mental or computer model of U.S. forces 
confronting hostile civilians, the possibilities for what can happen expand as the 
number of hostile civilians for each U.S. serviceman present also expand.  Non-
combatant behavior will be elaborated upon in Chapters 5 and 6, but it is argued 
here that many non-combatant behaviors need to be taken in the context of the 
sheer number of individuals who may be engaged in that behavior to fully 
appreciate its effects on non-combatant casualties and U.S. military operations.  
In some types of missions, such as stability operations, non-combatant 
considerations are not only important but also paramount to success. 
Population and Population Density 
This section explores the implications of population size and uniform 
population density.  Merely using citywide data on population, population 
density, and combatant to non-combatant ratios may be sufficient to answer 
some simple questions about civilian casualties, force structure requirements, 
system performance, situational awareness, or planning.  This is before taking 
into account any other information discussed in the rest of the chapter, such as 79
heterogeneity, or any of the non-combatant behaviors dealt with in later 
chapters.
As noted in the previous section, fairly basic information on population 
size and combatant to non-combatant ratios is enough to conduct basic analysis 
on force sizing.  Peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, and stability operations are 
all tasks where manpower requirements are primarily a function of the civilian 
population.197  Different force-to-civilian ratios are needed for scenarios and 
different levels of security requirements.  Estimates based on past operations 
show that a troop level of 1 to 4 per thousand of the population is in the range 
sufficient for daily policing activities in a peaceful population.  Troop levels of 4 
to 10 per thousand are more appropriate for some stability and counter-
insurgency operations.  In more demanding stability and counter-insurgency 
situations, troop levels of greater than 10 per thousand are appropriate.198  Force 
sizing does depend on the degree of resistance or conflict that U.S. forces may 
expect to face, but population size is a key driver for manpower requirements.
Parametrically estimating force structure requirements using ratios (1 to 4 per 
1,000; 4 to 10 per 1,000, etc.) also explicitly spells out what assumptions are being 
made about a city’s security environment.  Using the populations in some of the 
case study cities during U.S. military operations, the following table provides 
estimates on the level of forces that might have been called for: 
Table 4-1.  Potential Troop Requirements for Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 
Panama City (1989)  Mogadishu (1993)  Baghdad (2003) 
Population  1.2 million  500,000 to 1 
million 
5.6 million 
Troops for daily policing 
of peaceful population 
1,200 to 4,800  500 to 4,000  5,600 to 22,400 
Troops for some stability 
and counterinsurgency 
operations
4,800 to 12,000  2,000 to 10,000  22,400 to 56,000 
Troops for demanding 
stability and 
counterinsurgency ops 
12,000+  5,000 to 10,000+  56,000+ 
Actual ground forces  22,500 in Panama 
City and Colon area 
About 160 in Task 
Force Ranger 
N/A*
(140,000 in Iraq) 
*Number of U.S. troops in Baghdad during various phases of OIF is generally not available. 
_________________ 
197 James Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” Parameters, Vol. 25, Winter 
1995, pp. 59-69.  Note the argument that the level of counterinsurgency forces required depend on the 
size of the civilian population and not the size of the counterinsurgency force. 
198 Quinlivan, pp. 59-69. 80
  According to these estimates, with over 22,000 troops, the United States 
should have been enough forces in Panama to deal with the fairly friendly 
population after the fall of the Noriega government.  Somalia was a more 
challenging environment with a much lower number of directly involved U.S. 
personnel per population.  The 1993 raid in Somalia was not technically policing, 
stability, or counterinsurgency.  However, these estimates do show that a force 
substantially larger than Task Force Ranger would have been needed for 
population control, should that have been the requirement.  For Iraq, it is 
difficult to estimate how many of the 140,000 U.S. and coalition personnel 
present during post-conflict operations were assigned to Baghdad at any given 
point in time.  With a total population of about 25 million in Iraq, these ratios 
would suggest 25,000 troops in the entire country to police a peaceful population 
and 250,000 or more to deal with active counterinsurgency and difficult stability 
operations throughout all of Iraq. 
The next concept to explore after population is population density – the 
size of a population per square area.  At its most basic level, urban operations are 
combatants and non-combatants operating within a geographical space.  The 
simplest approach to modeling urban operations would use population densities 
to describe the distribution of non-combatants.   Even information on the 
average population density of an area, without knowing further detail about the 
actual distribution, is data that can be useful in different types of analyses.
Average population density will reflect a lower bound for the actual 
concentration of people in a given physical space.  This is because people do not 
uniformly spread out over an area but cluster.  However, it may be that even the 
average population density of an urban area poses sufficient operational 
challenges to strongly suggest that the real-life scenario would be even worse.
For example, weapons systems in development are often tested through high-
resolution modeling and simulations.  Using average density and not even 
taking crowds or other high concentrations of non-combatants into account, how 
does a system fare in an urban environment?  Is a system able to retain 
situational awareness despite a certain density of civilians surrounding it?  Does 
the amount of clutter sharply reduce a hypothetical system’s information 
superiority?  Does it need to dramatically increase the number of rounds the 
system fires before a certain number of the enemy has been engaged?  Does this 
cause more civilian casualties?   
Another use for basic population density information is to establish a 
baseline for non-combatant casualties.  One may begin with a proposed uniform 
population density for a city and add assumptions about munitions effects and 
shielding from structures.  It would then be possible to approximate a baseline 81
number of civilians killed and injured from air strikes, land-based indirect fire, 
direct fire, and other sources of death and injury from combatants on the 
battlefield with such a distribution.  (For low-resolution models that incorporate 
only about this level of fidelity, this may be the only model output that deals 
with non-combatants.)  It is then possible to ask questions using this baseline.  
For example, what happens as the distribution of non-combatants is no longer 
uniform but more concentrated in some areas?  Is there additional value to 
information about the way a population is distributed throughout a city?  How 
do different tactics and munitions affect non-combatant casualties as one 
operates in cities that are more highly developed or geographically more 
differentiated?
Figure 4-1.  Population Density of Panama, 1980 
Source: CIA. 
Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show the approximate population densities of 
Panama City, Colon, and Baghdad from 1980 Panamanian census data and 2000 
Iraqi population estimates.  Figure 4-3 gives a rough outline of Somalia’s 
population distribution in 1992: 82
Figure 4-2.  Population Density of Iraq, 2000 
             Source: CIA.83
Figure 4-3.  Estimated Population Distribution of Somalia, 1992. 
Source: CIA. 
As may be seen, the highest population densities tended to be in and 
around capital cities.  Using approximate square areas for these cities, it is 
possible to estimate the average population density that U.S. troops encountered 
in during various operations.  Figure 4-4 below gives provides a close-up look at 
Baghdad at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Using Figure 4-4, it is 
possible to calculate a rough estimate of Baghdad’s average population density 
in 2003.  Drawing a circle with a diameter of 15 miles around the center of the 
city gives an area estimate of approximately 177 square miles.  With a population 
of 5.6 million, this would give Baghdad an average population density of 
roughly 31,600 people per square mile. 84
Figure 4-3.  Map of Baghdad, 2003 
Source: National Imagery and Mapping Agency. 
Figure 4-5 is a map of Mogadishu.  The area inside the yellow rectangle 
and triangle is approximately 16 square miles.  With an estimated population of 
500,000 to 1 million in 1993, Mogadishu had roughly 31,000 to 62,000 people per 
square mile: 
Figure 4-4.  Map of Mogadishu 
            Source: GlobalSecurity.org. 85
These two estimates imply that the average population density in 
Mogadishu in 1993 may have been higher – even double – than the average 
density in Baghdad in 2003.  For comparison, the following table shows 
population densities of several other large cities around the world.  Many of 
these cities have population densities on the same order of magnitude as the 
estimates for Mogadishu and Baghdad: 
Table 4-2.  Population and Average Population Density for Select Cities 
Urban Area  Country  Year  Population 
(Millions)
Area      
(Sq Miles) 
People per 
Sq Mile
Los Angeles  USA  2000  3.69  238.7  7,878 
Mexico  City  Mexico 2000 8.59  579.0 14,838 
San Paulo  Brazil  2000  9.84  576.0  17,082 
New York City  USA  2000  8.01  309.0  25,917 
Tokyo Japan  1995  7.97  238.7  33,379 
Buenos Aires  Argentina  1990  2.96  77.0  38,455 
Seoul South  Korea  1990  10.73  237.0  45,257 
Manila, City of  Philippines  1990  1.63  14.7  110,917 
Calcutta India  2001  4.58  40.7  112,569 
Hong Kong  China  2001  3.44  26.8  128,432 
Lagos Nigeria  2001  7.72  56.0  137,857 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau for U.S. data, Demographia for international data.
Although the discussion has been focused on large cities so far, smaller 
cities and towns with lower population densities still matter.  For one, civilian 
casualties in more sparsely populated cities may still be a galvanizing event.  In 
February 1994, Serb forces shelled Markale marketplace in Sarajevo, killing 68 
civilians and wounding 200 more.199  The event focused international attention 
on the conflict in the Balkans and prompted NATO to threaten airstrikes against 
Serb guns outside the city.200  Additionally, looking forward, U.S. forces can 
expect to fight in smaller cities as well as in larger and more heavily populated 
ones.  In Panama, U.S. forces fought in Colon, a relatively small city of 60,000, as 
well as in the capital of Panama City.  Soldiers and Marines in Iraq often 
encountered Fedayeen and other fighters in the smaller cities and villages on 
their way to Baghdad.  In anticipating a potential war in a capital city such as 
Seoul, it may be best to also consider the fighting that is likely to happen in the 
city’s suburbs and smaller neighboring cities. 
_________________ 
199 Roger Cohen, “Shelling Kills Dozens in Sarajevo,” New York Times, August 29, 1995, p. A1. 
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Another form of non-combatant density is civilian vehicle density in an 
urban area.  Vehicles also add to the clutter and confusion that U.S. troops must 
deal with in an urban environment.  In Panama and Iraq, non-combatants 
frequently died in vehicles that were caught in crossfire or that were mistaken 
for enemy combatants.  In Iraq during major combat operations, Fedayeen 
blended in with civilian vehicles while attempting to attack U.S. ground forces or 
to use civilians as involuntary human shields.  The U.S. had difficulty dealing 
with civilian vehicles even during post-conflict operations in both Panama and 
Iraq, when they needed to sort out harmless but erratically behaving vehicles 
from genuine threats at checkpoints and roadblocks.  Old and abandoned 
vehicles can create another set of problems.  These add to clutter, especially in 
wooded areas, when U.S. forces attempt to scan for targets using foliage-
penetrating radar and other imagery technology. 
Table 4-3 below gives vehicles per 1,000 people and average vehicles per 
square kilometer for select countries.  Locally, vehicle density will depend on 
factors such as population, road networks, driving conditions, and even the time 
of day, week, or year.  Overall, Table 4-3 should give some idea of the number of 
vehicles expected on the road for a given level of industrialization.  If U.S. forces 
are more likely to enter conflicts in developing countries in the future, it follows 
that the vehicle density they encounter will actually be at the lower end of the 
spectrum.  However, this is not to say that the gross numbers are 
inconsequential.  A moderately advancing country may still have enough 
vehicles in a large city to pose operational problems for U.S. forces.  The one 
notable exception to the idea that U.S. forces are more likely to conduct urban 
operations in developing world cities in the future is the potential confrontation 
with North Korea in Seoul.  As a rapidly advancing country and an exporter of 
motor vehicles, South Korea has a high number of cars per capita.  There is a joke 
in Seoul that if North Korean tanks ever invaded the city, they would get stuck 
in rush hour traffic.  With one million registered vehicles and traffic jams that 
sometimes persist beyond midnight, vehicle traffic in Seoul could pose 
enormous headaches for a conventional armored force seeking to operate in the 
city.201
________________  
201 SeoulSearching.com; Internet: accessed at www.seoulsearching.com on August 31, 2004.  
Related to growing urban populations is the constant construction of new urban and suburban 
structures on land that was previously unused or used or agricultural purposes.  Multi-story 
construction, the presence of basements, and other factors all lead to the creation of more and more 
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Table 4-3.  Vehicle Densities For Select Countries 
Country Motor  Vehicles 
per 1,000 Persons 
Year  Vehicles per Sq. 
Km (1996-99)
Est. Vehicles 
per Km Road 
United States  765  1996  46.56   
Italy 566  1994  115.31   
United Kingdom  426  1995  101.40   
Saudi Arabia  336  N/A  3.68   
Argentina 170  1995  4.67  
Mexico 138  1997  10.91   
Russia 124  1996  5.66   
Panama 97  1997  5.59   
Iraq 50  1995  2.54   
Iran 23  N/A  1.66   
China 10  1997  1.77   
Pakistan 8  1997  1.58   
Angola 4  1995  0.45   
Somalia 3  N/A  0.01   
Chad 3  N/A  0.08   
Bangladesh 2  1996  0.97  
Afghanistan 0.0  1995  N/A   
Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook 2003 and World Statistics Pocketbook 2003; World 
Bank Development Indicators 2001; CIA World Factbook 2003 
Table 4-3 shows notable differences in the number of motor vehicles per 
1,000 of a country’s population.  The most advanced industrialized country in 
the world, the United States, had 3/4th of a vehicle for every person eight years 
ago.  The ratio for poorer and less industrialized countries drops off steeply.
Afghanistan, for example, had less than one tenth of a vehicle for every 1,000 of 
its citizens in 1995.  Table 4-3 also gives the average number of vehicles per 
square kilometer over a country’s total area.  However, citywide vehicle 
densities would be more useful, just as average citywide population density 
gives greater information for operational questions than average national 
population density.  Alternatively, the number of vehicles per kilometer of road 
would be a more useful metric.  This is because motorized vehicles are generally 
confined to roads and are not at liberty to roam the entire area of a country or 
city.
Table 4-4 below gives approximations for the number of motorized 
vehicles in the case study cities by combining a city’s population data with the 
per capital vehicle counts from Table 4-3.  The reader should be aware that 
population estimates and per capital vehicle data are from different years and 
that the estimated number of vehicles is a rough approximation only.  There are 
also likely to be different rates of vehicle ownership in a country between highly 
populated urban areas and other portions of the country.  This leads to rough 88
citywide vehicle estimates that might be the correct order of magnitude, but may 
still differ substantially from actual counts.  For example, for the number of 
vehicles in Baghdad during OIF, one might estimate (at 50 cars per 1,000 people 
in 1995) at least 280,000 vehicles in the city.   In reality, there were 500,000 private 
vehicles in Baghdad in April 2003 and over 1 million private vehicles in Baghdad 
by January 2004.202  Using an estimate of 177 square miles for Baghdad, this 
would mean a vehicle density of 2,800 per square mile at the start of OIF and a 
density of 5,600 vehicles per square mile less than a year later.  In contrast, 
Mogadishu may have had 190 to 380 vehicles per square mile in 1993. 
Table 4-4.  Estimated Number of Vehicles for Case Study Cities 
City Population  National  Vehicles 
per 1,000 
Estimated
Vehicles
Panama City  1.2 million (1990)  97 (1997)  116,400+ 
Colon  60,000 (1990)  97 (1997)  5,820+ 
Mogadishu  500,000 to 1 million 
(1995)
3 3,000-6,000+ 
Baghdad  5.6 million (2002)  50 (1995)  280,000+ 
(Actual: 500,000) 
Basra  1.3 million (2002)  50 (1995)  65,000+ 
Source: Data from Tables 4-1 and 4-3. 
Table 4-4 shows that even though vehicle density would be relatively 
low for the case study cities compared with advanced industrialized cities, the 
gross numbers of vehicles involved are still substantial.203  Finding hundreds of 
Fedayeen vehicles or screening for individual suicide bombers among 500,000 
vehicles in Baghdad is not an easy task.  Even screening the few thousand 
vehicles that might be present in a less advanced city such as Mogadishu could 
pose problems, particularly for a small U.S. force.  The U.S. experience in Haiti 
during the 1990s illustrates how civilian vehicles can affect operations even 
when a country is not heavily industrialized.  At the beginning of U.S. operations 
in that country, there was little civilian road traffic due to an oil embargo that 
had been placed against the country.  As a result, U.S. military vehicles were able 
to travel freely.  However, after the end of the embargo, civilian traffic increased 
________________  
202 Brig. Gen. David N. Blackledge, “Coalition Provisional Authority Briefing, Commander’s 
Emergency Response Program.”  U.S. Department of Defense briefing, January 14, 2004.  Internet: 
accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040114-1144.html on October 29, 
2004. 
203 It would also seem reasonable to assume different distributions in rural versus urban areas.  
Urban areas may have a higher number of vehicles per population, given higher incomes to support 
private vehicles, higher numbers of people to support buses and taxies, and higher economic activity 
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considerably and often forced U.S. personnel to travel by helicopter.204
Although civilian traffic may appear to be a mundane topic at first glance, it can 
cause genuine operational issues. 
Introducing Heterogeneity 
  So far the discussion has been on a homogeneous, uniformly distributed 
non-combatant population.  In real life, non-combatants are heterogeneous is 
almost unlimited ways.  This section discusses heterogeneity in demographic 
characteristics, population density, casualties, structural shielding, propensity to 
be friendly to U.S. forces, and ratio to combatants.  It discusses how population 
heterogeneity affects military operations and discusses how these lessons may be 
applied to modeling non-combatants.  This section is meant to complicate the 
assumption from the previous section of a uniform civilian population and to 
explore how assumptions about heterogeneity can be used in models and 
simulations.
  First and foremost, as mentioned earlier, an urban population is 
heterogeneous with regard to age and gender.  There is nothing in current 
military models that differentiate non-combatants along these lines, even as 
sensitivity for these types of casualties have consequences for the U.S. 
military.205  At the same time, it is very easy to add heterogeneity by gender and 
age.  This is especially true for agent-based models and this is one of the notable 
strengths of this technique.  Most populations are roughly half male and half 
female.  In developing countries such as Panama, Somalia, and Iraq, the 
population pyramid also shows a high number of children.  This tends to be a 
result of higher birth rates and shorter life expectancies for older members of the 
population.  Table 4-5 below shows the age distribution for countries in the three 
case studies, plus the distribution for the United States and Japan for 
comparison:206
_________________ 
204 Russell W. Glenn, Steven L. Hartman, and Scott Gerwehr, U.S. Combat Service Support 
Operations: the Shoulders of Atlas (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003) p. 51. 
205 One or two of the crowd dynamics models discuss heterogeneity in physical characteristics, 
noting that members of different genders and ethnicities should be represented by smaller agents.  
See work by Keith Still for an example. 
206 Although the United States is an advanced industrialized country, its population growth 
rate is higher than for most other industrialized countries because of immigration and the higher 
birth rates of some recent immigrants.  In contrast, Japan is a country with much less immigration and 
a negative population growth rate due to falling birth rates.  Several other industrialized countries are 
known to have declining growth rates and aging populations. 90
Table 4-5.  Age Distribution for Case Study Countries 
Country  Total Population  Age 0-14  Age 15-65  Age 65+ 
Panama (1990)  3,538,976  57.3%  39.3%  3.5% 
Somalia (1975)  4,089,203  46.6%  50.3%  3.1% 
Somalia (2003)  8,025,190  44.8%  52.5%  2.7% 
Iraq (2003)  24,683,313  40.7%  56.3%  3.0% 
United States (2004)  293,027,571  20.8%  66.9%  12.4% 
Japan (2004)  127,333,002  14.83  66.7%  19.0% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census International Database.  CIA World Factbook 2004 for 2003 
Somalia and Iraq statistics. 
A fairly large percentage of the population for the case study countries 
was under age 15 during the years that U.S. military operations took place.  In 
Panama in 1990, it was well over half of all Panamanians; in Iraq during OIF, 
children under 15 still made up slightly over 40% of the population.  There were 
no data on the percentage of Somalis who were under age 15 during the mid-
1990s, but the nation’s population survey in 1975 and a population estimate in 
2003 put both put the percentage of children in that age range in the mid-40s.207
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has conducted military 
operations primarily in developing countries where this type of population 
pyramid is common.  In contrast, children tend to make up a smaller percentage 
of the population in advanced industrial countries such as the United States and 
Japan.  One should note that these are age pyramids for these countries as a 
whole.  The percentage of young children should be a lower for an urban 
population, although the gross number will still be quite large.  This is because 
urban areas, even in developing countries, tend to have better nutrition, medical 
services, and higher levels of education for women.  This tends to lead to lower 
birth rates, more children surviving into adulthood, and longer life expectancies. 
  Even though children may make up a sizeable portion of a city’s 
population, it does not necessarily hold that they will automatically constitute 
the same percentage of those killed or injured.  This is because women and 
children may be in different places than men or have different exposures to 
combat.  It may also be because combatants are more likely to consider civilian 
men as threats or potential enemy combatants, whereas women and children are 
usually seen as non-combatants.  On the other hand, where there is much more 
difficulty in distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants, women 
________________  
207 However, U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1993 was triggered by famine conditions in that 
country.  During famine, one would expect small children, those under age five, to be most likely to 
die from the effects of malnutrition and disease.  The actual percentage of children under age 15 may 
thus have actually been lower during this time. 91
and children deaths will be closer to their overall demographic numbers.  
Although statistics on the breakdown of civilian casualties are not always 
complete, women and children appeared to make up different proportions of the 
dead and injured in the case studies. 
The discussion of Operation Just Cause in Chapter Three included the 
estimate that 13% of Panamanian civilian deaths were women and children.  
This is compared to the fact that 79% of the Panamanian people as a whole were 
children under 15 (58%) or women age 15 and over (21%).  It is impossible to 
pinpoint exactly what factors led to this.  However, there are a number of 
plausible influences.  It would seem that U.S. forces had some success in 
distinguishing likely targets from the general population.  Civilians also did not 
interfere in the fighting, U.S. troops maintained a good degree of control during 
the operation, combatants did not use women and children and human shields, 
and there were no heavy air strikes in urban residential neighborhoods.  Combat 
operations were short and apart from the three or four days of looting, violence 
in the post-conflict phase was low.  Putting all these factors together, Panama 
appears to be a scenario where both the magnitude of civilian casualties was 
relatively low and the demographic makeup of those casualties was skewed 
towards adult men. 
Age and gender breakdown for civilian deaths in Somalia are not 
available and it is more difficult to talk of exposure for women and children.
However, one would expect a higher proportion of deaths among women and 
children for several reasons.  In Somalia, both women and children actively 
participated in the fighting and acted as human shields for militia and irregular 
Somali fighters.  This would clearly bring them more frequently into the line of 
fire and in many cases make them legitimate targets.  Throngs of Somali 
civilians, including women, children, and the elderly, also ran towards the sound 
of gunfire and congregated at the scene of gun battles.  This would also have 
increased the percentage of women and children victims, compared to Panama, 
by increasing casualties from crossfire.  Another aspect that made operations in 
Mogadishu different from those in Colon and Panama City was the amount of 
control that U.S. forces had over events. In Panama, it seems fair to characterize 
U.S. forces as generally in control of the situation.  In Somalia, the gun battle was 
far fiercer than what troops had prepared for and the situation was far more 
desperate than what it had been in Panama City or Colon.  It is not implausible 
to argue that troops facing such conditions are less likely to have the time to 
better distinguish between potential targets. 
Operations in Iraq offer a more mixed picture.  As discussed in the case 
studies, women and children reportedly made up 18% of deaths during major 92
combat operations and the first two years of reconstruction.  Major combat 
operations in Iraq appeared to put women and children in danger.  As discussed 
earlier, air strikes against leadership targets tended to fall in residential 
neighborhoods.  Intense urban warfare also appeared to put women and 
children in danger by bringing violence into residential areas.  On the other 
hand, adult Iraqi men appeared to be the most frequent victim of violence 
during OIF.208  The overall lower rate of death for adult Iraqi women over the 
entire conflict is consistent with reports that women restricted their travel – and 
thus their exposure to danger in many instances – after the fall of Saddam 
Hussein’s government. 
To summarize the discussion, a high percentage of women and children 
in a city do not automatically translate into a high percentage of female and child 
civilian deaths during an urban operation.  Such deaths appeared to have been 
mitigated in Operation Just Cause.  However, not all urban campaigns will 
experience conditions as favorable for limiting these types of casualties and in 
some cases the higher population numbers do translate into higher casualty 
numbers.  As women and children willingly or unwillingly become human 
shields, as other factors draw them more frequently into the line of fire, as 
residential buildings receive heavy fire, and as U.S. forces have less time to 
distinguish between likely targets, they inevitably become a higher portion of 
those killed.  The higher percentage of children in a developing country’s 
population should become increasingly represented among the civilian dead as 
these types of circumstances prevail.209
Besides demographic heterogeneity, another type of heterogeneity is 
uneven population distribution.  The previous section of this chapter began with 
a non-combatant population that was uniformly distributed across a large area.  
In actuality, people are distributed unevenly across a city.  Some areas of a city 
and some buildings within a block are more densely occupied than others.  One 
would expect to see greater heterogeneity in density for more developed cities 
such as Panama City and Baghdad because of the presence of high-rise buildings 
and greater differentiation in use of urban spaces.  At the same time, even lesser 
developed cities such as Mogadishu will have areas of higher population 
________________  
208 Iraq Body Count, p. 2. 
209 Another issue has to do with the potential impact of realistic demographics has to do with 
non-lethal weapons.  Non-lethal weapons are currently being developed, tested, and modeled in 
computer simulations.  However, it would be prudent to keep in mind that non-lethal weapons may 
be deadlier for certain segments of a population, such as for children and the elderly.  The high 
percentage of children in some populations should not be forgotten as theory and practice for the use 
of these weapons evolves. 93
density.  Figure 4-5 below gives an idea of the difference in building density 
between neighborhoods: 
Figure 4-5.  Aerial Photograph of Mogadishu 
Source: Space Imaging and GlobalSecurity.org. 
One consequence of heterogeneous population distribution is that there 
may be events that produce an unusually large number of civilian deaths.  For 
example, the bombing of the al Firdos bunker that turned out to be filled with 
civilians during the 1991 Gulf War was an event where a bomb struck a point in 
the city that was densely populated at that moment.  The incident had a major 
impact on the subsequent conduct of the air war and such events are likely to 
happen again in future conflict in urban areas.  Although this would not be 
evident in a model using a uniform population density, this type of 
differentiation is easy to add.  Heterogeneity in population density will also 
result in heterogeneity in the non-combatant to combatant ratio throughout a 
city.  This is a realistic reflect of actual urban operations, where troops on the 
ground must operate in some areas that are more crowded than others. 
In modeling, assigning different population densities throughout a 
simulated city would allow for the possibility of catastrophic civilian casualty 94
incidents.  Such a density distribution could even be generated randomly instead 
of based on an actual city.  Random generation of many non-combatant 
parameters in a model may give more interesting results than attempting to base 
them on any particular past operation or incident.  Not only is this easier, it has 
the advantage of offering combinations of parameters that were possible but that 
did not happen to occur in that incident.  Because particular events in history 
may be so specific to that event and are unlikely to be recreated in the future, 
exploring the space of possibilities may be a better use of analytic resources than 
attempting to recreate the specific conditions that were present at the time.  
Related to heterogeneity in population distribution is heterogeneity in the 
“hardness” of urban cover.  Across cities and even within the same city, there 
will be some buildings and urban structures that offer better shielding for non-
combatants.  Concrete buildings offer better protection to inhabitants than 
shantytown buildings with tin roofs.  Varying both the population density and 
the protection factor across a city introduces the potential for very unexpected 
events in a model.  It is a simple way to create the pockets of vulnerable civilians 
within a model that are found in real urban operations. 
Another type of heterogeneity that may be interesting to add when non-
combatant actors in a model have interactive behavior.  This is heterogeneity by 
ethnic group, clan, class, or faction.  Casual observation would appear to support 
the implication of Schelling’s model for self-segregating neighborhoods: people 
do tend to sort by ethnicity, clan, and other divisions in real life rather than being 
distributed randomly across a given area.  Alternatively, one may argue that 
people within the same geographical area are more likely to share common 
loyalties, political interests, kinship ties, and other attributes.  The implication is 
that there may be pockets of people within a city or within a country that are 
more or less friendly to U.S. forces.  In Colon, poorer neighborhoods were often 
less friendly to U.S. troops.  In Somalia, members of Aidid’s clan were 
concentrated in certain areas.  In Iraq, there were pockets of anti-American 
discontent in Tikrit, Najaf, and Fallujah.  It would be very realistic to have pro- 
or anti-U.S. civilians grouped together in a simulation, creating areas of helpful 
or hostile activity for blue forces. 
Changes Over Time 
There are a few things to be said about changes to population density 
and heterogeneity over time.  To begin with, there are long-term trends over 
years and decades that are of general or long-term interest but that have limited 
immediate operational relevance and little meaning within the context of 
modeling non-combatants.  These types of trends include increased urbanization 95
in many countries, both through migration and natural population increase.  In 
the long run, many developing countries also experience declining birth rates 
and longer life expectancies.  This would decrease the proportion of children in 
an urban area but perhaps increase the elderly population.  Another trend is the 
overall population increase in many developing areas of the world.  This would 
also lead to higher population densities for many cities in the future.  While this 
may have implications for strategic thinking about future urban operations and 
future population densities, these types of changes are still many steps removed 
from analysis that directly affects day-to-day urban operations.  Because the 
timelines involved are beyond the timeline of most urban simulations, these 
types of trends are also unlikely to be useful for most modeling applications. 
Population density changes over a shorter time scale have more 
immediate operational effects and may be fairly easily incorporated into models.  
These are changes over days, weeks, or months.  (Changes to population density 
on a shorter time scale, such as minutes or hours, are better dealt with in the 
following chapters on non-combatant behavior and movement.)  Migration of 
refugees or internally displaced persons into an area has implications for the 
management of humanitarian, peacekeeping, stability, or counterinsurgency 
operations.  Increasing the population density in an area increases manpower 
requirements for U.S. forces engaged in peacekeeping and SOSO in that given 
area.  There is also greater concern for the civilian population being used for 
concealment and cover by combatants during an insurgency.  Short-term 
population density changes may also work in the opposite direction, with people 
leaving an area during the course of operations.  For example, by November 
2004, most of Fallujah’s 200,000 to 300,000 residents had fled the fighting 
between insurgents and U.S. Marines.210
It is also possible for U.S. troops to manage changes in population 
density to their advantage.  In many situations they may be able to influence 
density by warning non-combatants to leave, establishing humanitarian aid 
centers in certain locations, or blocking off travel so other areas.  There is also 
room to manage the exposure that non-combatants may face over short periods 
of time, such through curfews or other methods to encourage civilians to stay 
indoors or to avoid certain areas.  Cutting off power and water to an area is 
another tactic that can encourage civilians to leave.  Actively managing civilian 
exposure to urban operations is a means to reducing civilian casualties and 
_________________ 
210 Associated Press, “U.S.-led Forces Begin Second Phase of Falluja Offensive,” November 11, 
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denying cover to enemy combatants who are using civilian populations for cover 
and concealment. 
Example: Civilian Casualty Model 
  The following civilian casualty model illustrates how population density 
can be used to estimate casualties from air strikes in a populated urban area.  
Specifically, the model attempts to assess how many civilian casualties should 
have been expected from the 2003 leadership strikes during OIF.  U.S. forces 
conducted over 50 time-sensitive missions aimed at killing various Iraqi leaders 
during major combat operations.211  As information surfaced about the possible 
whereabouts of Saddam Hussein and other top Baath Party officials, U.S. forces 
bombed these suspected hiding places.  The majority of these leadership strikes 
appeared to have been in residential neighborhoods around Baghdad and 
resulted in civilian deaths.  Human rights groups criticized the United States for 
using unreliable intelligence methods to determine strike locations, for failing to 
do collateral damage assessments before these strikes, and for generating civilian 
casualties while missing every individual they targeted.212  In contrast, 
preplanned missions against Iraqi military and government targets resulted in 
fewer civilian casualties because civilians generally did not have access to these 
locations.213  U.S. planners also had more time to evaluate possible civilian 
deaths for preplanned strikes and avoided targets that would have resulted in a 
large number of civilian deaths.214
  Although the time-sensitive nature of these leadership strikes did not 
allow enough time for U.S. forces to evaluate the impact on nearby civilians, 
using the average population density of Baghdad would have given an 
approximation for the number of civilians killed in each strike.  Because these 
strikes tended to be in residential areas, there would have been civilians present.  
There is the argument that precision-guided munitions should result in fewer 
civilian deaths than “dumb” bombs, and that basing civilians deaths on the city’s 
average population density does not take this into account.  However, even with 
the use of laser- and Global Positioning System (GPS)- guided bombs, expected 
________________  
211 Moseley, p. 9.  The U.S. Air Force conducted 50 such missions.  The U.S. Navy also launched 
an unspecified number of ship- and submarine-launched cruise strikes at Iraqi leadership targets. 
212 Human Rights Watch, Off Target: the Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties In Iraq, pp. 6, 
22-4. 
213 Human Rights Watch, Off Target: the Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties In Iraq, pp. 41-
2. 
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civilian casualties may still be estimated as if these munitions struck a populated 
area.  There are two reasons why. 
  First, even if targeting coordinates were perfectly precise, the accuracy of 
U.S. bombs is moot when the lethal radius of a warhead for civilians and civilian 
buildings is much larger than the CEP.  Put another way, even if a bomb hits a 
targeted building exactly at the desired spot, the force of the explosion may be 
enough to damage or destroy the building next to it.  In the residential 
neighborhoods such as those where these OIF leadership strikes took place, 
some number of surrounding homes next to a targeted home would be damaged 
or destroyed.  Thus the population density in a given city or neighborhood and 
the lethal radius of a bomb factor heavily into the resulting number of civilian 
casualties.
  Second, the population density around these leadership targets was 
more representative of population density across Baghdad than would be true 
for preplanned targets.  For preplanned targets, U.S. military planners had time 
to assess potential civilian casualties and to avoid targets where there was a high 
density of non-combatants.  This would mean that preplanned targets were in 
lower population-density areas of Baghdad and other cities.  On the other hand, 
leadership strikes were launched as intelligence came in – at times within 
minutes of receiving information.215  There was no time to assess the potential 
effects on civilian casualties and no way of knowing beforehand where these 
targets would be.  In short, leadership strikes were more likely to end up in 
populated areas than preplanned ones. 
  A simple way to estimate the civilian casualties expected from a given 
bomb landing in a residential neighborhood is to take the area affected by the 
bomb and multiply it by the density of people per unit of area.  Letting the effects
radius be the distance from the center of an explosion within which people will 
be killed: 
Civilian Casualties = (Ǒ · Effects Radius2) · (People/Unit Area)
Next, the effects radius of a warhead is a function of two things: 1) the 
vulnerability of the target to its effects; and 2) the magnitude of a warhead’s 
_________________ 
215 David C. Isby, “Coalition Makes Massive Use of Guided Munitions,” Jane’s Missiles and 
Rockets, May 1, 2003; and Kim Burger, Nick Cook, Andrew Koch, and Michael Sirak, “What Went 
Right?” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 30, 2003. 98
effects at a given distance.216  Looking at blast effects, there are two different 
types of pressure generated by an explosion: peak overpressure and dynamic 
pressure.  For human beings standing out in the open, there is a 50% chance of 
lethality (probability of kill Pk = 0.5) when the peak overpressure for an 
explosion is between 33 and 58 psi.217  A person standing 27 meters from a 1,000-
lb TNT-equivalent explosion or less than 22 meters from a 500-lb explosion is 
almost certain to sustain severe injury or death.218  People are able to improve 
their chances of survival by lying prone, taking cover, and otherwise shielding 
themselves from the blast.219
People also die when explosions collapse buildings.  Civilians in 
residential areas are likely to be inside their homes and many deaths are 
presumably caused when residential buildings collapse.  This is especially true 
when such strikes are carried out mostly at night, as with the OIF leadership 
strikes.  A building’s vulnerability depends on several factors, including 
construction material and height.  Rigidly constructed buildings are less likely to 
survive a given peak overpressure than buildings that can flex or adjust.220
Table 4-6 below gives the distance from an explosion where a given type of 
building will suffer frame collapse and massive destruction.  Note that 
unreinforced concrete masonry buildings, potentially common in some areas of 
the developing world, are particularly vulnerable. 
Table 4-6.  Distance From Explosion Where Building Experiences Frame Collapse or 
Massive Destruction 
TNT Equivalent 
Weight of Explosion 
Reinforced Concrete 
Masonry Building 
Large One-Story 
Wooden Building 
Unreinforced
Concrete Masonry 
Building 
500 lb  3 m  12 m  30 m 
1,000 lb  2 m  21 m  46 m 
Source: Lim.  Estimated distances where buildings would be over 60% damaged. 
________________  
216 A target may also be vulnerable to the fragmentation from certain types of munitions.  For 
this example, we assume that the types of munitions used in leadership strikes do the bulk of their 
damage through blast effects. 
217 R. Augustus Lim, Anti Terrorism and Force Protection Applications in Facilities (University of 
Florida, Department of Civil and Coastal Engineering, 2003), p. 10.  This figure reflects lethality from 
blast effects and does not factor in potential fragmentation effects. 
218 Lim, p. 10. 
219 Fragmentation effects from explosions may also result in casualties.  However, the 
munitions used in these types of airstrikes are not primarily intended to be fragmentation weapons. 
220 Lim, p. 9. 99
Figure 4-6.  Expected Building Damage from Blast Overpressure 
Source: FEMA, 2003. 
  Figure 4-6 above gives the type of building damage that can be expected 
at different levels of peak, or incident, overpressure.  Presumably unreinforced 
concrete masonry walls will fail from about 2 psi, reinforced concrete buildings 
will be severely damaged from 6 psi, and most buildings will likely be destroyed 
from 10 psi upwards.  What is important to note is that these are lower than the 
overpressures that are fatal at least half the time for people who are out in the 
open (33+ psi).  With this data on target vulnerabilities, the second piece of 
information that is required to calculate the effects radius of a munition is the 
size of the warhead.  Data on the actual blast effects of various U.S. munitions 
are classified.  However, it is possible to estimate the peak and dynamic 
overpressure at a given distance from an explosion based on the weight of a high 
explosive (HE) warhead.  This is done by basing estimates on a reference 
explosion of 1 kg of TNT: 100
Figure 4-7.  Blast Effects From a 1 Kg TNT Explosion 
Source: Federation of American Scientists 
If a 1-kg TNT explosion produces a given peak overpressure at distance do from 
the center of the blast, an explosion of W kg of TNT will produce that peak 
overpressure at distance dW according to the following scaling law:221
dW = do W 1/3
Although not all the details of air war during OIF are yet available, the 
use of the following munitions in “decapitation” strikes against the Iraqi 
leadership has been reported in the press: 
________________  
221 John Stillion and David Orletsky, Airbase Vulnerability to Cruise-Missile and Ballistic-Missile 
Attacks (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), pp. 12, 63-4; and Federation of American 
Scientists, “Introduction to Naval Weapons Engineering: Warheads,” Internet: accessed at 
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/navy/docs/es310/warheads/Warheads.htm on February 2, 
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Table 4-7.  Munitions Used Against OIF Leadership Targets 
Munition Weight  Terminal  Guidance  CEP 
GBU-12 Paveway II  500 lb  Laser  8 meters 
Tomahawk (Block III)  1,000 lb  DSMAC and GPS  6-10 meters 
EGBU-27  2,000 lb  GPS and Laser  N/A 
GBU-31 JDAM  2,000 lb  GPS  13 meters 
Source: Burger, et. al., Isby, Jane’s Information Group, Federation of American Scientists. 
It should be noted that a 500-lb bomb carries less than 500 lbs of 
explosives because some of the weight is taken up by navigation, guidance, and 
other components.  Additionally, not all munitions use TNT.  Although Figure 4-
6 provides data to estimate the effects of TNT payloads, many U.S. munitions 
use explosives that are many times more powerful than TNT.  To arrive at an 
approximate number of casualties from these leadership strikes, the calculations 
below assume that 45% of a warhead’s weight is explosive and that the explosive 
is equivalent to TNT.  (It should be clear that this estimate is low if other types of 
explosives were used in the actual strikes.)  With approximate payload weights, 
casualty estimates based on different effects radius assumptions are now 
possible.  For any given peak overpressure, Figure 4-7 provides the distance do in 
meters at which this overpressure occurs for a 1-kg ton explosion.
If residential buildings collapse at 6 psi, civilian casualties with occur 
within a wider radius than if buildings collapse at 10 psi.  Converting the 
estimated payload Wlb from pounds into kilograms (Wlb is 45% of the total 
warhead weight), the effects radius in meters associated with a specific peak 
overpressure is given by: 
Effects Radius = do (Wlb · 0.45 kg/lb)1/3
This effects radius does not have to be the distance where death is 
certain (Pk = 1.0).  However, it is plausible to use a “cookie cutter” approach to 
estimating casualties by assuming complete lethality within the effects radius 
and no damage outside this radius.222  This is because while not everyone inside 
a given radius will be killed, some outside this radius will be.  For example, 
assume that a certain type of building has a fairly high but less than 100% 
probability of collapsing at 10 psi peak overpressure.  An explosion may destroy 
most of the building and kill most of its inhabitants within this 10 psi distance.  
However, similar buildings standing farther from the explosion may also 
experience some damage and bear some fatalities, even though these buildings 
_________________ 
222 Stillion and Orletsky, pp. 62, 64. 102
only experienced 8 or 9 psi.  For the purpose of obtaining a ballpark number of 
deaths, it is then plausible to estimate deaths as if everyone inside the first 
building would be killed and nobody in buildings farther away were harmed. 
The earlier discussion in Chapter 4 estimated a population density of 
31,600 people per square mile for Baghdad in 2003 during OIF, which is 
equivalent to 0.001133 people per square foot.  Converting this lethal radius from 
meters to feet and calculating the area cover by this distance yields the expected 
number of civilian deaths from a given air strike: 
Civilian Casualties = (Ǒ (Effects Radius · 3.28 ft/m)2) · (0.001133 people/ft2)
Table 4-8.  Estimated Civilian Deaths Under Different Effects Radius Assumptions 
Effects Radius (m)  Estimated Civilian Deaths  Notional
Warhead* 2 psi 6  psi 12  psi 2  psi 6  psi 12  psi
500  lbs  140 19  14 754  13  8 
1,000  lbs 177 24  18  1,197  21 12 
2,000  lbs 223 30  22  1,900  34 19 
*Table 4-7 assumes 45% of a warhead’s weight to be TNT-equivalent explosive. 
From the assumptions in this exercise, expected fatalities from a single 
strike could range from about 8 to 1,900 depending on building construction and 
warhead size.  There are more estimated civilian deaths when the size of the 
warhead increases and when the effects radius is larger.  (For example, the 
effects radius would increase where buildings are more vulnerable.  This would 
mean that buildings collapse at a lower peak overpressure.)  Again, the peak 
overpressures used in Table 4-8 were from data on estimated building damage in 
Figure 4-6.  2 psi is the overpressure at which unreinforced concrete masonry 
walls will fail; 6 psi presents the point where reinforced concrete structures begin 
to experience severe damage; and 10-12 psi is the range where most buildings 
will be completely destroyed. 
Do the overpressure values used in Table 4-8 reflect the approximate 
effects radii for leadership air strikes in OIF?  One way to test is to examine the 
damage done during an actual strike.  Figure 4-7 below shows satellite imagery 
from the leadership strike against Lieutenant General Ali Hassan al-Majid 
(“Chemical Ali”) on April 5, 2003 in Basra: 103
Figure 4-8.  Satellite Image of Leadership Strike in Basra 
Source: Human Rights Watch 
Two homes, belonging to the Hamudi and al-TaAyyar families, were 
destroyed.  According to witnesses, there were two bombs: one that hit a 
neighboring road and one that hit the target and destroyed two surrounding 
houses.  The munition that did hit the target was thought to be a 500-lb LGB.223
Looking at the image, these two homes were within 20-25 meters of the target.  
Additionally, 17 out of 22 civilians (77%) inside these two homes died, including 
nine children under age 15 (53% of deaths in this incident).  This 20-25 range is 
about the range from a 6 psi effects radius.  Assuming similar building 
construction in Basra and Baghdad, this appears to be a reasonable effects radius 
to use for Baghdad as well.224
  The next portion of this example turns to discussing the probabilistic 
uncertainty in some of these estimates.  Table 4-8 displays the mean (μ) – the 
expected value of civilian deaths under the assumptions outlined above.  If these 
strikes are thought of as a Poisson-distributed statistical process, it becomes 
possible to find the variance (ǔ2) as well.  The Poisson distribution can serve as 
an approximation for the binomial distribution when the number of trials n is 
_________________ 
223 Human Rights Watch, pp. 28-32.
224 The actual number of fatalities from this particular raid cannot be compared with the 
estimates in Table 4-8 because the population density of Baghdad is different from the population 
density of Basra. 104
large and the probability p of a certain event is small.  With n representing the 
number of civilians in Baghdad and p representing the probability that any 
individual will be killed in a leadership strike, n and p are such that the number 
of civilians killed in a single strike may be considered Poisson.  One of the 
properties of the Poisson is that the mean is equal to the variance.  Hence, the 
mean and variance for the number deaths from one strike using a 500-lb bomb 
and assuming a 6 psi effects radius are both 20.225  It is also possible to arrive at 
the probability that a single strike under these assumptions will yield more than 
30 civilians deaths, the threshold during OIF for requiring that the Secretary of 
Defense approve a target.226  Letting X be the number of deaths and ǌ = μ = 
13:227
P { X = i } § e –ǌ (ǌi/i!)
Thus:
P { X > 30 } = 1 –  P { X = 1 } – P { X = 2 } – … – P { X = 30 }
          § 1 – e –ǌ (ǌ) – e –ǌ (ǌ2/2) – … – e –ǌ (ǌ30/30!)  
          § 1 – e –23 (13) – e –23 (132/2) – … – e –23 (1330/30!)  =  0.000016 
The calculation shows that there close to a 0% probability that the use of a 500-lb 
bomb in a neighborhood of one of buildings that could withstand up to 6 psi 
peak overpressure would kill more than 30 civilians. 
However, if residential buildings cannot withstand more than 2 psi, then 
this probability will change.  Estimating the damage that a 500-lb bomb would 
do in this case uses the same calculation above, but with ǌ = 754 instead of 13 
from Table 4-9.  This gives P { X > 30 } § 1.00.  In short, there is a 100% chance 
that an air strike under these assumptions would kill more than 30 people.  Such 
a strike would likely have required approval from the Secretary of Defense if 
normal collateral damage assessment procedures had been followed.  Table 4-10 
shows the probability of killing more than 30 people using various assumptions: 
________________  
225 Sheldon M. Ross, Introduction to Probability and Statistics for Engineers and Scientists,
International Edition (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1987), pp. 78-89. 
226 Bradley Graham, “U.S. Moved Early for Air Supremacy,” Washington Post, July 20, 2003, p. 
A26. 
227 Euler’s number e § 2.7183. 105
Table 4-9.  Probability of More than 30 Civilian Deaths From a Single Strike 
Peak Overpressure At Which Buildings Collapse  Notional
Warhead* 2 psi  6 psi  12 psi 
500 lbs  100%  0%  0% 
1,000 lbs  100%  3%  0% 
2,000 lbs  100%  71%  1% 
The implication of Table 4-9 is that construction practices in a given area 
of the world have as much effect on exceeding this 30-death threshold as does 
weapons choice.  For example, where buildings are predominately built from 
unreinforced concrete masonry (2 psi level), there will be significant casualties 
even when using the smallest warheads available.  On the other hand, in a city of 
reinforced concrete buildings (6 psi level), only a strike using the largest 
warhead would have required Secretary of Defense approval under normal 
circumstances.
The discussion now turns to the total numbers of civilians potentially 
killed from the entire leadership strike campaign.  Table 4-8 estimated civilian 
deaths from a single air strike.  Table 4-10 below estimates a lower and upper 
range for the number of deaths that could be caused from 50 such air strikes, 
assuming a 6 psi effects radius.  (There were at least 50 such strikes during OIF).  
It also estimates how many of these deaths might be expected to be children, 
given Iraq’s demographics.  The table also assumes that all 50 strikes were 
carried out by one type of munition and that only one warhead was dropped on 
each target.  In reality there would be a mix of munitions and perhaps more than 
one warhead per strike.  Still, Table 4-10 provides a possible range for the 
number of civilian deaths that could have resulted from these leadership strikes: 
Table 4-10.  Estimated Civilians Deaths From 50 Leadership Strikes 
Notional
Warhead*
Deaths In One Strike  Deaths From 50 
Strikes
Deaths Under Age 15 
From 50 Strikes** 
500 lbs  13  670  275 
1,000 lbs  21  1,064  436 
2,000 lbs  34  1,689  692 
*Assumptions: a 6 psi effects radius and 45% of a warhead’s weight to be TNT-equivalent explosive. 
**Children under age 15 represented 41% of Iraq’s population in 2003. 
Table 4-10 suggests that even using only a single 500-lb bomb (the 
smallest LGB in the U.S. arsenal) per sortie, 50 leadership strikes in populated 106
areas would result in several hundred dead civilians.  Given Iraq’s population 
pyramid, some 275 of these dead would be children under age 15.  Other factors 
would increase this estimated number of total civilian deaths.  First, as the 
weapons mix changes to include larger bombs and as the number of bombs per 
sortie increases, the expected number of civilian deaths climbs.  U.S. forces did 
predominately use 500-lb LGBs in Baghdad to reduce collateral damage and not 
all leadership strikes took place in populated areas.228  However, there were 
times when the United States used 1,000- and 2,000-lb warheads in areas where 
civilians were present.  Second, the calculations in this estimate use average 
population density across Baghdad.  The number of civilian deaths would 
increase if true population densities in the areas where U.S. forces typically 
conducted leadership strikes is higher than this average.  (The estimates in Table 
4-8 and Table 4-10 represent the expected number of deaths if nothing is known 
about how these local population densities might vary.)229
If the United States believes it will carry out time-sensitive strikes in 
residential areas again in the future, it should develop very small payload PGMs.  
Table 4-10 below looks at how 100-lb PGMs might reduce casualties over 500-, 
1,000-, and 2,000-lb bombs used in a city with the population density of 31,600 
people per square mile: 
Table 4-11.  Expected Reduction in Civilian Casualties From Using 100-lb PGMs 
Effects Radius (m) 
Expected Deaths From 
50 Strikes 
% Reduction in Deaths 
If 100-lb PGMs Used 
Notional
Warhead*
6 psi 12  psi 6  psi 12  psi 6  psi 12  psi
100 lbs  5  3  229  129  --  -- 
500 lbs  13  8  670  377  66%  66% 
1,000 lbs  21  12  1,064  598  78%  78% 
2,000 lbs  34  29  1,689  950  86%  86% 
*Table 4-10 assumes 45% of a warhead’s weight to be TNT-equivalent explosive. 
________________  
228 Isby. 
229 In actuality, there is little data on the number of civilians actually killed during leadership 
strikes in OIF.  U.S. authorities no longer make estimates on the number of non-combatants killed 
during military operations.  Additionally, uman rights groups often provide reports on deaths from 
individual incidents (Human Rights Watch) or track estimated deaths from the conflict as a whole 
(Iraq Body Count).  However, no group has offered reports or estimates on the number killed 
specifically as a result of the 50+ leadership strikes.  Even when groups attempt to document or 
publicize deaths from individual leadership strikes, they are not likely to know which air strikes were 
aimed at Iraqi leaders as opposed to other types of targets.  Hence, they would be unable to provide 
an accurate tally of death due strictly to leadership strikes. 107
Using a 100-lb PGM instead of a 500-lb one would cut civilian deaths by 
66% under these set of assumptions.  As Table 4-11 shows, this 66% reduction is 
independent of the effects radius: there will be the same percentage decline in 
expected deaths whether a munition kills civilians within a 6 psi area or a 12 psi 
area.  This reduction should also be independent of population density as well: 
there will also be the same percentage reduction whether the population density 
is 31,600 people per square mile or 60,000.  This is because in calculating the 
percentage decrease in casualties, the same population density number is in both 
the numerator and the denominator.  To illustrate this point, let q0, the number of 
expected civilian deaths from a warhead, be a function of the payload W0
(kilograms), a given effects radius r (meters), and the population density ǒ
(people per m2).  The area affected by the warhead is a function f (W0, r).  Thus: 
q0 = f (W0, r)·ǒ
The number of expected civilian deaths from a warhead with a different payload 
W1 is: 
q1 = f (W1, r)·ǒ
The decline in civilian deaths moving from W0 to W1 is: 
Percentage Change in Expected Civilian Deaths  =  (q1 – q0) / q0
= [f (W1, r)·ǒ – f (W0, r)·ǒ] / [f (W0, r)·ǒ]
= [f (W1, r) – f (W0, r)]/ f (W0, r)
Therefore the population density cancels out and the percentage change in 
expected civilian deaths is a function of warhead payloads for a given effects 
radius.
Given the magnitude of possible reduction in expected civilian deaths, 
Table 4-11 would seem to support the case for developing smaller PGMs.230  As 
a further test of whether it does support such a policy, the next question is 
whether or not such a reduction in civilian deaths could happen merely due to 
chance if there was no change in the warhead size used in these strikes.  At the 6 
_________________ 
230 In a few past incidents, the USAF has used what are effectively concrete warheads instead of 
HE warheads in an attempt to minimize collateral damage.  However, these attempts did not tend to 
work out well because a concrete block dropped from moving planes tend to keep moving laterally 
after it has struck its initial aim point.  This causes damage outside the target area as the concrete 
continues to move and strikes objects at a very high velocity.  In contrast, a properly functioning HE 
warhead should detonate upon impact and destroy itself.  See Russell W. Glenn, Christopher Paul, 
and Todd C. Helmus, Men Make the City: Joint Urban Operations Observations and Insights from 
Afghanistan and Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation), forthcoming. 108
psi effects level, the expected number of deaths from 50 strikes using 100-lb 
warheads is 229 and the expected number of deaths from using 500-lb warheads 
is 670.  It has been discussed how the number of deaths from any single strike is 
distributed Poisson.  Another property is that the sum of Poisson distributions is 
also Poisson.231  Knowing this allows a test of whether or not using 100-lb bombs 
would reduce the number of civilian deaths in a statistically significant way.  Let 
X represent the number of civilian deaths, this time from 50 leadership strikes 
and with the expected number of deaths μ = ǌ = 670.  The probability that using 
500-lb bombs would result in no more than 229 deaths is: 
P { X  229} = P { X = 1} + P { X = 2} + … + P { X = 229} 
           § e –ǌ (ǌ) + e –ǌ (ǌ2/2) + … + e –ǌ (ǌ229/229!)  
           § e –670 (670) + e –670 (6702/2) + … + e –670 (670229/229!) 
           §  7.0 x 10-87 §  0 
 It is statistically impossible for a 500-lb bomb to cause the same number of 
deaths as a 100-lb bomb.  Thus, using 100-lb bombs would reduce deaths to a 
level that would never be seen using the larger warheads.  There is already 
support to add smaller warheads to the U.S. arsenal.  U.S. forces in Afghanistan 
and Iraq expressed the view that 2,000-lb JDAMS were too big in some 
situations, calling instead for 50- and 100-lb JDAMS, and even for munitions 
where the size of the payload could be adjusted.232
  This example shows how analysis using population density can have 
practical implications for certain types of simple policy questions.  The OIF 
leadership strike example shows that such analysis has relevance for weapons 
choice, development, and usage in urban areas.  It uses a simple method for 
arriving at a rough estimate of civilian deaths when there is a lack of detailed 
information or little time to gather data for a better assessment.  The example 
also serves as a baseline for asking other questions about ways to decrease 
civilian casualties from leadership strikes, such as policies to change the 
population density in a city. 
________________  
231 Ross, p. 83. 
232 Russell W. Glenn, Christopher Paul, and Todd C. Helmus, Men Make the City: Joint Urban 
Operations Observations and Insights from Afghanistan and Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation), 
forthcoming. 109
5.  Simple Non-combatant Behaviors 
Chapter 5 deals with simple non-combatant behaviors.  After population 
density, background behavior and simple reactions to combat are the next layer 
of non-combatant behaviors.  The case studies reveal a number of simple 
behaviors that appear often across individuals and across cases.  The previous 
chapter argued that merely introducing realistic population densities was an 
analytically useful exercise that could improve understanding on several types 
of policy and operational issues.  Chapter 5 extends this approach by exploring 
the usefulness of considering basic non-combatant background movement and 
simple reactions to combat.  The chapter builds on the previous discussion on 
populating models and adds the context for complex non-combatant behavior 
discussed in the next chapter.  Simple behaviors are also often a prelude to more 
complex ones, as will be seen in Chapter 6. 
The first section of this chapter discusses the relevance of taking simple 
non-combatant behaviors into consideration.  The next section discusses 
background behaviors that exist in any urban area: commuting, congregation, 
and traffic.  The third section introduces simple reactions to combat: running 
away from combat, seeking shelter, ignoring combat, and running towards it.
The next section of Chapter 5 discusses modeling implications of the simple 
behaviors outlined in this chapter within the framework of agent-based 
modeling.  The last section offers an example of how having a model that 
incorporates simple non-combatant behaviors might provide policy insights not 
available with a static population.  
Adding Simple Movement 
Many envision the advanced, complex, and adaptive behavior that 
civilians can show in confrontations with U.S. troops when they first begin to 
contemplate non-combatant behavior. However, beginning with simple non-
combatant behavior is an analytically useful step for a number of reasons.  First, 
these simple behaviors do account for many of the combatant-civilian 
interactions that U.S. forces have faced on the ground.  There are a number of 
policy and operational issues that arise from these interactions.  For example, 
commuting and congregation lead to U.S. troops encountering non-combatants 
on roads and marketplaces; civilian traffic creates cover for disguised combatant 110
vehicles; and U.S. troops meet civilians running and seeking shelter in the 
middle of urban gunfights.  All of these simple non-combatant behaviors have 
implications for rules of engagement, civil affairs, and public relations. 
Second, simple non-combatant behavior is also important because it is 
exhibited more often by more of the civilian population than some of the most 
complex behavior.  Some of the most complex behavior might be limited in 
frequency or scope.  For example, widespread looting matters a great deal when 
it occurs, but it does not always happen.  Civilians attacking U.S. forces is also 
behavior that causes concerns, but it may be limited to a subset of civilians under 
certain situations.  There is no doubt that these complex behaviors can have 
dramatic impacts on the conduct and outcome of U.S. military operations.  
However, simple behaviors such as running away from gunfire or accidentally 
driving through combat areas is much more universal behavior.  The point here 
is that some of these uncomplicated and unspectacular behaviors happen more 
of the time during an urban operation and are still worth preparing for because 
of their frequency. 
Third, it may also be sufficient for some purposes to stop at the simple 
non-combatant behavior that is discussed in this chapter.  This may be true 
particularly when considering a scenario where non-combatants are 
predominantly neutral or friendly to U.S. forces and are not likely to actively 
interfere in operations, such as Panamanian civilians during Operation Just 
Cause.  To get a general sense of civilian behavior during a short operation in a 
fairly friendly environment (excluding looting), the primary behaviors to focus 
on are background movement and defensive reactions to combat.233  In either 
live training exercises or computer simulations, limiting the scope of non-
combatant action to these behaviors would be sufficient for dealing with a 
friendly-population scenario.  Using the simplest set of rules possible to recreate 
realistic behavior is also consistent with the art of simulation.  Striving for 
simplicity in design – even when the expected output is complex – results in a 
model that is more elegant: assumptions that are more transparent, output that is 
easier to understand, and a structure that sets a cleaner baseline for more 
complicated analysis. 
  Fourth, simple non-combatant behavior can affect population density, 
with all the implications discussed in the previous chapter.  Background 
________________  
233Although there were a few reports of Panamanian civilians attacking U.S. forces, these 
appeared to be isolated incidents.  They did not happen frequently enough to change the overall non-
combatant environment or to warrant a systematic assessment of the way U.S. troops interacted with 
civilians. 111
behaviors such as travel and congregation produce dynamic changes to 
population and vehicle density.  Congregating behavior in particular will tend to 
produce population density patterns over time that can matter during urban 
operations.  For example, congregation in areas such as markets produce crowds 
of civilians who can be used for cover or who can be targeted by insurgency 
forces, as in Iraq.  Simple reactions to combat (running away, etc.) produce less 
predictable changes in population density but are also capable of producing 
sudden, significant changes in local density at the scene of urban fighting.  For 
example, these behaviors can produce crowds, disperse crowds, alter the density 
of non-combatants in nearby buildings, generate traffic, or create other non-
combatant movement at that location. 
Background Movement 
The mere presence of civilians, their background movement, and their 
reactions to combat increase the clutter and confusion that U.S. forces must deal 
with on the urban battlefield.  This section discusses background non-combatant 
movement – travel and congregation – while the next section deals with simple 
reactions to combat.  The sheer number of traveling, commuting, and 
congregating civilians in an urban area, combined with the fact that many may 
be caught in these activities when U.S. forces enter a city, mean that it is 
important to consider the implications of these behaviors.  Background 
movement appears to be the reason that many non-combatants end up as 
casualties in conflicts, leading them to be inadvertently in the wrong place at the 
wrong time.  Traveling, either by foot or with vehicles, leads to three behavioral 
phenomena: pedestrian congregations in buildings and in streets, pedestrian 
traffic, and vehicle traffic throughout a city: 
Figure 5-1.  Background Behaviors 
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One of the normal, daily activities that people undertake is commuting 
and traveling from their homes to workplaces, schools, stores, markets, and 
places of worship.  There are many reasons why this seemingly mundane 
behavior is of interest.  First, civilians traveling during urban fighting run the 
risk of becoming casualties.  The Panama and Iraq case studies show that many 
civilians became casualties while they were traveling, particularly in vehicles. 234
Any genuine attempt to limit non-combatant casualties during urban operations 
begins with realization that a city’s traveling residents are likely to be exposed. 
Second, civilian vehicle traffic provides both concealment and cover for 
unconventional forces operating within their midst.  It provides concealment by 
allowing unconventional forces to blend in with non-combatant vehicles and 
introduces a great deal of clutter for U.S. forces attempting to distinguish 
between friendly and hostile actors.  This was clearly the case during both main 
phases of OIF, when Fedayeen and then insurgents used civilian vehicles to 
avoid detection by U.S. forces.  Civilian traffic can also provide cover, since the 
presence of genuine non-combatant vehicles discourages U.S. troops from firing 
upon combatant vehicles that they can identify.  Situations where combatants 
intermingle with civilian traffic will thus be dangerous both for civilians and for 
U.S. forces attempting to identify disguised enemy combatants. 
Third, enough civilian vehicle traffic has the potential to hinder U.S. 
vehicles attempting to maneuver in a city.  As discussed in the previous chapter, 
the U.S. experience during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994 was an 
example where civilian traffic presented an impediment to U.S. military 
vehicles.235  In a future situation where U.S. military vehicle again find it 
difficult to use roads, they may again need to use alternative forms of 
transportation with different vulnerabilities, such as helicopters.  This could 
have implications for planning, logistics, and force protection. 
Fourth, pedestrian traffic feeds into congregations, which results in 
crowds during various times of the day.  Crowds are significant in urban 
operations in several ways.  The interim U.S. Army field manual on 
counterinsurgency operations identifies four types of crowds: casual crowds, 
sighting crowds, agitated crowds, and mobs.  Casual crowds are mere a 
gathering of people, while sighting crowds combine casual crowds and an event.
________________  
234 There is little information about the presence of civilian vehicles in Somalia during the battle 
in Mogadishu.  While Aidid’s forces also had technicals, much of the fighting appeared to involve 
Somali combatants and civilians on foot.  Given Somalia’s low rate of motorized vehicles per capita, 
this may not be unexpected. 
235 Written correspondence with Russell Glenn at the RAND Corporation on Operation Uphold 
Democracy.  Pittsburgh, PA, October 4, 2004. 113
Agitated crowds are sighting crowds with emotion, and mobs are agitated 
crowds engaged in physical activity.236  Casual and sighting crowds in Iraq and 
Panama provided inadvertent concealment for combatants (Iraq) and snipers 
(Panama).  Casual crowds are also higher points of population density that again 
may produce a disproportionately large number of civilian casualties.  For 
example, a marketplace blast in Baghdad in March 2003 produced many civilian 
casualties because people were congregated.237  In Somalia, sighting crowds 
because agitated crowds and mobs that attacked U.S. forces and dragged the 
bodies of dead servicemen through the streets. 
Figure 5-2.   Crowd Around U.S. Serviceman During Operation Iraqi Freedom
Photo: John Strycula 
To what extent do commuting, congregating, and traffic exist during an 
urban operation?  It is reasonable to assume that a great deal of travel and 
congregation may stop during intense urban operations or in anticipation of 
urban combat.  On the other hand, there are reasons why they may happen even 
in the midst of combat.  The case studies show that when U.S. forces achieve 
_________________ 
236 United States Army, Field Manual Interim 03-7.22, Counterinsurgency Operations
(Washington, D.C.: United States Army, 2004), p. 6-11. 
237 John F. Burns, “Iraq Blames U.S. for Market Blast that Killed Civilians in Baghdad,” New 
York Times, March 29, 2003, p. A1. 114
tactical surprise, they often encounter civilians who are traveling and 
commuting as they normally would.  During OIF, Iraqi forces and Iraqi civilians 
were caught off-guard during the start of the ground war.  Iraqis continued to 
travel in Baghdad and in other areas of the country even as U.S. ground forces 
had begun their offensive into Iraq.  Civilians in Mogadishu were also traveling 
around the city, congregating at the market, and conducting daily activities 
when Task Force Ranger began their raid.  Additionally, even when non-
combatants are aware of urban fighting, some non-combatants may still attempt 
to travel for various reasons.  For example, non-combatant deaths during 
operations in Panama included one family attempting to drive to the hospital.238
Lastly, even when background civilian behavior halts during periods of 
pitched battle, it is unlikely to go away completely and will resume as the 
intensity of fighting drops off.  This is particularly true if an operation continues 
over an extended period of time.  These background behaviors are also likely to 
be prominent during post-conflict operations after major combat has ended and 
non-combatants go back to some semblance of their previous lives.  For example, 
most of the residents of Fallujah fled before a November 2004 USMC offensive 
against insurgents in that city.  The lower density of civilians made the operation 
easier for the Marines and was also thought to have reduced civilian casualties.  
However, at the end of the operation, civilians were expected to return in large 
numbers as U.S. troops continued with lower-intensity counterinsurgency 
operations.  The return of many military-aged men was expected to make it more 
difficult to identify insurgents, and the return of normal civilian traffic was 
expected to provide cover for suicide vehicles.239
Identifying background civilian behaviors that contribute to civilian 
casualties and that introduce operational difficulties for U.S. forces can also 
suggest ways to influence or manage these behaviors.  U.S. troops in post-
conflict Iraq are currently using curfews to curtail civilian travel during certain 
periods of the day in cities such as Mosul, where they were conducting 
counterinsurgency activities in late 2004.240  Another area with room for further 
efforts may be in preparing an urban population for a U.S. offensive.  During 
Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. forces conducted an 
extensive psychological operations (PSYOPS) campaign directed at Iraqi forces.  
________________  
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This included leaflets and radio communication that included warnings not to 
take offensive postures and instructions on how to surrender.241
Currently, PSYOPS are sometimes targeted at civilian populations to 
influence support for U.S. objectives.  For example, Figure 5-3 shows a U.S. flier 
during the start of OIF that warns people to stay in their homes and away from 
military personnel.  It also shows a flier from 2005 warning civilians about 
unexploded ordnance: 
Figure 5-3.  U.S. Fliers Aimed at Civilians During OIF 
Source:  U.S. Central Command. 
However, this could be expanded into a more extensive, preparatory 
campaign that would mirror the level of detailed instruction generally aimed at 
enemy soldiers.  Before the start of an operation, PSYOPS targeted at Iraqi troops 
before the start of OIF included instructions on how to posture weapons, 
warnings against using weapons of mass destruction, and information to tune 
into certain radio stations for further information (Figure 5-4).  A new twist on 
conventional PSYOPS against enemy forces may be PSYOPS explicitly directed 
at civilian populations to reduce civilian casualties, civilian exposure to danger, 
and confusion for U.S. forces on the ground.  A parallel PSYOPS effort aimed at 
a civilian population could be part of a preparatory campaign to address the 
_________________ 
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issue of civilian casualties earlier.  Even without giving away information on the 
timing and method of a U.S. urban ground offensive, it seems possible to convey 
significant amounts of information to a civilian population on approaching U.S. 
vehicles, curfews, or other travel restrictions that the population should follow 
once U.S. forces are sighted.  Other instructions might include turning off music 
while driving (to reduce the chances of not hearing warnings), tuning into 
certain radio stations, or explanations of the rules of engagement.  Such a 
campaign should be able to reduce confusion and civilian casualties at the 
beginning of future urban operations. 
Figure 5-4.  U.S. Fliers Aimed at Iraqi Troops at the Beginning of OIF, 2003 
Source:  U.S. Central Command. 117
Simple Reactions to Combat 
The next topic to discuss in Chapter 5 is simple reactions to combat.  
Simple reactions to combat may be used in lieu of background behaviors to 
produce base non-combatant reactions in scenarios where urban combat is 
intense enough to bring a halt to most travel and congregation in the timeframe 
examined.  When analysis covers a longer time period or an area large enough to 
have different localized events, these simple reactions to combat may be layered 
on top of background behaviors.  Simple reactions to combat are: running away 
from combat, taking shelter, ignoring combat and continuing with present 
behavior, and running towards combat.  Running away from combat and 
seeking and staying in shelter are obvious behaviors.  However, non-combatants 
have also ignored combat or even advanced towards it.  There are also instances 
where different groups of non-combatants exhibit three or four of these types of 
behaviors at once in close proximity to each other.  Recreating the table of simple 
reactions to combat from Chapter 3: 
Table 5-1.  Simple Civilian Reactions to Combat 
Panama Somalia  Iraq 
Major combat 
Iraq
Post-conflict
Run Away  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Take Shelter  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Ignore
Combat
Vehicles Uncertain  Vehicles 
Pedestrians?
Vehicles
Run Towards  No Yes  No  No 
The first simple and seemingly most rational reaction to combat is to run 
away from it.  Fleeing from combat is a universal, defensive behavior that non-
combatants showed across case studies.  In Panama, civilians ran away from U.S. 
forces during lulls in the fighting.  Even in Somalia, where civilians actively 
participated against U.S. troops, some people attempted to run away from U.S. 
forces instead.  This is also a frequent behavior outside these case studies.
Although it is a defensive action, running from combat does pose dangers to 
non-combatants.  Fleeing civilians are vulnerable to crossfire between 118
combatants and run the risk of being mistaken for enemy combatants.242  They 
may also flee in the wrong direction and blunder into combat, or flee from one 
area where there is combat and find themselves in another battle scene.  For U.S. 
forces, moving civilians on the battlefield make it more difficult to minimize 
non-combatant casualties and large numbers of fleeing civilians hinder attempts 
to engage enemy combatants. 
The second behavior is seeking and staying inside shelter when there is 
fighting nearby.  Related to fleeing, this is also a defensive and widely observed 
behavior among civilians caught up in urban warfare.  Civilians may flee an area 
with fighting first and then seek shelter inside buildings once they are away 
from combat.  Alternatively, they may run into buildings in an attempt to take 
cover regardless of how close they are to combat.  Another way that non-
combatants may exhibit this behavior is merely to go to ground: continuously 
staying inside a building as fighting approaches, while it occurs around them, 
and after it moves away. 
  There may be ways for U.S. forces to take advantage of the self-
preservation instinct that drives running from combat and seeking shelter to 
manage civilian movement.  Aside from attempts to manage normal civilian 
travel and congregation, there may be ways to purposely direct the flight reflex 
during the midst of urban combat to reduce non-combatant exposure.  Again, 
U.S. forces have traditionally used PSYOPS tactics to influence enemy combatant 
morale and actions.  During the 1991 Gulf War, 15,000 lb munitions and B-52 
bombers were judged to have adversely affected Iraqi morale and to have 
encouraged surrender.243  In Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 
2002, the USAF again dropped 15,000 lb conventional munitions known as 
“Daisy Cutters” on Taliban positions in 2003 and near Iraqi troops in 1991.244
The USAF also attempted a “shock and awe” strategy of using spectacular 
explosions over Baghdad for similar reasons.245
The purpose of such operations was to impress upon enemy combatants 
the strength of the U.S. arsenal and the danger it posed to life and limb.  It might 
be worthwhile for U.S. forces to explore ways that they could also signal their 
________________  
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lethality to civilians and encourage them to get out from the open and seek 
shelter.  Such tactics could involve using flash grenades and other riot control 
devices that result in little damage but that encourage people to disperse or seek 
cover.  One potential danger in using such tactics too often may be that people 
begin to ignore warning tactics or to underestimate the danger of real munitions.  
However, this is an area that could be further explored, particularly if the United 
States plans to conduct future operations in urban areas. 
The third response to combat is a lack of reaction to what is happening.
Non-combatants, particularly those in vehicles, at times ignored combat and 
continued about their normal daily activities.  They appeared to do it because 
they were unaware of how close they were to combat, because they 
underestimated the danger they were in, or because some activities (such as 
seeking medical assistance) were urgent enough for people to take the risk.  This 
is a behavior that occurred to varying degrees in the case studies.  It was not as 
universal as defensive actions, such as running away from combat and seeking 
shelter.  However, it did happen and U.S. forces are likely to encounter it again I 
the future.  Ignoring the presence of combat poses risks for both non-combatants 
and U.S. forces.  A related behavior to ignoring combat, ignoring U.S. forces as 
vehicle checkpoints, is also a behavior that can lead to numerous non-combatant 
casualties in Panama and especially in Iraq.  Civilians appear to exhibit this 
behavior at times because they are not aware that a checkpoint exists, they 
underestimate the danger of approaching a checkpoint, or through other 
miscommunication and misunderstanding. 
Again, better communication with civilians prior to the start of conflict 
or PSYOPS-like tactics to stoke defensive responses may reduce the number of 
civilians who fail to respond to the dangers of combat.  It is doubtful that this 
behavior will ever completely disappear, since there will always be confusion, 
limited information, miscalculation, and miscommunication for civilians caught 
up in urban combat.  However, there may be room to reduce the proportion of 
civilians exhibiting this behavior during combat and the effect might again both 
reduce civilian casualties and improve situational awareness for U.S. troops on 
the ground. 
  The last non-combatant behavior, running towards fighting, is the most 
unusual of the behaviors described in this chapter.  Civilians in Panama and Iraq 
did not appear to exhibit this behavior on a large scale, although individuals 120
who attacked U.S. troops or who ran to greet U.S. troops did.246  In contrast, 
civilians in Somalia displayed it frequently.  In Mogadishu, civilians ran towards 
the sound of fighting and gathered in crowds at the scene of gunfire.  During 
U.S. troops’ final retreat from the city, Somalis also gathered in crowds to watch 
them leave.247  Running towards combat cannot be considered a defensive or a 
default behavior, unlike the ones mentioned up until this point.  It is not a 
universal or easily explained non-combatant behavior.  Nonetheless, this 
behavior is considered a simple reaction to combat because it is spontaneous, 
driven by a simple reflex, does not require planning, and does not involve 
complex interaction with combatants.  It merits attention because it is a behavior 
that can lead to more aggressive civilian actions towards U.S. forces. 
  If the U.S. experience in Mogadishu is any indication of what can 
happen when large numbers of civilians are drawn to scenes of urban combat, it 
is definitely best to explore actions that would discourage this behavior.  When it 
comes to ideas on dispersing crowds, non-lethal weapons naturally come to 
mind.  Current types of non-lethal weapons in use or under development 
include nets, foams, and weapons aimed at nerve stimulation.248  In addition to 
using non-lethal weapons to disperse crowds, the appearance of large and 
heavily armed U.S. forces might also be an effective way to discourage civilians 
from remaining at particular locations.  (Task Force Ranger in Mogadishu was a 
small and light force, unlike the heavy armored units that appeared on the 
streets of Baghdad.)  Just as PSYOPS might be directed at the civilian population 
specifically to reduce civilian casualties and unnecessary interaction with U.S. 
forces, shows of force might also be aimed at civilians for similar reasons. 
Simple Behaviors and Agent-based Modeling 
  As discussed in the previous chapter, information on the size, 
composition, and density of a civilian population allows analysis on certain 
types of policy options.  Introducing simple behaviors to this static population 
opens the possibility of using models to examine additional policy alternatives 
that could not be assessed before.  Table 5-2 lists some specific options that could 
________________  
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be evaluated in models when certain types of non-combatant behavior are 
added:
Table 5-2.  Civilian Population Characteristics and Potential Policy Options 
Civilian Characteristic or Behavior 
Introduced to Model 
Example Policy Options That May Now be 
Considered
Demographic information and 
population density 
Force sizing 
Planning and resource management 
Weapons choice 
Targeting decisions 
Policies that affect density or total population 
Commuting and congregation  Curfews 
Vehicle checkpoints and roadblocks 
Restrictions on congregation 
Operation timing (day versus night, etc.) 
Transportation requirements for U.S. troops 
Simple reactions to combat  Effects of maneuver 
Rules of engagement 
Tactical surprise 
Information operations aimed at civilians 
Sensor technologies 
Introducing individual-level behavior for non-combatants in models 
requires a fairly high degree of model resolution.  Although population density 
and heterogeneity in population distribution are attributes that could be 
incorporated into low-resolution models, much of what is discussed in this 
chapter pertains to models that can depict individual non-combatant agents.  
Vehicle density could be used in lower-resolution models to some extent, but 
traffic and individual reactions to combat require greater resolution.  Because of 
this, this chapter begins to discuss non-combatant behavior more specifically 
within the context of ABM.  The strengths of the ABM approach become evident 
during this discussion of simple non-combatant behavior.  Trying to animate the 
numbers of non-combatant actors suggested in Chapter 4 may make it difficult 
to use approaches other than ABM.  Non-combatant actors also need to be able 
to react to their specific local environment in order to emulate phenomena such 
as vehicle traffic and fleeing from fighting combatants.  Also because various 
non-combatants may exhibit different types of reactions to combat at the same 
time, ABM is useful because it easily allows for this type of heterogeneity in 
behavioral rules. 
Agents with simple behavior are enough in many agent-based models to 
produce complex, emergent behavior from the system as a whole.  For example, 122
the simple behavior of agents in a town moving around until their environment 
meets certain criteria for ethnic mix produces segregated neighborhoods.  The 
relatively simple behavior of panicking people racing for an exit in crowd 
dynamic models produce casualties or not depending on the building’s 
structural characteristics.  Both in ABMs and in simpler cellular automata 
models, agents with routes and destinations produce traffic jams and congestion 
along simulated roads and at intersections.  Introducing self-directed non-
combatants into a military model should also produce emergent, system-wide 
behavior.  Depending on any number of model characteristics, such emergent 
behavior could include patterns of non-combatant agent casualties or a 
relationship between red agent casualties and non-combatant movement. 
There is a framework for modeling simple agent behavior that begins to 
emerge from just this discussion of background behaviors and simple reactions 
to combat.  An interactive non-combatant population can be created by setting 
non-combatants to exhibit background behavior in the absence of combat, 
having simple reactions to combat come into play when fighting occurs around 
non-combatant agents, and instructing agents to revert to background behavior 
when agents no longer detect combat.  This should result in varying, localized 
behavior that allows for the simulation of the “three block war” that often 
characterizes urban operations, even with only these simple behaviors.
Disparate local events will also be especially true in scenarios where there is 
sporadic, low-level violence, such as in post-conflict Iraq. 
First, there are some points to be made about setting background 
behaviors for non-combatant agents. Although non-combatant behavior may 
differ substantially for some scenarios, a base model could consist of non-
combatants carrying about background activities.  People travel to and from a 
wide variety of locations where they meet, learn, worship, conduct business, or 
buy goods and services.  Non-combatants in an urban ABM could be animated 
by having their default goals set for traveling and staying for various times at 
different locations.  An individual agent travels according to the instructions it 
has about moving back and forth between its home and other destination points 
throughout the city.   
Figure 5-5.  Moving Between Destination Points 
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As agents travel, the emergent behaviors that arise from multiple agents 
making trips are vehicle traffic, pedestrian traffic, and pedestrian congregation.
Traffic patterns arise as agents encounter other agents attempting to reach their 
destinations.  Congregation happens when there are destinations that attract 
multiple agents, who may stay at that location for a certain period of time before 
traveling to another destination.  Recreating Figure 5-1 but distinguishing 
between individual and emergent behavior yields: 
Figure 5-6.  Individual Rule Sets Versus Emergent Behavior for Background Non-
combatant Behaviors 
Here, individual agent rules about when and how to travel should create these 
other emergent behaviors.  Figure 5-1 treated these behaviors as a pathway, 
where one leads to another.  However, in the ABM framework, traffic and 
congregations are aggregate-level behavior that arises indirectly from individual 
behavioral rules. 
Introducing heterogeneity in walking versus riding vehicles allows for 
agents to represent either vehicles or pedestrians.  (The total number of vehicles 
might be a function of the total number of vehicles per population set for the 
scenario.)  It would also be realistic to have are daily and geographic traffic 
patterns.  It is reasonable to assume that traffic peaks during certain times of the 
day and falls off at night.  Traffic will also depend on a number of other factors 
such as the day of the week, holidays, and patterns in economic activity.  When 
thinking of traffic activity across a city, it would also make sense for locations to 
have varying degrees of “attraction” for people in vehicles making trips instead 
of assuming random activity throughout the city.  This is more likely to produce 
variations in traffic and vehicle density that reflect real events. 
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It is not necessary to use a model with very complex rules to emulate 
traffic: even cellular automata models have given good approximations of 
realistic behavior.  By setting attraction values for both buildings and open areas, 
it should be possible to reconstruct high population density points both inside 
and outside of buildings.  Modeling traffic and congregation at the city block 
level may or may not be desired: depicting agents moving along roads certainly 
grants a higher fidelity to non-combatant movement.  Alternatively, other types 
models may reflect traffic as population and vehicle densities that change over 
time for a given geographical unit.  ABMs could also be used to generate these 
dynamic population densities, and the results could be fed into other types of 
models in lieu of adding non-combatant actors. 
The next layer in such a proposed modeling framework is to add simple 
reactions to combat.  Although activities around the simulated city can continue 
to be agents’ primary objectives, agents should also have rules that direct them 
to deviate from their behavior (or not) in the event that they sense combat in 
their vicinity.  This requires some awareness or information about the local 
environment for each agent.  Such awareness is necessary for the highest 
definition traffic models, since individual vehicles will be required to slow down 
or speed up depending on the presence of other vehicle agents.  Agents should 
either be heterogeneous in rules that dictate whether they flee, go to ground, or 
continue their activities.  Alternatively, they may be assigned probabilities rather 
than rules for each of the possible actions.  Although non-combatants had 
various motives for simple reactions to combat in the case studies, making these 
behaviors probability-based instead of situation-based would simplify rules and 
yet can expect to give rise to realistic emergent behavior.  Such emergent 
behavior would include non-combatants running during firefights and finding 
non-combatants inside buildings as red or blue forces move through them.  This 
is where the non-combatant actors proposed in this dissertation begin to break 
from the current state of the art in military modeling.  Now, non-combatant 
actions are exogenously determined, with no feedback from the surrounding 
environment incorporated into behavior. 
  Running away from combat and seeking or remaining in shelter are two 
defensive non-combatant behaviors that are related.  An entirely plausible set of 
rules could direct an agent who is out in the open to flee combat, seek shelter, 
and remain there.  There may even be an error term that gives agents some 
chance of running in the wrong direction.  These rules for fleeing combat could 
be coupled with directions for an agent to remain inside a building if it detects 
combat outside, but to flee and seek shelter again if fighting moves into the 
building.  This should result in non-combatant agents running from building to 125
building as they find themselves in the midst of combat.  Here, possible rules are 
that agents remain inside buildings as long as there is fighting within their area 
of awareness.  After that, one set of rules may be that they reestablish their 
normal routine after a randomly generated wait period.  There is also leeway to 
emphasize one behavior over another, resulting in non-combatants who tend to 
stay inside shelter as much as possible, or non-combatants who tend to move 
even when combat is fairly distant.  These types of variations across non-
combatant populations are found in the real world.  There is also plenty of room 
for experimenting with how likely it is for civilians in a simulation to ignore 
combat.   The reaction to run towards combatants may be excluded or assigned a 
very low number of occurrences. 
There is a great deal of heterogeneity and variation that can be 
introduced for non-combatant agents depicting these relatively simple 
behaviors.  There is potential heterogeneity in behavioral rules, where agents 
may have different rules on how to react to combat.  There is heterogeneity in 
parameters, such as the length of time an agent remains in shelter if it goes to 
ground or the probability that an agent will flee a given area if it detects combat.  
There may also be heterogeneity for a host of other factors, such as how 
accurately it can detect the presence of combatants.  Another type of 
heterogeneity is differences in the demographic characteristics of agents.  For 
example, men were much more likely to be traveling in Iraq after the immediate 
fall of the Hussein government because security concerns prevented many 
women from leaving their homes. 
Behavioral heterogeneity among simulated civilian agents reflects the 
fog of war when not everyone response in the same manner.  In a model, it may 
be useful in several ways.  Variation in non-combatant behavior can test 
methods of distinguishing between friend and foe in high-resolution 
simulations.  It should also be an advantage in training simulations since 
changing behavior can help keep circumstances challenging and results from 
becoming too predictable. 
ABM also allows agents to communicate information with one another.  
Communication is an interesting dynamic that should almost certainly lead to 
non-linearities and other interesting phenomena.  Communication between 
agents in a model can also allow researchers to pose questions about PSYOPS, 
civil affairs policies, and the role of information.  It can be represented as simply 
as having non-combatant agents observe the behavior of other non-combatant 
agents.  Introducing elements of social behavior could lead to non-combatants 
running away from the vicinity of combat even though they have not directly 
observed combat themselves, but have observed other non-combatants fleeing 126
an area.  Rules may instruct an agent to flee with some probability if they detect 
combat in a given area and to flee with some additional probability if they 
observe other non-combatants fleeing.  An alternative is to represent 
communication between agents through an extended sensory range for non-
combatant agents.  Information passing between agents would effectively 
increase the geographical area that non-combatant agents perceive.  Agents 
could also have imperfect, incorrect, or incomplete information about combat in 
their extended ranges, reflecting the uncertain nature of communication during 
the fog of war. 
Yet another way to capture communication between agents is to use 
networks.  Here, agents are members of networks and learn from other agents in 
their network.  Networks and communicating agents are often used to model 
technology diffusion and social learning and they could also be used to model 
non-combatant communication.  Networks may reflect neighborhood, kinship, 
clan, or ethnic ties between civilians.  It is important to note that such networks 
need not necessarily be contained within geographical boundaries: in real life 
civilians may be in communication with others in different areas of the city or in 
different areas of the country.  Communication along networks can be used to 
represent information passing between civilians through phone, Internet, radio, 
TV, and other media that do not require physical proximity.  Thus information 
between non-combatants could jump areas, with some non-combatants farther 
from the fighting having more information than some who are closer.  In the 
context of the simple behaviors described in this chapter, networking could, for 
example, prompt non-combatants in another area of the city to seek shelter.
Networking also has relevance when modeling complex behavior that requires 
non-combatant agents to have more information.  
Example: Hypothetical FCS Model 
  The example model in the previous chapter used leadership strikes 
during OIF to show how information about population density can be used to 
reduce civilian deaths.  Using population density data is appropriate when 
considering urban operations that mainly affect stationary civilians.  For this 
reason, the OIF leadership strike example did not need to go beyond density 
data.  However, in many cases, adding civilian movement and simple reactions 
to combat introduce enough new information to alter the policy 
recommendations that come from models with a static non-combatant 
population.  The example section of this chapter looks at how this is expected to 
be the case when evaluating the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program.  It will 
look at the policy implications of a RAND FCS study that used population 127
density to answer questions about civilian casualties.  It will then explore how 
dynamic civilians in a simulation change recommendations and allow analysts 
to consider a wider scope of policy alternatives.  The purpose of this exercise is 
to demonstrate how introducing more complex civilian behavior into a model 
now makes it possible to evaluate an expanded range of policy options. 
The FCS program is central to the U.S. Army’s efforts to transform itself 
from a Cold War era force into one that is lighter and more mobile.  When fully 
developed, the FCS program will be a suite of 18 systems.  These systems are 
scheduled to include eight new manned ground vehicles, four unmanned air 
vehicles, unmanned ground vehicles, sensors, and missiles.249  Connected by an 
advanced information network, these components are expected to produce a 
system of systems that should be as lethal, as survivable, more readily 
deployable, and sustainable with a smaller logistics footprint than the current 
heavy armor vehicles they replace.250  FCS vehicles will be “medium” weight (20 
tons) and deployable by air, instead of “heavy” like the M1 Abrams (70 tons).251
The fundamental idea behind the FCS is that substituting superior information 
for mass will allow the Army to realize all these goals simultaneously.252
Current plans call for the Army to equip 15 brigade-sized forces with the FCS 
over the next 20 years.253  According to some observers, the Army has accepted 
cancellation of two other major weapons systems – the Comanche helicopter and 
the Crusader artillery system – in order to preserve funding for the FCS.254
Many FCS technologies are still under development and the actual 
design of the FCS may not be finalized until 2008 at the earliest.255  In the 
absence of a physical prototype, there is no choice but to use modeling and 
simulation to test notional FCS performance.  As part of the 2000 Army Science 
Board’s look at “Technical and Tactical Opportunities for Revolutionary 
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Advances in Rapidly Deployable Joint Ground Forces in the 2015-2020 Era,” the 
RAND Corporation’s Arroyo Center for Army Research used high-resolution 
modeling to evaluate the value of different potential FCS technologies in a SSC.  
The SSC was set in Kosovo and involved the FCS against Serbian armor.  Serbian 
armor capabilities were upgraded compared with current capabilities in order to 
account for improved capabilities in the future.256  In real operations against 
Serb forces in Kosovo, NATO relied on airstrikes and did not use ground forces.
In its modeling scenarios, RAND examined the results from relying on airstrikes 
and other long-range indirect fires, and the results from adding FCS capabilities 
on the ground. 
To estimate non-combatant casualties from FCS long-range fires, 
researchers used different population densities to represent urban versus 
sparsely populated areas.  The estimates assumed that there was a uniform 
population density and a given probability of injury depending on the distance 
from an aerial strike.  They also assumed that more munitions would be fired 
when a target was harder, when the payload was smaller, and when the CEP of 
the munition was greater.  Thus, the most civilian casualties came from using the 
smallest munition with the largest CEP against the hardest targets.257  The policy 
implication of this type of casualty estimate is that certain munitions, depending 
on the CEP and the payload, should not be employed in the FCS.  The results 
from such a model imply that to reduce civilian casualties, decision makers 
should use the most accurate munitions available.  Also under the targeting 
assumptions outlined in the report, using a smaller munition may increase 
civilian casualties because more munitions must be fired at a target to ensure a 
certain probability of damaging it.  However, this implied relationship between 
weapons choice and civilian casualties might not necessarily hold because it 
ignores civilian movement.  Civilian travel and movement in response to combat 
could be a far greater driver of non-combatant injuries than the choice of FCS 
munitions.  Had a model with detailed non-combatant behavior been available 
to the researchers who conducted the study, it would have been possible to ask 
this question. 
There are similarities between the RAND civilian casualty estimates and 
the example model discussed in Chapter 4.  Although many of the assumptions 
are slightly different, at their core, both models envision warheads going off over 
a stationary and uniformly distributed non-combatant population.  This 
assumption was more or less accurate for the OIF leadership strike example.
________________  
256 Matsumura, et. al., pp. xiii, 4. 
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However, it was much less realistic for the Kosovo scenario.  The terrain 
examined in the RAND modeling scenario was mostly roads, fields, and villages 
instead of urban residential areas.  Population movement would have been the 
primary driver for civilian exposure.  The study results point out the range of 
civilian casualties that could result from different population densities and are 
consistent with such a view. 
In some cases, local population density around targets was greater than 
average in real life: Serbian forces compelled civilians to act as human shields 
during Operation Allied Force in 2000, increasing the population density around 
certain targets.258  In other cases, using the average population density 
overestimates civilian casualties.  The scenario assumed that ethnic Albanian 
civilians would stand around uniformly distributed in open areas where there 
are Serbian tanks, explosions, and other combat activity.  Human shields were 
not present around all Serbian targets, and for these, using uniform population 
density would overestimate civilian casualties.  This is because it would be 
natural for non-combatants to flee or to avoid combat areas.  The modeling 
scenario also did not take differences in terrain into account when estimating 
civilian casualties.  For examples, civilians are more likely to be concentrated on 
roads because of civilian traffic than in rural areas just meters from a main road. 
Figure 5-6 is taken from the RAND FCS study and depicts the use of four 
250-lb JDAMs with a 3-meter target location error (TLE) and 3-meter CEP against 
armored targets in Kosovo.  The blue inner circles depict the effective area 
against the targets, while the outer green circles show the possible injury range 
for non-combatants in the area259:
_________________ 
258 Matsumura, et. al., pp. 65-9. 
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Figure 5-7.   Illustration of Noncombatant Effects of Dropping Four 250-Pound JDAM 
With 3-Meter TLE 
Source: RAND MR-1332-A. 
Adding the simple behaviors discussed earlier in this chapter would go 
a long way towards introducing civilian behavior that is appropriate for this 
scenario.  (This is actually suggested from Figure 5-6, which points out an upper 
and lower bound for civilian casualties based on different population density 
assumptions.  Using different density assumptions is the simplest way to depict 
a dynamic population that may move around relative to target locations.)  
Civilians in this model should have rules that direct them to run or drive away 
from areas where they observe combat. This creates very basic non-combatants 
whose motion can still influence the policy suggestions that come out of the 
model.  Instead of policy options being limited to FCS weapons choice, potential 
policy levers now include ways to influence civilian movement.  It is also now 
possible to examine the potential impact that rules of engagement, different FCS 
sensor technologies, and other options can have on civilian casualties and other 
MOE.
Adding other simple population characteristics also paves the way to 
ask further policy questions.  For example, Figure 5-6 shows civilian vehicles on 131
the road near Serbian armor.  Although the RAND study did not model civilian 
vehicles, this would clearly be a concern in real life.  Having civilian vehicular 
traffic in a model would offer a more realistic test of how often proposed FCS 
technologies are able to distinguish and engage armored targets among 
additional sensory clutter.  Examples of technologies that could be used by the 
FCS include 1) advances in remote assets such as synthetic aperture radar (SAR) 
and foliage penetration radar (FOPEN) equipped satellites; 2) organic tactical 
sensors such as low-flying fixed-wing UAVs, hovering UAVs, and air-
deliverable acoustic sensors (ADAS); and 3) armed and unarmed robotic 
reconnaissance ground vehicles.260  It is a distinct possibility that adding civilian 
vehicles that substantially outnumber Serb armored vehicles into the modeling 
scenario could alter the assessment of these different technologies.  For example, 
it may show that a certain candidate technology is less suitable than it formerly 
appeared because it now consistently mistakes civilian vehicles for legitimate 
targets.  Another technology may not be as stellar as an alternative in killing Serb 
armor, but may balance this with fewer civilian casualties.  Or, yet another 
technology may show a previously hidden talent for discerning civilian vehicles. 
In addition to simple movement and reactions to combat, there are two 
other non-combatant behaviors that would be appropriate when recreating the 
Kosovo scenario from Operation Allied Force.261  The first behavior is a 
directional refugee flow.  During the fighting between Serbs and ethnic 
Albanians in Kosovo, approximately 300,000 ethnic Albanians fled to 
neighboring Macedonia.262  The second behavior is the use of involuntary 
human shields by Serb forces.  Involuntary human shields are discussed in 
further in the next chapter and are listed as a complex non-combatant behavior 
in this dissertation.  However, it is also possible to model this form of human 
shield behavior by initially placing some civilians close to certain targets and 
having them not react to combat. 
Table 5-3 illustrates how even simple civilian behaviors can allow 
researchers to ask additional policy questions.  It lists one of the behaviors dealt 
with in this chapter and proposes a policy question that researchers for the FCS 
program might have been able to investigate if a model with interactive non-
combatants had been available.  Again, the baseline analysis is FCS long-range 
fires over a stationary and uniformly distributed population.  In that scenario, 
_________________ 
260 Matsumura, et. al., pp. 15-7, 22-3, 41. 
261 Recreating the all-air power campaign from the actual Operation Allied Force versus 
recreating a counterfactual with an FCS ground force may have different implications for the 
magnitude or prevalence of these behaviors. 
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the primary policy questions that can be asked in the analysis revolve around 
weapons choice and usage.  Table 5-3 also goes a step further and lists ways that 
Serb forces did or might have used these civilian behaviors to counteract NATO 
actions.  Asking this question automatically generates ways to make enemy 
combatants in a model more life-like and challenging to confront. 
Table 5-3.  Simple Non-combatant Behaviors and FCS Program Analysis 
Civilian Behavior 
Introduced to Model 
Additional Policy Questions  Potential Serb Use of 
Civilian Behavior 
Vehicle traffic  How does proposed FCS 
technology perform when vehicle 
clutter is added? 
Can civilian traffic be controlled 
in a way to maximize FCS 
effectiveness?
Use civilian traffic for cover 
and concealment. 
Fleeing from combat/ 
seeking shelter 
How can civilian exposure to 
combat operations be reduced? 
Force civilians from their 
homes to raise number of 
civilian casualties from 
NATO actions. 
Ignoring combat 
(approximation for 
human shields) 
What tactics help counteract the 
Serb use of human shields? 
What technologies better target 
enemy combatants in close 
proximity to civilians? 
Force civilians to act as 
human shields. 
Directional
refugee/IDP flow 
How should NATO plan for 
humanitarian assistance? 
What techniques can control or 
manage mass civilian movement? 
Create refugee flows. 
Close borders to increase 
exposure for civilians 
caught inside the country. 
  One this that Table 5-3 makes clear even without completed model runs 
is that the presence of non-combatants could greatly complicate FCS operations 
in even modestly built-up areas.  There is substantial potential for Serb mischief 
with ethnic Albanian civilians that would reduce FCS systems’ ability to 
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.  It raises questions about 
whether the systems’ projected informational superiority would be great enough 
to overcome these types of low-tech tactics.  There is also the possibility that 
refugee movement and civilian traffic could hinder maneuver, another 
important anticipated element of the FCS program.133
6.  Complex Non-combatant Behaviors 
Chapter Six deals with complex non-combatant behaviors.  It identifies 
and discusses the implications of some of the complex behaviors found in the 
case studies: looting, involuntary human shields, voluntary human shields, 
attacking U.S. forces, and swarming. This chapter expands on the simple 
behaviors introduced in the previous chapter and introduces pathways for 
combining complex and simple behavior.  The next section of Chapter Six deals 
with modeling these complex behaviors in an agent-based framework.  It 
discusses potential behavior rules, adaptive, and emergent non-combatant 
behavior.  The last section offers an example of how complex behaviors might be 
used in a model to further expand the range of policy questions that can be 
examined.
Adding Complex Behavior 
Up until this point, this dissertation has discussed population density, 
background movement, and simple reactions to combat.  This has laid the 
supporting layers for the set of complex behaviors that will be discussed in the 
following section.  There are a number of reasons why incorporating complex 
non-combatant behavior into models, simulations, training, and analyses is a 
worthwhile endeavor.  Complex behaviors are some of the most important 
because they include the most hostile and most extreme behaviors that civilian 
can exhibit towards U.S. forces.  Large-scale looting or swarming can easily 
overwhelm the ability of U.S. troops to control a population or even to operate at 
all.  Even when behaviors are not widespread, hostile actions such as attacking 
U.S. forces still have important ramifications for how U.S. forces carry out their 
activities.  Being able to recreate this set of behaviors in models or other planning 
and training tools improves the ability of U.S. forces and decision makers to 
understand and prepare for difficult civilian behavior. 
Another reason that complex behaviors are important is that explicitly 
considering them can change and improve overall planning and 
conceptualization of urban operations.  The exercise of attempting to deal with 
the uncertainty in complex behaviors and the expanded range of situational 
implications forces broader thinking about uncertainty, risk, and robust 
solutions.  Complex behaviors are more uncertain and more situation-specific 134
than the background and simple behaviors discussed so far.  Thus, adding the 
final layer of complex non-combatant behavior greatly expands the uncertainty, 
the complexity, and the range of potential events that can come from an urban 
population far beyond what arises from considering only population density and 
simple behaviors.  This greater range of events happens because there is much 
more uncertainty in whether or not civilians will exhibit complex behaviors such 
as looting, human shields, and attacking U.S. troops than for simple or 
background behaviors. 
One complex behavior, looting, illustrates this point that extending the 
range of potential civilian behaviors that the defense community plans for may 
be beneficial.  U.S. forces appeared to be unprepared to deal with the 
widespread looting in Panama that took place in the wake of Noriega’s fall.263
This was a significant civilian response that greatly shaped the environment that 
U.S. troops faced as they attempted to shift to post-conflict operations.  The real 
problem, however, was the fact that this experience did not leave the United 
States any more ready to deal with looting in Iraq after the fall of Saddam 
Hussein’s government.  Instead, policy makers and troops on the ground again 
seemed to be caught unprepared to intervene successfully in the looting and 
lawlessness that marked the beginning of the U.S. presence in post-conflict Iraq.
Hindsight is always 20/20, but if the possibility of looting civilians had been 
considered more explicitly in analysis, simulation, or training in the twelve years 
between Operation Just Cause and Operation Iraqi Freedom, looting in Iraq 
might have been less of a surprise.264
The complex behaviors discussed in this chapter are not exhaustive and 
are better thought of as a start to systematic research into non-combatant 
behavior.  The behaviors identified generally tilt towards those that are more 
aggressive or disruptive for U.S. forces. It is certainly not the case that all U.S. 
military activities will only be met with negative reactions.  It would not be 
accurate to expect this.  However, there is a low cost to being pleasantly 
surprised by cooperative or helpful behavior and a high cost to being caught off-
guard by hostile or impeding behavior.  Preparations and planning for a military 
engagement tend to focus less on the ways that an adversary may fall short of 
performing as an effective fighting force and more on the ways that they might.  
________________  
263 Fishel, p. 60-1. 
264 Interestingly enough, at the time, there was also criticism that U.S. military planners had not 
sufficiently prepared for looting in Panama.  Fishel, for one, disputed the claim that there had been a 
conscious decision to dedicate manpower to other higher-priority missions and questioned how 
planners who were normally intelligent could fail to miss this possibility.  If looting in Panama in 
1989 and looting in Iraq in 2003 both came as a surprise to U.S. forces, it is clearly time to be explicit 
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Similarly, research resources would be better spent on understanding and 
preparing for aggressive or disruptive civilian behavior. 
This chapter also does not offer a compendium of civilians “types” that 
correspond to each of the behaviors.  This was deliberately avoided because 
transitions between different types of behaviors can be fluid.  Civilian 
populations can generally be characterized as friendly, hostile, or neutral, 
because of the behavior that predominates.  However, individual behavior can 
vary considerably throughout a population and over time.  For example, some of 
the same civilians who greeted U.S. troops in Iraq could very well have later 
become looters or insurgents.  The discussion of non-combatant behaviors in this 
dissertation provides only a brief overview of the way civilians may transition 
between different attitudes and acts towards U.S. forces.  Yet the topic deserves 
considerable further attention.  If there are common patterns across many cases 
on how civilians shift from one behavior to another, it would be very valuable 
information for understanding and managing populations in future operations.  
Solid theory for how large numbers of individuals begin to “swing” towards one 
behavior or another, combined with computational experimentation with 
emergent behavior, could greatly improve current insight into non-combatant 
populations. 
This chapter also attempts to avoid suggesting that culture is the 
primary cause of any of these behaviors.  Leaning too heavily on culture often 
blinds researchers to other situational factors that may have contributed to 
certain actions.  It encourages narrower thinking about a population’s motives, 
adaptability, powers of observation, and ability to learn.  The danger to tagging 
the behaviors discussed in this dissertation as atavistic to certain cultures or 
areas of the world is that it may encourage outdated beliefs about a society for 
years after a conflict.  This would be the equivalent of “fighting the last war” 
when it comes to considering possible non-combatant behavior in that country 
during future conflicts.  A good example of this mentality is how U.S. military 
planners assumed that OIF would produce a refugee crisis because the 1991 Gulf 
War had produced one.  Although there is no evidence that they believed 
cultural reasons were behind this, the point is that planners may have 
automatically assumed that it would happen in 2003 because it had in 1991 even 
though conditions were very different.  Greater understanding improves 
analysis, training, planning, and other preparation for future conflicts.
Anchoring a certain expected behavior to a certain population does not improve 
understanding and should not be done. 136
Complex Behaviors 
  The following table recreates Table 3-4 in the case study section and 
summarizes the complex civilian behaviors that this chapter discusses: 
Table 6-1.  Complex Civilian Reactions to Combat 
Panama Somalia  Iraq 
Major combat 
Iraq
Post-conflict
Looting  Yes No Yes  No 
Involuntary 
Human Shields 
No No Yes  Yes 
Voluntary 
Human Shields 
No Yes No  No 
Attacking U.S. 
Forces 
Yes (Rare)  Yes (Frequent)  Yes (Rare)  Yes 
Swarming  No Yes No  No 
As previously stated, this is not mean to be an exhaustive list of all complex 
behaviors that civilians can display towards U.S. forces.  The table focuses on 
physical movement and actions that can prompt direct engagement by U.S. 
troops.  It does attempt to identify the ones that have had the most serious 
implications for U.S. urban operations in recent years, even though some of these 
behaviors may be fairly uncommon.  The ultimate goal is to explore ways to 
manage or prevent some of these civilian responses in the future. 
Beginning with the first complex behavior in the table, widespread 
looting was evident in Panama and Iraq.  Looting in areas such as Panama City, 
Colon, Baghdad, and Basra started spontaneously as soon as it became apparent 
that the government was no longer in power.  Looting in Panama appeared to 
begin in shopping districts while looting in Iraq began at government buildings.  
In each of these locations, looting gained momentum as time went on: more and 
more people joined in on the looting, the scope of the looting broadened to other 
targets, and looters became more brazen and more violent.  Looting typically 
died down in a few days as looters began to run out of goods to take.  On the 
whole, Panamanian and Iraqi looters appeared to be undeterred by the presence 
of U.S. troops when they began breaking into buildings.  U.S. troops had some 
local success in restraining looting in Panama, but could not stop the full extent.  
U.S. forces were also dealing with manpower constraints and other mission 
objectives at the same time. 137
To what extent should the United States be concerned about looting as 
future a non-combatant behavior?  On one hand, looting did not take place until 
after the United States had accomplished its objective of overthrowing the 
Noriega and the Hussein governments.  Nor does it occur in every urban 
operation.  Nonetheless, widespread and prolonged looting is disruptive enough 
that U.S. forces should be concerned about the possibility that they will 
encounter it again in the future.  Additionally, it is usually consistent with U.S. 
interests to leave a country in a reasonably stable and functional condition when 
it withdraws forces.  The damage that looting during OIF did to Iraq’s already 
fragile infrastructure required the United States to pour additional resources into 
physical repairs and into reestablishing law and order.  It prolonged the process 
towards establishing a stable country, which in turn prolonged the period of 
time that U.S. forces had to stay in Iraq. 
Further research is needed on this phenomenon to better understand the 
dynamics of widespread looting and how U.S. forces can stop, prevent, or 
mitigate it.  The U.S. experience in Panama and Iraq suggest some theories for 
when it happens.  In both cases, the United States targeted internal security 
forces that were responsible for both law enforcement and for keeping the 
government in power.  Looting happened after U.S. forces successfully 
undermined these security forces.  Thus, the collapse of internal security forces 
in Panama and Iraq led to the fall of the Noriega and Hussein governments.  
However, the collapse of these security forces also may have encouraged people 
to believe that they could loot with immunity.  Both governments were also 
unpopular and appeared to have low legitimacy among its citizens, which may 
have emboldened civil disobedience in the wake of their demise.  Again, 
however, not much can be said only looking at only two instances and a more in-
depth look is necessary before one can arrive at any policy recommendations. 
In addition to investigating the causes and potential warning signs for 
why civilian populations engage in widespread looting, it would be helpful to 
identify methods to deal with looting and to give estimates on the types and 
sizes of forces potentially required.  Modeling and simulation are potential tools 
to use for this purpose.  Live humans used in training exercises to stand in for 
civilians cannot capture all aspects of a civilian population that is looting.  This is 
because widespread, spontaneous looting across a large urban area might 
potentially involve thousands of people.  It also involves sustained activity that 
escalates over days and would be difficult to recreate in an exercise.  Instead, this 
appears to be a problem where modeling and simulation could offer a great deal.  
U.S. forces in future urban operations are likely to be lean, given this country’s 
continued efforts to substitute capital and technology for labor in its armed 138
forces.  Further analysis on looting might even suggest that these anticipated 
force levels would be insufficient to control large urban populations once looting 
and the breakdown of law and order has started.  Yet even this would be 
valuable information, since efforts could then be directed to preventing the start 
of looting.  Such efforts might involve better identifying the preconditions for 
widespread looting, or more a more involved PSYOPS campaign before 
hostilities aimed at the civilian population precisely on this issue. 
Looting may largely be thought of as a standalone behavior.  Except 
where U.S. forces are attempting to control looting, it generally does not involve 
significant civilian interaction with either enemy combatants or U.S. forces.  (In 
Iraq, looters ignored U.S. forces and looted whether they were present or not.)
However, the other behaviors discussed in this chapter are civilian responses to 
combatant actions.  Non-combatants acting as involuntary or voluntary human 
shields engage in behavior that is closely tied to the activities of enemy 
combatants.  Civilian attempts to attack U.S. forces, or to swarm, require actions 
closely tied to the movement of U.S. troops.  The following figure depicts these 
relationships and arranges civilian behaviors according to how hostile they are 
towards U.S. forces: 
Figure 6-1.  Civilian Interactions with Combatants 
Non-combatants acting as involuntary human shields is the least hostile 
of the behaviors depicted in Figure 6-1. It may even be thought of as a defensive 
measure on the part of non-combatants because they are cooperating with 
enemy combatants in order to avoid harm.  With involuntary human shields, 
civilian behavior is (involuntarily) coordinated with enemy combatant behavior.  
There are a few different types of involuntary human shields.  At a passive level 
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is a conventional army’s decision to store munitions dumps, weapon, and 
vehicles near protected civilian structures such as schools or religious buildings.  
This was what Iraqi conventional forces did during OIF.  Deliberately operating 
in densely populated residential areas should also be considered employing a 
form of involuntary human shields.  Pulling individual civilians into harm’s way 
during combat is a much more active form of using involuntary human shields.  
Enemy combatants can force non-combatants to travel with them, to stay 
between them and U.S. forces, or to move forward first in the presence of U.S. 
troops.  All were tactics shown by the Fedayeen during major combat operations 
in Iraq. 
The study of involuntary human shields is actually a study of 
unconventional enemy combatant tactics.  Whether or not there are involuntary 
human shields, to what extent they are used, and what shielding behaviors are 
common all depend on the enemy.  In most cases it will be difficult to know 
beforehand whether or not a certain opponent will use involuntary human 
shields as actively as the Fedayeen did in OIF.  However, preparing for the 
possibility is still important.  The use of involuntary human shields clearly 
increases non-combatant casualties by bringing them deliberately into the line of 
fire.  Involuntary human shields also endanger U.S. forces, because they are not 
able to fully engage combatants who are using non-combatants for cover.  
The next behavior is civilians acting as voluntary human shields.  Here, 
civilians actively coordinate their movement with combatants’, placing 
themselves between combatants and U.S. forces.  This civilian behavior is 
primarily dependent on enemy combatant movement and behavior.  It also only 
occurs in the presence of U.S. forces, since human shields are pointless if there 
are no U.S. troops in the vicinity.  Similarly to involuntary human shields, 
voluntary human shields increase the danger to both civilians and to U.S. forces.  
At the same time, voluntary human shields appear to be uncommon compared 
with background behavior or even with involuntary human shields. 
It might be possible to see both involuntary and voluntary human 
shields in the same conflict.  This was not true in the case studies: overall, there 
were voluntary human shields in Somali and involuntary ones in Iraq.  Somali 
civilians backed Aidid’s rule in Mogadishu and sided with militiamen against 
U.S. forces.  Fedayeen had no interest in protecting Iraqi civilians and chose to 
exploit them to their advantage instead.  Looking at this, one might suggest that 
a positive relationship between civilians and enemy combatants results in no 
human shields or voluntary human shields; while a forced or discordant 
relationship between them could lead to involuntary human shields.  However, 
it is easy to imagine a situation where both would occur.  One example could be 140
a conflict involving opposing factions or ethnic groups, where enemy 
combatants have positive relations with one group and antagonistic ones against 
another.  U.S. forces attempting to intervene in such a case could very well see 
both types of human shield behavior simultaneously. 
Another thing to note is that non-combatants acting as either voluntary 
or involuntary human shields may appear to be exhibiting some of the simple 
reactions to combat discussed in the previous chapter.  For example, civilians 
who are being compelled to stay in a certain location may appear to be ignoring 
combat around them.  Others who are being forced to accompany combatants or 
to precede them to discourage U.S. fire may appear to be running or traveling in 
the direction of combat.  Non-combatants acting as voluntary human shields 
may also appear to be ignoring combat or running towards combat.  In real life, 
there tends to be considerable confusion for U.S. troops confronting numerous 
civilians exhibiting different behaviors at the same time.  It may be easy to 
mistaken one type of behavior for another under such circumstances. 
Attacking blue forces is the next level up in aggressive civilian behavior.  
Here, the line between hostile civilians and enemy combatants disappears.  For 
the purposes of this dissertation, people are still considered to be civilians rather 
than enemy combatants if they attack U.S. forces in a way that tends to be 
spontaneous, uncoordinated, and not part of a planned or organized group.
Unlike background travel, simple reactions to combat, or the role of non-
combatants as human shields, there is quite a deal of variation within this 
category of behavior.  Variations in behaviors previously described in this 
dissertation tend to be a matter of degree: non-combatants in a given situation 
are more or less likely to flee from combat, or more or less likely continue 
driving around a city.  On the other hand, there are a number of separate 
behaviors that fall under the umbrella of attacking U.S. troops.  Actions in this 
category include individuals firing at U.S. personnel, groups of civilians 
attacking vehicles, or crowds becoming hostile toward U.S. troops who are 
present.  There are times when attacking U.S. forces clearly turns a non-
combatant into a combatant, despite factors such as age or gender.  Some actions 
such as suicide bombing or shooting U.S. forces would clearly cross the line and 
make such actors combatants.  However, it is far less clear whether a group of 
unarmed civilians surrounding a U.S. military vehicle and hurling stones should 
be regarded as combatants.  Another case where the line between combatant and 
non-combatant is blurry is when enemy combatants compel a non-combatant to 
attack. 
Swarming is the ultimate hostile behavior that civilians can show 
towards U.S. forces.  This dissertation uses a definition of swarming used in 141
military case studies: a swarm occurs when multiple attackers converge on a 
target from multiple directions. Action ebbs and flows as the swarm converges 
and disperses.265   It does consist of individual civilians attacking U.S. forces.  
However, what distinguishes it from this category is the presence of 
coordination and the magnitude and persistence of the attacks.  It is typically 
done by combatants on the battlefield and extremely rarely by civilians.  When 
civilians do swarm, it represents such an escalation in hostility that it can be 
distinguished from other types of attacks on U.S. forces.  For example, there was 
a qualitative difference in the Somali civilians swarmed against U.S. forces in 
Mogadishu and confrontations between hostile crowds and U.S. forces in the 
Balkans, Iraq, and other conflicts.   
There is little doubt that civilian swarming poses substantial hazards to 
both civilians and to U.S. military personnel.  Large numbers of armed or 
unarmed civilians converging on U.S. forces will clearly lead to casualties on 
both sides.  An enemy combatant taking the opportunity to use a civilian swarm 
as cover or as a diversion would also be able to inflict greater damage on U.S. 
forces while potentially taking fewer casualties themselves.  Although there are 
many examples of swarming in military engagements throughout history, 
civilians’ swarming upon military forces is quite rare.  Although there is little 
data available on civilian swarms outside of Operation Continue Hope, this one 
case does suggest some possible causes of civilian swarming.  It is plausible that 
civilians may be most likely to swarm when a civilian population is exceedingly 
hostile and the military force in question is small, light, isolated, and retreating. 
As non-combatant behavior in urban operations becomes more complex, 
the interplay between different types of civilian behavior also becomes more 
complex.  The most hostile behaviors, attacking U.S. troops and swarming, are 
likely to be the climax in a sequence of other non-combatant behaviors.  For 
example, civilians may first rush towards the sound of combat, congregate, 
voluntarily act as human shields, attack U.S. forces, and ultimately begin to 
swarm.  Non-combatant behavior need not culminate with this level of hostility 
towards U.S. personnel, but this example shows how behavior might progress 
down such a path.  The following figure attempts to capture some of the 
dynamics of operations in Somalia: 
_________________ 
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Figure 6-2.  Sample Pathway of Hostile Civilian Behaviors 
Additionally, civilians might move between different types of behaviors 
without a clear progression of actions. Even when they become hostile towards 
U.S. forces, they may be sufficiently deterred from escalating events beyond a 
certain point.  Civilians might instead cycle through various hostile and non-
hostile behavior:
Figure 6-3.  Sample Transition Between Hostile and Non-hostile Civilian Behaviors 
Non-combatants might also cycle between purely non-hostile actions.
Neutral or fundamentally friendly non-combatants could potentially switch back 
and forth between running from combat, seeking shelter, and occasionally acting 
as involuntary human shields.  (Such a dynamic appeared to be present in the 
early stages of OIF.)  This type of transition back and forth between different 
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types of defensive acts would be reasonable since non-hostile behavior, unlike 
hostile behavior, cannot really be said to escalate: 
Figure 6-4.  Sample Transition Between Non-hostile Civilian Behaviors 
The way that civilians transition between behaviors will also be affected 
by the interaction between combatants and non-combatants, and it is clear that 
enemy combatants could use this as a deliberate strategy.  For example, enemy 
combatants alter the dynamic between civilians and U.S. troops when they 
disguise themselves as civilians.  Although a given civilian population may be 
generally neutral or even friendly at times towards U.S. forces, a few experiences 
with disguised combatants will result in U.S. forces treating civilians as potential 
combatants.  This could then lead to more inadvertent civilian deaths and 
injuries, which could then lead to tensions between U.S. troops and non-
combatants.  Enemy combatants may also make use of the more complex civilian 
behaviors – human shields, attacks on U.S. forces, and swarming – to provide 
concealment and cover, reduce situational awareness, immobilize, or gain 
intelligence.  They can also use civilian reactions to win strategic victories: 
insurgent violence against Iraqi civilians undermined the U.S. strategic goal of 
political and economic stability in post-conflict Iraq. 
There is the opportunity for enemy combatant actions to combine 
synergistically with complex civilian behavior in ways that increase the danger 
or difficulty that U.S. troops face.  Much of it will depend on the enemy 
combatants themselves, but civilian behavior can also have a dramatic impact 
when taken together with enemy combatant behavior.  The urban environment 
will tend to magnify these effects due to the high number of non-combatants and 
the complexity of urban warfare.  For these reasons, it is important to study 
civilian behavior both on its own and as a component of an opponent’s tactics.  
The ability to manipulate civilian interactions with U.S. forces is part of an 
asymmetric strategy that unconventional forces can use against the United States 
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in urban areas.  Non-combatants may also become combatants, then act as non-
combatants again during the course of a conflict.  This also adds another layer of 
complexity to the problem and is intimately tied to the nature, goals, and tactics 
of a particular enemy combatant. 
Including complex civilian behaviors and the transitions between 
behaviors in military models and simulations would add another tool to the case 
studies, lessons learned, and other methods that are currently being used to 
improve understanding in this area.  For one, modeling and simulation can 
provide a larger laboratory for experimenting with non-combatant behavior than 
is offered by live exercises or actual operations.  Additionally, models and 
simulations with complex civilian reactions can illustrate what is already known 
about civilian behavior and can serve as training tools for those preparing for 
future urban operations. 
Complex Behaviors and Agent-based Modeling 
  Just as adding simple behaviors to a static population expanded the 
range of policy options that a model could consider, introducing complex 
behaviors on top of these two previous layers provides the means to assess 
additional policy alternatives.  Table 6-2 adds to Table 5-2 by adding complex 
behaviors.  It also includes communication, learning, and adaptation – these can 
be added when a model has only simple behavior, or both simple and complex 
behavior.  With the introduction of complex behaviors into models and 
simulations, it is then possible to assess more sophisticated policies than before.  
For example, a model with commuting and congregation allows polices such as 
curfews and vehicle checkpoints.  A model that adds civilian human shields and 
attacks on U.S. forces allows researchers to ask questions about more advanced 
crowd control tactics. 145
Table 6-2.  Civilian Population Characteristics and Potential Policy Options, Continued 
Civilian Characteristic or Behavior 
Introduced to Model 
Example Policy Options That May Now be 
Considered
Demographic information and 
population density 
Force sizing 
Planning and resource management 
Weapons choice 
Targeting decisions 
Policies that affect density or total population 
Commuting and congregation  Curfews 
Vehicle checkpoints and roadblocks 
Restrictions on congregation 
Operation timing (day versus night, etc.) 
Transportation requirements for U.S. troops 
Simple reactions to combat  Effects of maneuver 
Rules of engagement 
Tactical surprise 
Information operations aimed at civilians 
Sensor technologies 
Widespread looting  Strategies to prevent looting 
Methods to control looters 
Human shields, attacking U.S. forces, 
and swarming 
Rules of engagement 
Crowd control tactics 
Non-lethal weapons 
Methods to discourage human shields 
Countermeasures to human shields 
Communication, learning, and 
adaptation
PSYOPS and information operations directed 
at civilians 
  In dealing with the complex behaviors discussed in this chapter, ABM 
has a number of advantages over the alternatives discussed in Chapter 2.  Again, 
ABM allows for the localized effects that can simulate the “three block war” 
where the environment that U.S. forces face is very different over a span of a few 
city blocks.  Two of the complex behaviors, looting and swarming, lend 
themselves to being modeled as emergent behaviors.  Additionally, civilian 
behavior that can progress towards higher and higher levels of hostility can be 
obtained by using adaptive agents.  What follows in this section are some 
suggestions for potential rules to recreate complex non-combatant behaviors 
within an ABM.  This is by no means the only way that these behaviors could be 
simulated.  Instead, it is meant to be a starting point for encouraging 
experimentation with agent rules that could introduce these behaviors into 
urban combat models. 
In the literature on agent-based modeling of numerous social dynamics, 
agent rules are not necessarily judged on how complex or detailed they happen 
to be.  Rather, they are judged on whether they realistically approximate what is 
know about individual behavior and whether they generate realistic emergent 146
behavior.  Rules that direct agent actions in stock markets, civil disobedience, 
global climate change, smallpox transmission, and technology diffusion tend to 
be specified by various authors without undue emphasis on recreating the exact 
parameters that reflect reality.  Researchers instead formulate behavioral rules 
that are consistent with general information about individual behavior and then 
use the resulting emergent behavior as a test for whether the rules are acceptable 
or not.  Similarly, successful non-combatant agent rules are those that not only 
reflect plausible individual reactions but those that also recreate recognizable 
patterns of emergent civilian behavior in past urban operations.  The rules 
proposed in this section need to be tested in simulations to see what emergent 
patterns arise before they can be considered adequate.  It is hoped that those 
with the resources to experiment more extensively with non-combatant agent-
based rules will be able to confirm or improve upon the rules offered here. 
Starting with the first complex behavior in Chapter 6, looting is a 
phenomena that appears to be a good match with ABM.  There should be some 
probability in a simulation that a few non-combatants will begin to loot if blue 
forces overwhelm centralized red forces. Looting should also be more likely to 
occur in certain locations in the city, regardless of whether or not these areas saw 
combat.  Looting should spread from a few geographical points in a downtown 
area to a much wider area, peak within a day or two, and diminish as looters run 
out of goods to take.  The presence of looters should encourage other non-
combatants to become looters.  Looters in the immediate vicinity of clashes 
between blue forces and looters should become less likely to loot.  However, 
looters may have different behavioral rules for interacting with blue agents who 
are not shooting looters, such as ignoring them, avoiding them, or diminishing 
looting in their immediate presence.  As the prevalence of looting increases, 
looters should be more likely to ignore blue forces who are not using lethal force.  
This could be because the presence of other looters is psychologically reinforcing 
or because individual looters judge that they are less likely to be singled out by 
blue forces if there are more looters.  (It is also possible to have some type of 
injury rate for non-combatants who participate in the looting or who are 
present.)  These types of non-linear rules would conceivably allow looting to 
escalate or to diminish partly due to the nature and size of the blue force 
response.
  The next behavior to discuss is non-combatant agents acting as 
involuntary human shields.  Non-combatants acting as human shields should 
stay near red forces, follow them around, or come between red and blue forces.
Involuntary human shields will only be present when red forces decide to coerce 
nearby non-combatant agents to act as cover.  Unlike other non-combatant 147
behaviors that arise from internal civilian agent predispositions, involuntary 
human shields are driven by the behavioral rules of red force agents.  There will 
have to be coordination between red agent behavioral rules and non-combatant 
agent rules, plus reactions in the face of blue agents.  Figure 6-4 showed how 
non-combatants might cycle through various types of defensive behavior and an 
individual non-combatant agent’s decision to run from combat, seek shelter, or 
act as an involuntary human shield could be based on what action has the 
highest defensive value at that moment given the immediate environment.  In 
general, involuntary human shields are more common than voluntary human 
shields.  Most scenarios are likely to have significantly more of the former type 
of behavior than the latter.  As mentioned earlier, it may not always be evident 
that non-combatants are acting as involuntary human shields as opposed to 
exhibiting other behaviors.  In real life, individual civilian intentions are often 
opaque to blue force combatants, who can only observe behavior and not 
internal beliefs or motivations. 
  For voluntary human shields, non-combatant agents should run towards 
combat and place themselves between blue forces and red forces, providing 
cover for red agents.  Civilians may follow red forces around and act as human 
shields when blue forces come into view.  Alternatively, they can act as human 
shields when both red and blue forces are present, but not follow red forces from 
one location to another.  Adaptive rules may have civilians more likely to act as 
voluntary human shields if they see others acting in a similar fashion, but less 
likely to do so if they observe casualties among voluntary human shields and the 
enemy combatants who use them.  Yet another form of voluntary shielding 
behavior may be for civilians to offer their homes as shelter or bases of 
operations for combatants.  One way to seed the start of voluntary human 
shields may be to give non-combatant agents a random probability of becoming 
one as their internal hostility level towards the blue team increases.  In some 
cases this threshold will never be reached.  In other cases, it may be possible to 
have this behavior start spontaneously and spread to other civilians.  One thing 
to note is that modeling voluntary human shields brings very unpredictable 
behavior into a simulation because this non-combatant behavior will depend on 
red agent behavioral rules plus the presence of blue forces.  Red agent behavioral 
rules need to be able to accommodate voluntary as well as involuntary human 
shields.
  Devising behavioral rules for simulating civilians who attack blue forces 
is a much more complicated task because there are numerous individual and 
group acts that fall under this category.  In a very simple ABM it may be possible 
to simulate non-combatants attacks on blue forces as “hits” that blue agents take 148
on their “health” or other barometer that determines whether or not a blue agent 
is functional or a casualty.  If it is possible to simplify it to this level, it may be 
sufficient to have individuals or groups of non-combatants who attack isolated 
blue agents, individual blue vehicles, or small forces of blue agents.  On the other 
hand, models with very high resolution and fine detail in the actions that blue 
forces have open to them may need additional information about individual 
civilian acts against blue forces.  (These would include very high fidelity training 
models.)  Also, civilians may exhibit isolated acts of aggression against blue 
forces (attack and run), or acts may escalate as the actions of some attacking 
civilians encourage others to follow suit. 
  A possible rule set to simulate escalating behavior may define whether 
or not an agent attacks as a function of: hostility (H), risk aversion (R), perceived 
danger from blue forces (D), and the presence of other civilian agents attacking 
blue agents (O).  An agent should be more likely to attack when H and O are 
high; and less likely when R and D are high, whatever the particular functional 
form used in a simulation.  These values should also be dynamic over time.  It 
may also make sense to have values of H and R unique to individual agents, 
while making the agent function that determines values for D and O standard 
across agents.  (One may also choose to express R as a function of the other 
variables instead.)  This type of rule set should allow for random attacks from 
individual agents, for crowds to turn ugly, and for attacks to stop when civilians 
are sufficiently deterred by blue forces.  Setting the initial parameters of H and R 
also controls the general disposition of a non-combatant population.  There were 
attacks on U.S. forces even from the relatively friendly Panamanians, supporting 
the idea that it is realistic to randomly seed even a benign population with a few 
agents who are either very hostile or not risk adverse.  Hostility could be set 
exogenously to reflect pre-existing feelings towards blue forces, or set as a 
function of civilian casualties or some other function to make civilian reactions 
truly interactive.  This would certainly be an interesting feature to add in 
simulations that cover SOSO, peacekeeping, and post-conflict “Phase IV” 
operations that span long periods of time. 
  Swarming, another hostile act, is an emergent behavior that arises from 
the dynamics of individual attacks on blue forces.  Civilian agents converge on 
blue forces along multiple lines of attack and may disperse and attack again.  Yet 
swarming can still be considered emergent because individual attacks are not 
centrally directed but are the result of decentralized action.  Although agents 
may communicate with each other, swarming arises as individual agents pursue 
internal goals.  When enough civilian agents are persistent in attacking blue 149
agents, they may cross the threshold from individual attacks into swarming 
behavior. 
  In reality, there seem to be several conditions that need to be met before 
civilian swarming will occur, such as a large number of hostile civilians, a small 
number of blue agents, or retreating blue agents.  (Each condition is likely to be 
necessary to create a civilian swarm, but also likely to be insufficient to induce 
swarming by itself.)  Using a rule framework like the one specified above should 
be consistent with the creation of civilian swarms only when such extreme 
conditions are met.  Incorporating two simple behaviors into this framework – 
running away from combat and running towards combat – may even be 
sufficient to produce opportunistic swarms that can disperse and reconstitute 
themselves, depending on the circumstances.  There is room for considerable 
experimentation with swarming behavior in an urban simulation.  One should 
again be reminded that a civilian swarm is an unusual phenomenon and will 
only very rarely be encountered in real life.266  However, adding swarming 
behavior to models offers an extreme environment for simulated testing of 
weapons systems and tactics.
  In addition to swarming, some of the other behaviors depicted in the 
potential behavioral pathways are themselves emergent behaviors.  Revisiting 
the sample pathway of hostile civilian behaviors from Figure 6-2, Congregate and 
Swarm should be treated as emergent behaviors.  An individual agent cannot 
really congregate or swarm.  Instead, it is the actions of multiple agents that 
constitute a congregation or a swarm:   
_________________ 
266 See Edwards, Swarming and the Future of Warfare, for a history of swarming on the battlefield.  
Edwards identifies Somali militia as the swarm participants in Operation Continue Hope on pp. 262-
8.  However, Somali civilians also participated in attacks on U.S. forces and also converged on U.S. 
locations according to Bowden’s version of events.  Hence, it appears correct to say that civilians also 
swarmed in that case. 150
Figure 6-5.  Individual Rule Sets Versus Emergent Behavior for Agents in Sample 
Pathway of Hostile Civilian Behaviors 
  It may help to think of each behavior inside a box as directed by a 
separate rule set that instructs an agent whether or not to express that behavior.  
Another important point to make is that moving between the boxes with 
individual rule sets and following a behavioral pathway constitutes adaptive 
agent behavior.  When a civilian agent goes from acting as a voluntary human 
shield to attacking U.S. forces, it shows adaptive behavior because it follows 
different rules based on feedback from its environment and the actions of other 
agents around it.  In order to allow for this adaptive behavior, agents need to 
have instructions on when to transition from one rule set to another.  Looking at 
Figure 6-5, an agent may have Run Towards Combat as its default rule set when 
combat takes place (presumably agents would carry out background activities 
otherwise).  However, agents may then be instructed to evaluate whether it will 
follow the rule set for acting as voluntary human shields based on whether 
civilian hostility exceeds a certain threshold, perceived danger is below another, 
and red forces are standing out in the open.  The behaviors that arise from the 
actions of multiple agents is emergent behavior that has not been explicitly 
programmed into rule sets.  The sample behavioral pathways in Figures 6-2, 6-3, 
and 6-4 can thus be thought of as combinations of rule sets, instructions for 
whether to transition from one rule set to another, and the emergent behavior 
that arises from individual agent actions. 
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  There are numerous behavioral pathways that give a plausible sequence 
of non-combatant behavior and plausible emergent behavior.  These pathways 
may be directional, culminating in a particular behavior; or cycling back and 
forth between different complex or simple behaviors.  In addition to the possible 
ways that any individual behavioral pathway could be specified, there are many 
different ways that agents may be instructed to chose whether or not it proceeds 
down a particular pathway.  Agents may be asked to evaluate internal 
parameters of factors within their immediate environment to decide whether or 
not to follow a rule set.  An alternative way to deal with behavioral pathways is 
to treat it as a Markov matrix.  Instead of evaluating a set of decision rules, 
agents may remain in a particular behavior, transition to one behavior, or to 
another based on globally set probabilities.  Although modeling a behavioral 
pathway as a Markov matrix means that agent behavior is not adaptive, it may 
be appropriate when non-combatant preferences are so strong and so insensitive 
to the immediate environment that they may be treated as exogenous.  The 
Markov matrix method is also likely to be sufficient for many purposes, since 
adaptive behavior is not necessary to produce emergent behavior, and since 
sometimes simpler is better. 
  It is also reasonable that many different pathways would exist in the 
same non-combatant population at the same time.  Some civilians may be 
inclined to be hostile, some may be averse to encountering blue forces, and some 
may tend to underestimate or overestimate the physical danger they face in the 
vicinity of combat.  How many agents belong to what pathway is one set of 
parameter values that introduces heterogeneity among non-combatant agents.  
Heterogeneity among individual parameters such as risk aversion and hostility 
will also mean that agents move down the same behavioral pathway at varying 
rates.  Non-combatants are not homogeneous in real life and the mix of 
characteristics for a simulated non-combatant population should depend on the 
type of scenario that a simulation is meant to represent.  Because U.S. troops will 
encounter different mixes of non-combatants in future operations, recreating the 
specific friendly/hostile mix from Panama, Somalia, or Iraq is of limited value.  
Instead, experimenting with different mixes of parameters and pathways is more 
useful than overusing any one particular non-combatant behavioral pathway. 
  Depending on how detailed one wishes to be about non-combatant 
behavior, there are other behavioral aspects that can be modeled using ABM.  
Some of these finer behavioral points may or may not make a difference 
compared with how basic rules and pathways are specified.  However, they are 
possible and merit mention.  Learning is one aspect that can be readily 
incorporated into agents in an ABM.  Agents have internal variables that can be 152
set to reflect past experience and can thus be said to learn.  For example, perhaps 
a non-combatant agent initially attaches a high level of danger to the presence of 
any blue agent.  Assume that its perception of danger (D) is a function of how 
many non-combatants it observed being injured (I) in the presence of a blue 
agent during the previous n number of time periods and the present period t:
 D t = f (It, It-1, It-2,…, It-n)
This agent should then perceive blue forces as less dangerous over time if it sees 
few or no non-combatants injured when blue forces are present; and blue forces 
as more dangerous if it sees non-combatants consistently or recently injured. 
  Communication is another behavior that can be captured within an 
ABM.  There are several types of communication possible.  Updating global 
variables that all non-combatant agents can observe would capture widespread, 
perfect, and near-instantaneous communication.  News that a central 
government has collapsed might be most appropriately modeled this way, with 
implications for behavior such as looting.  Communication between agents 
might also be locality or network based. If based on locality, agents may have an 
expanded range of observation because they hear from neighboring agents 
around them.  Agents may flee or seek shelter even though combat is further 
away than they can observe because they are able to communicate about events 
over longer distances.  Introducing an error term into information transmissions 
or making communication possible only a fraction of the time would make 
communication more realistic by making information incomplete and sometimes 
incorrect.
  Another way that communication is often modeled in ABMs is through 
networks: agents learn from and receive information through others in their 
network.  For non-combatant agents, networks can reflect ethnic or kinship ties.
Such networks can be geographically spread out and represent information 
skipping physical distance.  Non-combatant agents need not be restricted to 
communicating strictly with other non-combatant agents.  They could 
communicate with red or blue forces as well, both receiving information from 
and giving intelligence to combatant agents.  Passing information to either red or 
blue side would effectively extend the range of situational awareness for the 
force in question. 
  The possible universe of different rule and parameter combinations is a 
vast one, even before introducing variables for red and blue agents.  With the 
great complexity that is possible for non-combatant behavior, simulated events 
become even more unexpected, non-linear, and interesting when adaptive blue 153
and red agents within a model begin to interact with adaptive non-combatant 
agents.  In particular, there is considerable room for exploring the red strategies 
that emerge when the red force is an unconventional or paramilitary force 
operating in a sea of non-combatants.  How do red forces employ the presence of 
non-combatants?  How do non-combatants advertently or inadvertently act as 
force multipliers for red agents?  And most importantly, what can blue forces do 
about it, acting either directing against red forces or indirectly in their 
interactions with civilians? 
  The point of being able to create complexity in simulated civilian 
populations is to offer a laboratory for experimenting with a crucial aspect of the 
urban environment that cannot be recreated on a large scale in real life.  It is 
hoped that having such a tool will enhance strategies for managing urban 
populations, offer insight into countering enemy opponent tactics in an urban 
environment, improve training, exploring tactics, and encourage more robust 
planning.  Further discussion along these points continues in Chapter 7.  Table 6-
3 below summarizes the agent rules that might be used for the different complex 
behaviors.  The table also includes the policy significance of some of these 
behaviors, as a reminder that the ultimate point is to improve actual decisions in 
future urban operations.154
Table 6-3.  Complex Behaviors, Agent Rules, and Policy Significance 
Non-combatant
Behavior 
Summary of Proposed Agent Rules  Policy Significance of 
Modeling Behavior 
Looting x A few looters emerge 
spontaneously
x Looters are encouraged by other 
looters
x Looting is discouraged by blue 
forces shooting looters 
x Looting continues until there is 
nothing to loot. 
x Identify potential tactics 
for controlling or 
avoiding widespread 
looting in future 
operations
x Force requirements to 
prevent widespread 
looting in future conflicts 
Involuntary 
Human Shields 
x Civilians follow red agents, stay 
near them, or come between red 
and blue agents 
x Actions driven by red agent 
behavioral rules 
x Evaluate tactics to 
minimize non-combatant 
casualties 
x Explore ways to 
discourage behavior 
Voluntary
Human Shields 
x Civilians come between red and 
blue forces 
x Agents are more likely to act as 
voluntary human shields when 
others do the same 
x Agents are less likely to do so when 
they witness civilian casualties 
x Agents may follow red agents 
around
x Explore ways to 
counteract and 
discourage behavior 
Attacking U.S. 
Forces 
x Civilians attack when hostility is 
high and other civilians are also 
attacking blue forces 
x Civilians attack when risk aversion 
and perceived danger from blue 
forces are low 
x Test non-lethal weapons 
and peacekeeping tactics 
in simulations 
Swarming x Emergent behavior that happens 
when large numbers of individual 
civilians carry out sustained attacks 
on blue forces along multiple axes 
of attack 
xModeling swarming 
civilians provides an 
extreme simulated 
environment for 
platforms and tactics. 
Example: Hypothetical Looting Model 
  The purpose of the example in Chapter 6 is to illustrate the ways that a 
model with complex civilian behavior might be used to improve policy 
decisions.  This example examines the type of widespread looting behavior that 
was present during Operations Just Cause and Iraqi Freedom.  In these two 
cases, looting began almost immediately after the central government had fallen 
and escalated out of control before subsiding three or four days later.  Modeling 
should help explore the dynamics of citywide looting – how looting spreads, 155
how looters are deterred at the local level, and how individual actions lead to 
emergent behavior at the city scale.  Gaining insight into these dynamics will in 
turn give a number of policy recommendations for future operations where a 
breakdown of law and order is expected to bring wide scale looting.  Such 
recommendations include manpower requirements, suggested tactics, and city-
level deployment strategies for a force attempting to prevent or control looting.  
The following thought exercise is an example of how a hypothetical looting 
model would be able to guide decision-making in each of these areas. 
  This example considers a hypothetical ABM looting model.  As 
discussed in Chapter 2, aggregate models for non-combatant behavior will not 
be able to incorporate research on the behavior and decision-making process of 
individual looters.  Nor are aggregate models able to demonstrate the effects of 
local dynamics or geographical concentrations of buildings and goods that 
would be attractive for looters.  There are also significant problems with other 
approaches that are able to incorporate individual behavior and localized events: 
live exercises, constructive modeling, and HITL modeling.  As mentioned earlier 
in this chapter, live exercises involving large numbers of participants pretending 
to be looters are fraught with substantial practical difficulties.  Additionally, 
such exercises are as susceptible to modeler bias as any computer simulation: the 
instructions given to participants on how to act as looters will reflect the bias and 
preferences of the exercise designer as surely as any coded instructions given to 
virtual looters. 
Lastly, constructive and human-in-the-loop modeling of large numbers 
of looters is also impractical.  Although both allow for individual actions and 
different local dynamics, it would be impossible for either method to handle the 
large number of looters needed to approximate citywide looting.  As a policy 
problem, looting does not necessarily scale – the policy implications of 100 
people looting may be very different in nature from the policy implications of 
10,000 people looting.  In other words, the latter cannot necessarily be dealt with 
as if it were 100 of the former.  For this reason, it is better to consider the effects 
of numerous looters.  After introducing these criteria for handling localized 
events and large numbers of individual actors, ABM is the last method left 
standing.  Its other advantages – its ability to handle many different types of 
agents and numerous model runs over different scenarios – further bolster its 
case.
A perfect agent-based model of looting behavior would have complete 
and accurate information on the different participants and potential participants, 
true behavioral models for each type of participant, and perfect means for 
translating individual actions into precise patterns of group behavior.  A perfect 156
model would also consider every single factor that could affect individual or 
aggregate looting behavior, including psychological attributes, perception, 
communication, and inter-group political grievances.  Needless to say, it is 
impossible to ever build this perfect model.  First of all, unlike the movement of 
physical objects or the outcome of chemical reactions, predicting human 
behavior is an endeavor fraught with uncertainty.  Second, looting is a form of 
crowd and mob behavior, and the dynamics of crowds and mobs are not always 
well understood. 
There is much that is known about crowd and mob behavior.  For 
instance, more recent empirical work contradicts earlier notions that crowds are 
homogeneous entities.  Additionally, crowds are not made up of isolated 
individuals but of “companion clusters”; participants have many differing 
motives and seldom act in unison; participants do not necessarily believe they 
are anonymous; and crowds may be thought of as a process with a beginning, 
middle, and end.267  However, there are still considerable gaps in the 
understanding of crowd behavior.  For example, there are no consistent 
predictors for the intensity of rioting mobs.  The reasons for why crowds gather 
are also not always well understood.  Additionally, the study of crowd behavior 
has almost exclusively focused on Western events and little is known about how 
crowds in other cultures might differ.  More research is also needed to determine 
what psychological, social, cultural, and situational factors contribute to violent 
crowd behavior.268  Considerable more work needs to be done on these types of 
fundamentally basic questions before a theoretically perfect simulation of any 
looting crowd is even conceivable. 
While the perfect looting simulation cannot even be attempted at this 
point, models that are still less than perfect can be useful sinces shortcoming in a 
model can be assessed and compensated for when applying it for policy 
purposes.  Constructing an ABM has the potential to provide 1) a means for 
theoretical inquiry into what is still unknown, and 2) a means for exploring the 
implications of what is currently known.  On the first point, there have already 
been calls to use ABM to explore the type of crowd behavior that could arise 
from different combinations of participants and ranges of behavior.269  While 
________________  
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this use for ABM might seem the most relevant for theory-building research 
rather than for policy analysis, both types of applications are actually useful for 
improving policy decisions.  This is because exploratory use of either type of 
model can raise basic assumptions and help explore a fuller range of scenarios 
than will appear when relying exclusively on past experiences.  When there are 
still unanswered questions about the basic nature of a phenomenon (such as 
crowd behavior), using a model for theoretical inquiry at least provides 
hypotheses or a framework for approaching a problem.270  In other words, even 
when ABM results are insufficient by themselves to offer firm policy 
recommendations, they help to explore relationships and to generate ideas about 
policy options. 
On the second point, using a model that focuses on capturing what is 
known can raise questions about risk and uncertainty – two components of 
problems that are often overlooked but that are vital to crafting policy options in 
urban operations.  This is because unexpected results from a plausible model, 
even when the results in question are unlikely, forces decision makers to 
confront the possibility of such outcomes.271  Being able to generate a range of 
scenarios is particularly useful in attempting to come up with robust solutions 
over a landscape of possible conditions or situations.272  Possible examples of 
these uses will be discussed in further detail below. 
Turning next to proposing agent rules for a hypothetical model, this 
exercise assumes that looters are rational.  Compared with some types of crowd 
behavior, looting may be thought of as opportunistic and relatively rational.  
Other types of crowds may have goals that change over time, such as volatile 
crowds.  In contrast, the goal of most looters is fixed and does not change as 
behavior or conditions around them change: it is to carry off material 
possessions.273  Because looting is considered to be less emotionally driven than 
some other types of crowd behavior, the actions of individual looters will be 
more calculating.  For example, some experts find that looting mobs last longer 
than other types of crowds because of greed.  At the same time, looting mobs 
_________________ 
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tend to be easier to break up because there is little emotional content.274  Looters 
may vary in the intensity of their desire to acquire loot; the degree to which they 
are deterred by authorities; the extent to which they are emboldened by the 
presence of others; and other factors.  These variations do not change the 
underlying assumption that looting behavior is fundamentally rational at its 
core.  Varying parameter values across individuals easily accommodates these 
variations. 
  Next, this exercise uses the suggested looter behavioral rules discussed 
in the previous portion of this chapter.  These suggested rules for agent behavior 
came out of the case studies.275  Civilian agents are assigned a heterogeneous 
propensity to loot.  They are more likely to loot given the presence of other 
looters and a concentration of items to loot.  This should make looting a 
phenomenon that feeds on itself, but also one that burns out over time.  Agents 
also have a heterogeneous initial deterrence factor that makes them less likely to 
loot in the presence of blue agent troops.  This exercise also assumes that agents 
are less deterred by the presence of a blue agent if there are more looters in the 
same area (a lower concentration of blue agents per x number of looters).  This 
would reflect the idea that people are emboldened when they have a lower 
probability of being individually picked out by blue agents.  Additionally, agents 
can be adaptive: the deterrence factor can change over time as agents learn about 
blue behavior.  Agents could be more readily deterred by the presence of blue 
agents if they saw them taking action in previous time periods, but less likely to 
be deterred by them if blue agents failed to react in the past.  Introducing 
communication between agents and letting information change behavior is 
another way to make them adaptive.  If all these agent rules listed above are 
realistic, the macrobehavior that results from them should be consistent with the 
looting that was observed in Operations Just Cause and Iraqi Freedom. 
  The first set of model runs should represent cases where there is no 
intervention.  That is, what happens after the local police force collapses and blue 
forces are not present to deal with looters?  This sets a baseline scenario that can 
be compared to other model runs with different types and levels of blue agent 
intervention.  It is also useful for theoretical inquiry because it helps shape a 
basic understanding of how looting gains momentum and identifies the key 
drivers that affect momentum.  Given the limited number of alternative methods 
________________  
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available for testing hypotheses on looting dynamics, even the baseline scenario 
may be valuable for basic research on the phenomenon.  A baseline ABM can 
allow researchers to illustrate what is currently known about widespread looting 
and to conduct hypothetical cases by varying conditions and actor composition. 
Next, what are some specific types of policy decisions that would benefit 
if such a looting ABM existed?  The next portion of this exercise attempts to 
illustrate some potential policy uses.  Undoubtedly, the propensity for onlookers 
to become looters themselves will be one of the most important factors in 
determining how widespread looting will become.  An ABM would allow 
researchers to aggregate individual-level behavior and explore the relationship 
between the propensity to join and the overall number of non-combatants 
participating in the looting at any given moment.  Until such a model is built, let 
this following equation stand in for what this relationship might look like.  L is
the citywide number of looters in time period t; a is the propensity for onlookers 
to become looters.  Let a > 0 for the purposes of this exercise.  Again, the 
following equation is strictly hypothetical and does not incorporate intervention 
or looters running out of material to steal: 
Lt = a Lt-1
  Note that this equation is a geometric progression where the number of 
looters in any given time period is a multiple of the looters in the previous 
period.  Figure 6-6 shows two hypothetical cases: one where there is a high 
propensity for looting to spread and a second where there is a lower propensity.
In the high propensity case, a = 2 and the number of looters doubles in each time 
period.  In the lower propensity case, a = 1.5 and the number of looters increases 
by half in each time period.  Starting out initially with 100 looters, the growth 
after 10 time periods according to this model is shown below: 160
Figure 6-6.  Hypothetical Number of Looters Over Time Given Different Propensities to 
Join in Looting 
Looter growth according to a progression such as in Figure 6-6 would 
suggest that small changes to people’s propensity become looters can have 
substantial impacts at the city level.  One potential policy implication is that 
where possible, there should be an effort to change a civilian population’s 
willingness to join in looting should it occur.  Realistically, these efforts need to 
take place before an operation begins.  This is because looting, if it happens, 
takes place as soon as constraints are removed.  As discussed previously in 
Chapter 3, the U.S. invasion of Panama began on December 20, 1989 and looting 
in downtown Panama City began the same day.  In Iraq, OIF started on March 
19, 2003.  U.S. troops took control of Baghdad on April 9 and looting also began 
the same day.  In the case of Panama such advance attempts to influence 
potential civilian looters was not possible because the operation involved 
strategic surprise.  Fliers or announcements telling Panamanians to continue 
obeying laws after the fall of their government were sure to give the Panamanian 
government more information than the United States was willing to give.  On the 
other hand, Iraq offered more opportunities for U.S. forces to begin shaping the 
civilian response before looting began.  This is because the United States had 
already sent a number of signals about its intentions to invade Iraq.  There was 
also more time between the start of the operation and the fall of the regime in 
Iraq.
 Another implication of model results such as in Figure 6-6 is that once 
looting has begun, intervention is likely to be most effective in the beginning 
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time periods than after the number of looters has increased beyond a certain 
threshold.  This is especially important where there are resources constraints, 
such as a limited number of troops that can be devoted to dealing with looters.  
In all likelihood, in future operations where looting is possible, this will mean 
that forces dedicated to preventing the breakdown of law and order need to be 
in place before the end of combat operations.  (An alternative policy is to make a 
serious effort at convincing local police to continue their jobs instead of fleeing or 
fighting U.S. troops.)  This is because troops engaged in combat will not be able 
to transition rapidly enough to post-conflict operations to prevent the start of 
widespread looting because of the timeframes involved.  Conventional thinking 
is that troops can first conduct combat operations and then transition into post-
conflict missions.  However, rapid looter growth means that looting may peak 
before troops have completely transitioned from combat operations.276  In both 
Panama and Iraq, looting began and peaked within two or three days while U.S. 
troops were still engaged in combat operations. 
  How does building an ABM improve upon using a simple equation 
model?  For one, it does a better job of modeling social contagion such as looting.  
It also adds a geographical component to citywide looting that is not available in 
equations such as the one in Figure 6-6.  If it is true that onlookers are more 
likely to become looters in the presence of other looters, than looting is a local 
contagion and needs to be modeled at this local level.  This geographical aspect 
becomes particularly useful when attempting to evaluate intervention strategies.  
Knowing only the equation behind Figure 6-6 produces a limited number of 
policy options: reduce the propensity to join in looting, intervene early when 
looting starts, and perhaps reduce the number of initial looters.  However, there 
are many more questions that an ABM would allow a researcher to ask.  For 
instance, does the number of policing forces required to prevent or stop looting 
depend on the ratio of forces per population or forces per square area of the city?
How sensitive is citywide looting to the geographical distribution of policing 
forces?  Can precise information about looter activity throughout a city act as a 
force multiplier?  When it is unknown before looting begins what areas of the 
city are most attractive to looters, what is the best way to deploy forces that are 
attempting to prevent looting?  Does civilian mobility make looting more 
difficult to contain?  If so, how effective are roadblocks and curfews at reducing 
looting activity?   
  ABM also allows policy analysts to examine the potential effect of 
different parameter values.  For example, if looters are not deterred by the 
_________________ 
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presence of U.S. forces, what are the implications?  One problem that U.S. troops 
may have in confronting future looters is the belief that U.S. forces are reluctant 
to use force against civilians: many looters in both Panama and Iraq ignored U.S. 
forces.  While this may be better for winning hearts and minds, it may be terrible 
for containing looting.  One immediate implication is that where deterrence is 
weak, merely increasing the number of troops is unlikely to prevent looting from 
spreading.  Instead, alternative policy options are needed.  Restricting travel by 
blocking roads and enforcing curfews may offer a solution.  Alternatively, 
modeling may show that a small force that is highly effective at dealing with 
looters is more effective than a force several times larger that looters feel they can 
safely ignore.  If such is the case, it will not be enough to get troops into position 
quickly: there needs to be much more effort developing tactics and methods to 
manage a civilian population after a regime collapse.  This would mean some 
level of training to a larger number of ground troops, such as those first into a 
city.  Another option would be a higher level of specialized training to one 
particular group of soldiers or Marines who would be assigned the mission of 
containing any looting that does break out. 
An ABM would also be an improvement over a simple equation model 
as in Figure 6-6 because in reality, the total number of looters over time is 
unlikely to be a smoothly increasing curve.  There are likely to be local troughs 
and peaks since total looting activity will probably vary with time and location.  
Although equation modeling can accommodate different trends such as at 
nighttime versus during the day, it is difficult to use this method to assess policy 
prescriptions that address both dimensions.  For example, it may be that looting 
activity diminishes as night – either because looters too need to sleep or because 
the lack of light interferes with identifying goods to take.  If this is the case, one 
possible policy to further diminish nighttime looting could be to cut off power to 
affected areas of the city to further reduce visibility.  Given their superior ability 
to operate under cover of night, U.S. forces might also take advantage of 
imposed blackouts to preposition troops in areas where looting activity is likely 
to resume during daylight hours.  Alternatively, if darkness actually encourages 
looters because it leads them to believe that they are less likely to be identified 
and caught, the opposite tactic would be appropriate: areas of the city should be 
illuminated at night, possibly with additional lighting brought in by U.S. troops. 
Whichever case is the one borne out by further research, an ABM would be 
better suited to illustrating such point than an aggregate model such as the one 
in Figure 6-6.277
________________  
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  Communication may also be introduced to agents to model the effect of 
rumor and information.  For example, if civilians can communicate with each 
other, agents should learn about blue behavior from each other and react more 
quickly to events.  The deterrence value of blue forces will then be a function of 
an individual agent’s direct past observations as well as the past observations of 
agents that are near the individual or connect through networks.  Rather than 
waiting to observe that blue agents do nothing when surrounded by looters, an 
individual may already assign a lower deterrence value to blue agents before it 
sees this inactivity because it heard from other agents about previous blue 
behavior.  In other words, information will travel quickly on whether U.S. forces 
react passively or aggressively toward looters.  The policy implication under 
these circumstances is that any observed lack of response will encourage even 
more looters than where there is little communication, while effective action 
might only need to be demonstrated to some looters and potential looters 
because of this “multiplier” effect. 
At first glance, it seems that looting is a behavior that can be looked at 
independently from most other civilian behaviors and attributes.  However, the 
layered approached discussed in this dissertation is still useful.  First and 
foremost, the size of the civilian population is of paramount importance.  Having 
more blue forces than civilians will produce model results that are vastly 
different from results from a simulated city where there are thousands of 
civilians for each blue soldier.  Because of this sensitivity, thought needs to go 
into how to populate a citywide looting model.  It may also seem that looting can 
be taken independently from simple behaviors such as congregating or running 
from combat.  The argument for this might be that other behaviors are likely to 
halt during episodes of widespread looting.  Yet there are some 
counterarguments to this position. 
First, the purpose of a particular model with looting behavior may be to 
explore ways of preventing looting.  Where this is the case, it would make sense 
to have civilians who exhibited background behaviors.  At a minimum, this 
would at least allow researchers to examine if there is any effect from curfews or 
other methods of controlling population movement.  Second, it is very realistic 
for looting to happen alongside combat operations.  If researchers wished to 
examine this type of scenario in a model, it would be best to incorporate simple 
reactions to combat as well as looting to create a population that can respond 
appropriately to the surrounding environment.  Population information and 
simple behaviors should not be ignored, but considered in any looting model. 
As can be seen from this example, there are a number of potential policy 
options to widespread looting that can be explored using ABM.  Even when a 164
model raises more questions than it answers, there is considerable value in the 
exercise because it encourages thinking about a problem.  The very act of trying 
to build a model together forces the researcher to identify gaps in the current 
understanding of this phenomena; to craft plausible types of interventions; and 
to search for policy solutions that will be robust under varying conditions.  With 
little systematic thinking done to date on addressing looting non-combatants in 
urban operations, the issues raised in even this short thought exercise could 
constitute a rudimentary research agenda on this topic. 165
7. Conclusions 
Non-combatants are and will continue to be an important element of the 
urban environment.  Evaluating how U.S. military operations may affect non-
combatants and how they in turn may affect U.S. military operations will be an 
important policy consideration in future urban operations.  At the same time, the 
analytic tools available for exploring these issues are still being developed.  
There needs to be a sea change in the importance that non-combatants are given 
in modeling and other types of urban operations analysis.  Improved 
representation of non-combatants in models and simulations would complement 
the current suite of analytic tools that the U.S. military can use to better prepare 
for urban operations.  Chapter 7 provides some final comments about the 
layered approach that this dissertation recommends for incorporating civilians 
into military models.  It also discusses policy recommendations, and the broader 
policy implications from improving modeling and simulation of non-combatants 
and from improving understanding of non-combatant behavior in general.  It 
concludes with areas for future work. 
Layered Framework for Modeling Non-combatants 
  This dissertation has proposed a layered framework for incorporating 
non-combatant behavior into military models and simulations.  The first layer 
consists of population size, population density, and other demographic 
characteristics.  As discussed extensively in previous chapters and as shown in 
an example using the leadership strikes during OIF, basic information on 
population density enables policy makers to evaluate certain courses of action.  
These include airstrikes in populated areas, weapons choice, targeting 
procedures, weapons development, force structure requirements, and other 
planning choices.  Simple calculations with population information often offer 
good first approximations for many metrics of interest, such as civilian casualties 
or the number of peacekeeping troops that are necessary for an operation.  They 
also offer a baseline for other analyses that contain active non-combatants.  The 
need to have a correctly sized urban population in these types of analyses should 
be clear, since a different population size will yield different results model or 
analysis results. 166
  The next layer in the proposed framework is simple behaviors: 
background physical movement and simple reactions to combat.  Incorporating 
these behaviors into a model go a long way towards creating a simulated civilian 
population with realistic individual-lvel behaviors.  It also expands the range of 
policies that may then be examined in analytic tools.  It now becomes possible to 
consider ways to encourage or discourage population movement; the effect of an 
active non-combatant population on U.S. troop mobility; and the effect of 
moving civilians on the fog of war.  Some specific policies that may now be 
evaluated include curfews, roadblocks, rules of engagement, tactical surprise, 
and different sensor technologies.  It should also be possible to evaluate U.S. and 
enemy combatant tactics in urban areas in ways that it cannot be done in models 
with static or purely scripted non-combatant actors.  If civilians are a vital part of 
the urban environment, populating models to the correct scale and introducing 
simple behaviors together open up new areas in urban operations analysis. 
  Complex behaviors are the most advanced, the most changeable, the 
most situation-specific, and some of the most dangerous civilian behaviors for 
U.S. forces.  These behaviors further expand the scope of policies and options 
that decision makers can use models and simulations to assess.  In addition to 
the policy alternatives that can be examined when simple behaviors are 
introduced, it is now possible to consider advanced U.S. and enemy combatant 
tactics.  Population and simple behaviors tend to describe generic non-combatant 
populations.  In comparison, the complex civilian behaviors described in 
Chapter 6 are less frequent, harder to predict, and far more variable.  Their 
addition allows researchers to expand the range of scenarios they can create in a 
simulation and to produce situations that are more challenging, more hostile, 
unpredictable, and unique.  This is especially true when civilian agents are able 
to learn, adapt, and communicate. 
It is vital to make the point that the middle and top layer of the proposed 
framework – simple and complex behaviors – cannot stand without the bottom 
layer of populating models.  This point bears repeating and if the reader 
remembers one argument in this dissertation, this should be the one.  
Introducing simple or complex behaviors without taking the correct population 
densities into account has shortcomings.  It is not analytically sound to recreate 
detailed behaviors but give scant thought to how a model should be populated 
with civilians.  For many policy questions, a static model with the correct 
population size may be more useful than an urban operations model that has 
complicated civilian behaviors but more combatants than non-combatants.  This 
is because the former may be truer to capturing information relevant to a policy 
problem than the latter.  There is much more to the urban environment than 167
buildings, and the current emphasis on modeling physical terrain could be 
missing the forest for the trees there this isn’t equal attention to the non-
combatant element. 
Neither should researchers assume that complex behaviors can be taken 
separately from simple ones.  As previously discussed, there are situations when 
combat can bring about a momentary halt to background behaviors.  Yet actions 
such as throwing rocks at U.S. forces do not exist in a vacuum from other 
civilians running from combat or attempting to travel.  Many plausible 
behavioral pathways also include movement back and forth between complex 
and simple behavior, strengthening the case to include both together.  Focusing 
on the complex behaviors can also be analytically misleading, because it may 
incorrectly set these as default non-combatant behaviors in a model.  Because of 
their more sporadic nature, it is better to set the simple behaviors as the base 
behavior and ask what happens when particular combinations of complex 
behavior arise.  Because these complex behaviors are harder to predict, an 
approach to examining these behaviors in models and simulations should be 
done in a way to take this uncertainty into account. 
Policy Implications 
Modeling and simulations have their uses and limitations; they can 
never fully substitute for the reality that they attempt to represent, especially for 
phenomena as complicated as warfare.  They suffer from limitations in scope, 
data, and imagination.  Assumptions and weaknesses in a model are not always 
easily evident, and may result in some misunderstanding or misapplying model 
results.  It is relatively easy to be seduced by models – to think that they capture 
reality better than should be able to, given their assumptions.  Building large-
scale models and simulations often also absorbs resources that could have been 
spent on other useful forms of analysis, while producing output that not all find 
useful or even understandable.  There is also the danger for model developers to 
fall in love with their model: building the model becomes the goal in and of 
itself, rather than seeking to shed light on specific policy problems. 
However, models and simulations do serve a purpose.  Some form of 
analysis usually needs to be done between actual urban operations.  Models can 
often offer advantages not available in other tools, including the chance to 
simulate a much wider range of conditions that would be possible in reviews of 
past operations or physically recreations of the urban environment.  Combining 
improved models and simulations of urban warfare with other research, 
training, and planning methods should enhance overall understanding and 168
preparation.  Using multiple alternative analytic approaches should also help 
mitigate many of the potential pitfalls of using models, such as believing too 
much in an individual model or failing to understand the extent of a model’s 
limitations.  A commitment to approaching a problem from many analytic angles 
could even help models and simulations from drawing a disproportionate share 
of resources as well, since it implies that efforts are made to advance analysis 
along different avenues.  In short, the best defense against the misuse of models 
seems to be to prevent modeling in a vacuum, and to avail modelers to other 
sources of research and analysis. 
Another defense, one naturally occurring in the Project Albert work, is to 
encourage the development of many models whose results can be compared.
Different models will have different strengths, and differences or contradictions 
in their results should help reduce model misuse and encourage more rigorous 
analysis overall.  Creating competing models is the most productive when model 
creators come from diverse backgrounds, emphasize different issues, and work 
without too much regard for what others have found.  This particular defense 
will be less successful if research converges or if researchers begin to standardize 
which models they use.  This has begun to happen somewhat within Project 
Albert, and it should be noted that the presence of many models is analytically 
healthy.  However, developing multiple models is likely to be impractical when 
simulations need to be very large and very complex, since not enough resources 
are likely to be available to develop many alternative models. 
As part of a larger research agenda on non-combatants in urban 
operations, improved urban models and simulations do have the potential to 
improve policy on a number of levels.  Again, used in conjunction with other 
types of analysis and compared with competing models, they do have the 
potential to be useful.  Models and simulations directly feed into the conduct of 
actual military operations for certain classes of problems, such as those that 
require optimization or scheduling.  For problems such as managing and 
shaping the urban environment, their influence is more indirect but still 
potentially important.  Figure 7-1 illustrates one way to conceptualize the way 
that modeling and simulations fit in relative to the conduct of actual urban 
operations:169
Figure 7-1.  Impact of Models and Simulation on Actual Urban Operations 
As Figure 7-1 shows, there are many ways that bringing realistic non-
combatant behavior into urban combat models and simulations can ultimately 
affect the conduct of future urban operations.  Training is one key area where 
this could have a substantial impact in the future.  While it cannot completely 
replace physical instruction and live training, simulation is sometimes used as a 
training tool to reduce costs and physical risks.  Currently, there are a number of 
advanced models and simulations being considered for urban operations 
training, such as OneSAF, Full Spectrum Command, and JCATS.278
Incorporating an agent-based non-combatant population into a constructive 
model such as JCATS would expand the scope of that particular model in a very 
productive way.  Quite obviously, having a high density of realistic non-
combatants would create a simulation that more realistically reflects an urban 
environment.  For example, an advanced simulation used to teach small unit-
level tactics could better recreate the clutter and confusion that a city presents by 
including large numbers of civilians reacting in multiple different ways. 
Aside from teaching or reinforcing certain combat skills, models and 
simulations have the ability to graphically demonstrate the types of past urban 
environments that U.S. forces have encountered.  Visualization is a powerful 
_________________ 
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teaching tool, and using models and simulations to present a library of past 
urban experiences would have considerable training value.  Using models to 
illustrate historical knowledge would draw information in case studies, lessons 
learned, and other sources to create a unifying training tool.  In past U.S. urban 
operations, the nature of the surrounding population has been a large driver in 
shaping the character of the urban environment and determining the range of 
appropriate actions for U.S. troops.  Capturing some of these civilian 
characteristics will be vital in simulating urban environments that are realistic 
enough to use in training. 
One might create training modules with hostile crowds in the Balkans, 
looters in Panama, traffic jams in Haiti, swarming civilians in Somalia, or 
civilians being used as involuntary human shields in Iraq.  The lessons that a 
trainee draws from each scenario should be based on the actual dynamics of that 
event.  Because there can be considerable interaction between enemy combatants 
and civilians, such recreations of past scenarios should include the enemy tactics 
and how the enemy used or benefited from the surrounding population in each 
particular instance.  It should allow a trainee to understand the range of urban 
situations that has occurred in the past and the different (or common) skills and 
tactics that were required across each type of event.  It would bring home the 
range of scenarios one might face, from rock-throwing crowds to cheering ones, 
violent looters to traffic jams, and voluntary human shields to civilians 
accidentally driving towards U.S. forces.  Had such a tool been available to U.S. 
troops before OIF, looting in Iraq would not have entirely surprised them 
because they would have encountered it in simulations that include elements 
from cases such as Operation Just Cause.  And if U.S. troops in OIF had 
responded to early looting based on their understanding of looting in Panama, 
there is the very real possibility that it could have altered the course of events.  In 
addition to recreating past events, models and simulations can create entirely 
new scenarios to present trainees with unexpected situations.  Variation in the 
complex behaviors, in particular, can go a long ways toward generating 
unknown but challenging urban conditions. 
Having artificial civilians at the correct density and reflecting realistic 
behavior is also important when models and simulations are used to test 
weapons and platforms, particularly those that are in development.  There are 
ongoing efforts within the defense community to improve models and 
simulations of the urban environment precisely in order to test technologies that 
may be helpful in urban operations.  Such efforts include further development of 
the Joint Semi-Automated Forces (JSAF) model – a variation of OneSAF – and 171
other simulations.279  Again, using a non-combatant ABM overlay to salvage 
constructive models such as JCATS or Janus would also extend these their use 
and provide decision makers with usable models sooner.  Urban models and 
simulations that can give estimates for civilian casualties that are on the correct 
order of magnitude should be helpful in evaluating the ability of different 
weapons, munitions, or sensors to minimize civilian injuries.  Populating models 
with more realistic population densities should also provide evaluators with a 
simulated environment that better reflects the challenges posed by urban areas.  
As discussed earlier, effectively modeling urban civilians would assist in 
evaluating non-lethal weapons that are being developed.  Because actually 
deploying non-lethal weapons on live human beings is restricted due to ethnical 
and legal issues, simulation may be the only real tool for exploring issues related 
to their use among urban populations.  Incorporating demographic information 
that reflects the high percentage of young children in developing countries could 
uncover the disproportionate harm that such weapons might do to the most 
vulnerable civilians.
Also as noted in the example at the end of Chapter 5, the Army’s FCS 
program is a network-centric suite of systems that are meant to be effective 
across the full spectrum of operations.  Simulating the FCS in urban combat 
currently offers the method to evaluate how the systems might fare in cities.  In 
addition to issues such as weapons choice discussed in the example, simulations 
may prove to be important for this program at conceptually more advanced 
levels.  Compared to previous weapons systems, the configuration of an FCS 
force deployed in the field will vary substantially depending on mission and 
conditions.  The ability to simulate different urban conditions and experiment 
with results should help the Army gain a better understanding of how to equip 
and organize its FCS forces in future operations.  Non-combatant models could 
help the Army decide on the mix and size of an FCS task force to send on a 
mission.  At a minimum, they should raise awareness that the optimal 
organization will change depending on the civilian component of an urban area 
and hopefully better inform long-term decisions about FCS development and 
deployment.
  Adding more realistic non-combatants to urban models and simulations 
will also be helpful is in planning, wargaming, and other types of 
experimentation.  Clearly, a simulated urban environment offers greater room 
for pure experimentation than one that is physically constructed and populated 
with live actors.  This is because simulated environments can easily offer a 
_________________ 
279 Ceranowicz and Torpey, pp. 1-2. 172
greater range of conditions, scenarios, a larger scale, and even a greater number 
of runs due to cost effectiveness.  Although live environments offer significant 
advantages, their use is limited by resource constraints and the need to limit 
actual physical risk to participants.  Hence it is possible to set up several blocks 
with enemy combatants and non-combatants, but impossible for live exercises to 
frequently involve truly city-sized areas and millions of non-combatants.  It is 
possible to train on a few different scenarios involving hostile crowds but 
impossible to experiment with swarming or looting civilians.  At the same time, 
there are precisely the dangerous situations that U.S. forces need to prepare for 
the most. 
Experimentation and wargaming can involve questions at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels.  Urban simulations could be used to explore 
tactics and strategies that enemy combatants might employ to use the urban 
population to their advantage.  Although it is impossible to anticipate the full 
universe of potential future events, using urban models as laboratories could 
inspire ideas.  Simulations could also be used to generate hypothesis on 
managing civilians under different circumstances.  In particular, using agent-
based models would depict civilian behavior as a complex adaptive system that 
has non-linear effects, such as escalated looting.  ABMs with large non-
combatant populations could encourage thinking about early intervention or 
managing early conditions because of the way CAS events can become more 
than the sum of its parts. 
The best-case scenario is that experimenting with non-combatants in 
models and simulations will give rise to new tactics and strategies on how to 
deal with non-combatants and enemy combatants who make use of the 
surrounding population.  The goal would be to improve analysis on what actions 
can reduce civilian casualties and allow U.S. forces to accomplish their objectives 
in the midst of a civilian population.  How does dispersing, concentrating, or 
otherwise controlling civilian movement potentially affect the outcome of a 
mission?  How effective is separating enemy combatants from non-combatants?  
What is the level of non-combatant casualties using one tactic versus another 
one, given clutter and certain errors rates in identification?  How does civilian 
affiliation with one side of a conflict or another change events, intelligence, or 
access to information?  There is no shortage of questions or problems that need 
examination. 
As it has been stated often, models (and even live exercises) are not 
reality: there is no guarantee that simulation results will be indicative of actual 
results for something as “fuzzy” as non-combatant behavior.  Because of this, it 
is best to accept model output with a grain of salt and to see if other forms of 173
research can collaborate such results.  For example, simulation of large civilian 
populations may show that use of force against early looters prevents the 
outbreak of citywide looting.  If other known police or peacekeeping research is 
consistent with such findings, such tactics may be plausibly considered in future 
urban operations.  It is easier if a simulation is used to extend something that is 
already known.  For example, previous experience may strongly indicate that 
curfews decrease certain types of insurgent activity.  Using a model to display 
what happens at a citywide level with different curfew strategies would give 
results that are more certain, since it was based on dynamics that were already 
known to be true.  Thus, in the area of experimentation, models can be used to 
suggest brand-new tactics and to show the results of implementing accepted 
tactics in different ways. 
  Planning is another major area that can be improved by urban models 
and simulations with better depiction of non-combatants.  Improved tools help 
planners in two ways: by addressing specific planning problems, and by forcing 
clearer thinking about assumptions, risk, and uncertainty.  Models that have 
good information about civilian populations could help answer questions about 
force sizing and force requirements for a variety of support, stability, 
humanitarian, peacekeeping, and other operations.  In many of these cases the 
size and disposition of the civilian population drive force requirements.  Chapter 
4 offered an example of a simple back-of-the envelope calculation for the size of 
the force that was potentially required for post-conflict operations in Iraq under 
different conditions.  Even such rudimentary “models” offer useful guidelines 
for future situations based on past experience. 
  Additionally, improved models and simulations can advance planning 
by forcing decision makers to clearly consider their assumptions.  For example, 
U.S. policy makers went into OIF preparing for humanitarian disaster but not 
preparing for looting or an insurgency.  If there had been tools that ran many 
more scenarios, U.S. forces might have been better prepared to meet some of the 
challenges that they did.  At a minimum, explicitly raising the possibility of 
other scenarios could make clear which ones U.S. decision makers are choosing 
not to consider.  But laying out the range of non-combatant behaviors, such tools 
might also encourage thinking about how behavior can change dynamically over 
time and how U.S. forces might need to adapt.  Future urban operations will 
demand a great deal of interaction with the surrounding civilian environment, 
and more information about civilians is sure to improve higher-level planning 
decisions.
   This dissertation recommends that planners begin to compare their 
expectations for future operations against the full spectrum of non-combatant 174
behaviors and interaction between non-combatants and combatants.  Just as the 
Army must first be familiar with the full spectrum of warfare to be able to plan 
for it, those who are looking to be prepared for operations across the full 
spectrum of urban operations must first know the range of a vital dimension of 
the urban environment – civilians.  Such a shift in thinking is analogous to the 
trend away from threat-based planning and toward capabilities-based planning.  
In threat-based planning, military planning is done around a specific threat that 
a specific adversary is thought to pose.  In capabilities-based planning, planning 
is based on providing U.S. forces with the capabilities to meet a broad range of 
scenarios that may occur.  There is a built-in attempt to deal with uncertainty in 
capabilities-based planning because it attempts to prepare U.S. forces for a 
number of situations that may happen. (This is in contrast to threat-based 
planning, where only one situation is anticipated.)  The same now needs to be 
done for urban operations, and such an effort should begin with understanding 
the range of scenarios in the urban arena. 
Policy Recommendations 
This dissertation has a number of recommendations.  First, model 
developers should use ABM to incorporate non-combatants into existing, 
accredited constructive models.  As discussed earlier, this would salvage the 
enormous investment that has been made in these simulations and would extend 
their use beyond force-on-force scenarios to urban operations scenarios as well. 
Second, Project Albert agent-based models should incorporate the 
recommendations that this dissertation has given for populating ABMs with 
more realistic non-combatants.  The natural fit between non-combatant behavior 
and ABM makes it logical to do so.  As has been discussed, there has been 
considerable work using ABM to model social behavior in areas that would be 
relevant to urban populations.  Project Albert researchers are already using 
ABMs to experiment creatively with basic tenets of warfare as well as tactical 
questions in specific combat and MOOTW scenarios.  Project Albert research has 
progressed to a level where there has already been considerable thought given to 
complexity, uncertainty, and the uses and limitations of ABMs to further military 
knowledge.  Intensive experimentation with urban populations in ABMs is a 
natural and timely evolution of its research agenda, particularly given the 
current policy relevance of urban operations for Project Albert’s primary sponsor 
– the U.S. Marine Corps. 
Third, information on past non-combatant behavior reviewed in this 
dissertation should be incorporated into current efforts to develop the next 175
generation of urban combat simulations that will be used for asking tactical and 
technological questions about urban operations.  As discussed in Chapter 1, 
Urban Resolve is one such attempt to advance urban models in order to arrive at 
new approaches to urban combat.  As argued earlier, Urban Resolve does not go 
far enough in populating its terrain with non-combatants to approach the 
population densities actually seen in past urban operations.280  Including the 
simple reactions to combat discussed in Chapter 5 and the complex behaviors 
discussed in Chapter 6 would greatly expand on the repertoire of civilian 
reactions in JSAF beyond daily travel and traffic patterns.  These current 
limitations on the non-combatant component of the Urban Resolve project will 
result in considerable resources being spent to develop a tool that is not flexible 
enough to answer many pressing questions about urban operations.  Because 
civilians are an influential but unpredictable force in urban operations, it would 
be ideal to create them as such in future urban combat models.  To do otherwise 
would limit the scope of the experimentation that can be done with new tools 
and would therefore undercut some of the rationale for developing these new 
tools.
Fourth, non-combatant behavior should be more extensively 
incorporated into the research and development of technology solutions for 
urban combat needs.  For example, Joint Publication 3-06, Joint Urban Operations,
uses USECT (Understand, Shape, Engage, Consolidate, and Transition) as a way 
to describe the nature of urban undertakings.281  It is aimed at improving the 
way different types of information at all levels of an urban operation are 
gathered, processed, disseminated, and displayed.  One product of this research 
effort is Optipath, a Canadian project aimed at better navigation during urban 
operations.  Optipath is envisioned to improve tactics, intelligence collection, 
mission planning, command and control, logistics, and coordination between 
land vehicles.  It would communicate with a larger urban operations software 
architecture and provide optimal navigation through a city.  In an attempt to be 
useful in a dynamic urban environment, Optipath explicitly takes into account 
other agents on a road network (including non-combatants), their interaction 
with terrain, and their potential impact on friendly forces.282  In short, 
Optiopath’s purpose is to improve the ability of vehicles to better navigate a city 
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during operations, given other activity on the road network and other real-time 
data on conditions.  Clearly, some concept of civilian behavior and movement 
and their implications for forces operating in a city would be an important part 
of Optipath’s ability to deal with a dynamic environment.  The research 
presented in this dissertation would be a start to creating an Optipath prototype 
that is intelligent about guiding vehicles through a city with crowds, civilian 
traffic, riots, and other such civilian activity.  
A fifth recommendation that immediately comes from this dissertation is 
to better capture and more extensively analyze current lessons that are being 
learned about non-combatant behavior and its implications for urban operations.   
As much information as possible should be recorded on the effectiveness, 
advantages, disadvantages, and other attributes of tactics and measures used to 
deal with civilians.  Such qualitative research and analysis serves to balance 
research based primarily on models and simulations, and helps to act as a 
defense against some misuse of models.  There should be considerable attention 
given to writing down what is currently being learned about controlling civilian 
populations, mitigating advantages they offer to enemy combatants, and 
improving their disposition towards U.S. forces.  This is something that model 
developers may wish to be involved with, given the payoffs from having this 
information available for modeling non-combatants.  Investing in a central 
repository for non-combatant information is recommended.  Figure 7-1 shows 
how non-combatant research in general eventually affects the conduct of urban 
operations on the ground.
  Sixth, there should be further investment in modeling and simulation-
based urban operations training.  Specifically, models and simulations should be 
used to train U.S. forces in the lessons learned from dealing with non-combatants 
in past urban operations.  Modeling and simulation can be very good at 
demonstrating what is already known from past urban experiences and creating 
entirely new situations.  Using simulation to create a virtual training library of 
the non-combatant component of past urban operations would be an invaluable 
tool for passing on institutional memory to new soldiers and Marines.  Although 
this type of application is very advanced and further off in the future, it would 
have considerable value in preparing U.S. forces for future urban operations.  
Seventh, there are a number of gaps in knowledge even within the 
rudimentary framework presented in this dissertation.  The discussion has dealt 
with relatively few behaviors at each level of the suggested behavioral layer.
Additional research could expand this list to cover others types of salient 
demographic information, as well as other simple and complex behaviors that 
show themselves to be important.  To better understand non-combatant 177
behavior, additional work is also needed on behavioral pathways, crowd 
behavior, and other topics that have not yet been extensively researched.  There 
should also be work done on non-combatant behavior that was not covered by 
the three case studies, such as refugee behavior, ethnic cleansing, and other 
violent civilian behavior that might be of relevance in urban operations.  
Depending on the case, it may even be useful to examine civilian behavior in 
non-U.S. operations. 
Lastly, there are other ways to approach the problem of understanding 
civilian behavior during times of war.  Developing conceptual frameworks that 
are different from the one offered in this dissertation and exploring additional 
methods of representing them in simulations and analysis should be 
encouraged.  This is a topic that merits considerable attention and it requires 
additional interested researchers to build a more solid base of knowledge.  There 
is no shortage of questions to ask about non-combatants in urban operations, 
and there is a definite need to include them in the analytic tools that policy 
makers depend upon to shape decisions179
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